THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS OF IQBAL

EDITED WITH NOTES
BY
SYED ABDUL VAHID

SH. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
KASHMIRI BAZAR - LAHORE (PAKISTAN)

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In loving memory of my wife

SAHELI

but for whose encouragement and assistance this compilation would not have been possible.

به چه مشغول کنم دیده و دل را که مدام
دل ترا می طلبد دیده ترا می خواهد

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PART II—ISLAM AND QADIANISM

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INTRODUCTION

Iqbal was a great literary artist. He wrote copiously in prose and poetry and, surprisingly enough, he wrote bilingually in both. And yet it is a fact that compared to his sublime poetry the world does not know much about his prose writings, with the exception perhaps of his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, which attracted world-wide attention owing to the prominent place it occupied in the religious literature. Although it must be admitted that with the exception of his letters in English as well as Urdu most of his prose writings dealt with non-literary subjects like religion, metaphysics and economics, yet they all bear the mark of his literary genius. It is not perhaps generally realised that Iqbal had written two prose works—*Ilm-ul-Iqtesad* in Urdu published in 1902 and *Development of Metaphysics in Persia* in English, published in 1908, before any collection of his poetical works appeared. Apart from these two books, most of Iqbal's writings in English were either in the form of essays published in various journals or speeches and addresses delivered on various occasions. He also issued statements as the occasion demanded. Leaving aside such statements, Iqbal's addresses and writings can be divided into the following categories:

Philosophical,
Literary,
Political,
Religious.

The collection, in its present form, being a small one, it was not considered desirable to attempt any rigid classification. All that is attempted is a very broad classification according to which the whole collection has been divided into four parts. In Part I have been included all writings and addresses dealing with Philosophical, Literary and Political subjects. In Part II have been included Iqbal's writings on religion, dealing with Islam and Qadianism. These writings attracted a great deal of attention when they were first published, and it was considered desirable to put them together. The two main essays in this part deal with important problems concerning the history and philosophy of religion, the others being just letters or interviews are not of very great importance. But as they also serve to throw light on the main subject they have been included in this part.

As is well-known, Iqbal was a member of the Punjab Legislative Council from 1927 to 1929, and he made important speeches in that Council. As contributions to political thought these speeches cannot be classed with the addresses included in Part I. Still as they deal with subjects of great significance to developing nations, it was decided to include them in this collection. They form Part III of the collection.

The statements that Iqbal issued at various times and the message he issued on the New Year's day of 1938 throw so much light on the period 1925-1938, that it was decided to include at least the more important of them in Part IV.

It will be seen from all that has been stated above that the arrangement of the writings and addresses included in this collection is not strictly systematic. But the main object of publishing this collection—the preservation of Iqbal's writings, addresses and statements has been largely served, and the more or less arbitrary classification and division is adopted mainly to help those turning to it for reference. As for comments each essay or address merits a detailed study by students of Iqbal. And it can be confidently expected that this will be done by serious students of Iqbal in due course. Hence it is not proposed to say here much on this aspect of the collection.

Every word written or uttered by Iqbal is of great significance and deserves preservation. Hence an attempt has been made to collect all his writings and addresses etc., on which hands could be laid. But out of his statements only those have been included in this collection which deal with important subjects. During the last 15 years of his life Iqbal occupied an important place in the public life of the sub-continent, and newspaper-men always approached him to find out his views whenever any important question arose, but most of the statements made by him on such occasions were topical, and it was decided not to include them in this collection. Many of these statements have been included in that excellent collection *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* by 'Shamloo'. Although all that are included in the present collection were taken from the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore, Shamloo's work deserves re-

cognition as presenting, for the first time, most of the important statements in one collection. Students of Iqbal will gladly acknowledge their gratitude to 'Shamloo', under which name Mr. Latif Ahmad Sherwani of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, published his work.

In addition to the addresses and speeches included in this collection Iqbal made a number of speeches during his stay in England from 1905 to 1908. It was not possible to get copies of these. Moreover the following writings and addresses were also not available :

(*i*) "Islam and Khilafat" published in the Sociological Review of London, 1908.

(*ii*) "Islam as a Social and Political Ideal", an address delivered in Aligarh in 1910.

(*iii*) "Inner Synthesis of Life", published in the Indian Review of Madras, 1926.

(*iv*) Note on "Qurratul Ain."

Luckily the substance of the article on "Islam and Khilafat" was incorporated by Iqbal in 'Political Thought in Islam' published later on in the *Hindustan Review* of Allahabad, India.

Iqbal wrote an article on *Ijtehad* about 1920a nd sent the manuscript to Moulana Abdul Majid Daryabadi for opinion. The Moulana criticised it adversely and so Iqbal decided not to publish it. At one time Iqbal proposed to write a history of Sufism, and had actually written two chapters. An attempt was made to procure these chapters as well as the article on *Ijtehad*, but without success.

All the articles and addresses of which I am aware, but which were not available at the time of preparing this collection, have been mentioned above so that the search for them may be continued. But it is quite possible that there are other writings of Iqbal which have not come to my notice. If any of the readers is aware of any such writing, I would be grateful for information concerning them.

Some collections of Iqbal's letters in Urdu as well as English have been published, other collections are under preparation. It is hoped that a complete collection of Iqbal's letters will be available soon and therefore it was decided not to include any of Iqbal's letters in this collection. Exceptions were made in the case of two letters: one to Dr. Nicholson and the other to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan. Both these letters are actually learned essays on the subjects with which they deal, and they throw so much light on Iqbal's philosophy of ego and his ideas on educational reforms that they are included in this collection.

The articles on 'Stray Thoughts' reproduced from the 'New Era' contained several entries which are also included in Allama's note-book entitled 'Stray Reflections', which has been edited by Dr. Javid Iqbal. As deletion of these entries would have upset the original design of these articles Dr. Javid Iqbal has kindly permitted the publication of these common entries also. His kindness will be appreciated by all readers.

I gratefully acknowledge the help I have received from numerous friends in the preparation of this

collection. The work has occupied many years and such sources as the British Museum, London, Khuda Bakhsh Library, Patna, Azad Library, Aligarh and libraries in Hyderabad, Deccan were used. It is obvious that the work could not have been carried out successfully without help from many students of Iqbal but special thanks are due to two friends: Dr. Zakir Hussain, Vice-President of India, and Dr. Ghulam Yazdani, formerly Director General of Archaeology in what used to be the Nizam's Dominions. They responded generously to all requests for help.

Karachi, S. A. VAHID
1st Jan., 1964.

PART I—MISCELLANEOUS

(1900-1937 A.D.)

I

THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE UNITY AS EXPOUNDED BY ABDUL KARIM AL-JILANI*

While European scholars have investigated ancient Hindu Philosophy with an unflagging enthusiasm, they have, as a rule, looked upon Muslim Philosophy as only an unprogressive repetition of Aristotle and Plato.

Although during recent years some attention has been paid to this part of Arabic literature, yet the work achieved by reapers in this field bears no proportion to the harvest that may yet be reaped. This comparatively indifferent attitude towards Arabic philosophy has been evident, perhaps, ever since the discovery of Sanskrit literature.

We admit the superiority of the Hindu in point of philosophical acumen, yet this admission need not lead us to ignore the intellectual independence of Muslim thinkers.

* Iqbal has in the course of this article described the author as Abdul Karim al-Jilani, although he is better know as 'al-Jili'.

Abdul Karim al-Jili was born at Jil in the district of Baghdad in 1365 and died in 1408 We have no exact data concerning his life but in his works he mentions as his Shaikh one Sharfud-Din Ismail bin Ismail al-Jabarti, with whom he lived in Zabid. He developed the doctrine of Logos in a classical form in the theory of the *Insan al-Kamil.* He was not a prolific writer, but like Iqbal he combined in himself poetical imagination and philosophical genius. Iqbal deals here mainly with his well-known work *Insan al-Kamil.* Al-Jili is a very discursive writer, and his treatise is full of digressions, hence it is not easy to grasp the fundamentals of his criterion for a Perfect Man. But luckily we have before us the results of patient studies by Iqbal and Nicholson.—*Ed.*

The post-Islamic history of the Arabs is a long series of glorious military exploits, which compelled them to adopt a mode of life leaving but little time for gentler conquests in the great field of science and philosophy. They did not, and could not, produce men like Kapila and Shankara Acharya, but they zealously rebuilt the smouldering edifice of science, and even attempted to add fresh stories to it. The originality does not appear at once because the unscientific condition of the age led them to write in the spirit of expositors rather than that of independent thinkers.

We wish here to illustrate their originality by considering that portion of the Islamic philosophy which has been generally condemned under the contemptuous name of mysticism. We believe, however, that mysticism is but metaphysics hidden under the veil of religious phraseology, and that the superstructure of mysticism is impossible without a system of metaphysics serving as its foundation. It is, in our opinion, essentially a system of verification—a spiritual method by which the ego realizes as fact what intellect has understood as theory. We know much in theory and our belief in this kind of knowledge depends on the force of the number of arguments advanced in its support. The detection of some logical flaw in our argument, or the force of the arguments in favour of the opposite view, may at once induce us to abandon our theory, but if the ego has "realized" the theory, if the theory in question has been a spiritual experience on our part, no argument, however forcible, no logical flaw, can

dispose us to abandon our position. Hence mysticism appeals to a standard higher than intellect itself. This standard, waiving the question of its objective existence is, according to the mystic, *qalb* or heart, the meaning of which will be explained later on. I shall not dwell here upon the scientific necessity of mysticism for the solution of human enigma, but shall content myself with a brief statement of the Islamic Metaphysical Mysticism as represented by Shaikh Abdul Karim al-Jilani in his famous work *Al-Insan al-Kamil* (The Perfect Man).

The deep thinker was born at Jilan in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses, and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like Shaikh Muhy al-Din Ibn Arabi, whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced his teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and philosophical genius, but his poetry is no more than a vehicle for his mystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books, he wrote a commentary on Shaikh Muhy al-Din Ibn Arabi's *Futuh al-Makkiyah*, a commentary on *Bismillah*, and *Al-Insan al-Kamil*, which we propose to consider here.

This famous work comprises two volumes: the first may be looked upon as a treatise on his metaphysical opinions while the second attempts explanation of terms current in popular Muhammadan theology. In order to make his doctrine easy of understanding, he enters into certain preliminary explanations and declares that in speaking of the Ultimate we must not come down to popular language—a vehicle quite insufficient for the purpose. He avows

that the enigma of existence is too high for common phraseology, and that his statements must necessarily be "broken lights" of the great truth. After this brief apology he goes on to relate a personal anecdote showing how he once felt intense thirst for truth and how at last he learnt it from a person endowed with "all the attributes of spiritual glory". The introduction ends with a condensed statement of his doctrine which he puts in this way:

"Divine nature soars upwards, human nature sinks downwards; hence perfect human nature must stand midway between the two, it must share both the Divine and the human attributes—in one word perfect man must be the god-man."

In the first chapter the author explains the meanings of the word *Zaat*, or Essence. Essence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and attributes are given, whether it is existent or non-existent like *unaqa*. The existent is for two species:

(1) The Existent is absolute or pure existence —Pure being God.

(2) The existence joined with non-existence—the creation-Nature.

The Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can express it, for it is beyond all relation, and knowledge is relation. The Intellect flying through fathomless empty space pierces through the veil of names and attributes, traverses the vast sphere of time, enters the domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to be an existence which is non-existence, a sum of contra-

dictions. It is interesting to compare this passage with Hegel whose speculations have exercised such a vast influence on the methods of modern scientific investigations. It will appear how strikingly he anticipates the conclusions of modern German philosophy without seeking the help of the Hegelian method —a fact which makes his teaching appear rather dogmatic.

After this confession of ignorance the author goes on to say that Pure Being has two *ardh* (accidents): eternal life in all past time, and eternal life in all future time. It has two qualities (*wasf*): God and Creation. It has two *lughat* (definitions): God and man. It has *wajhaan* (two faces): the manifested (this world) and the unmanifested (the next world). It has *hukman* (two effects): necessity and possibility. It has *istibaraan* (two points of view): from the first it is non-existent for itself but existent for what it is not itself; from the second it is existent for itself, and non-existent for what is not itself. With these truths of Hegelianism the author closes this difficult speculation, and begins his second chapter on the name.

Name, he says, fixes the named in understanding, pictures it in the mind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is the outside or the husk, as it were, of the named, while the named is the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality, but exist in name only as *anqa* (a fabulous bird). It is a name, the object of which does not exist in reality. Just as *anqa* is absolutely nonexistent, so God is absolutely present, although it cannot be touched or seen. The *anqa* exists only

in idea while the object of the name Allah exists in reality, and can be known like *anqa* only through its names and attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of the Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God feels Himself.

In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three stages of development of Pure Being, enumerated by the author in his chapter on the 'Illuminations of the Essence'. There he propounds that the Absolute existence of Pure Being when it leaves its absoluteness undergoes three stages:

(1) Oneness;

(2) He-ness; and,

(3) I-ness.

In the first stage there is absence of all attributes and relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step away from the absoluteness. In the second stage the Pure Being is yet free from all manifestations, while the third stage I-ness is nothing but an external manifestation of the He-ness or, as Hegel would say, it is the self-diremption of God. The third stage is the sphere of the name 'Allah'; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that the name of Allah is the stuff of all the perfections of the different phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure Being, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third stage

of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallization dispelled all the gloom of the Absolute Being.

In correspondence with these three stages of the Absolute Development, the perfect man has three stages of spiritual training, but in his case the process of development must be the reverse, because his is a process of ascent while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially the process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is scaled; in the second stage he steps into the sphere of the attribute and in the third stage he enters the sphere of *Zaat*, the Essence. It is here that he becomes the God-man; his eye becomes the eye of God; his word the word of God; his life the life of God—participates in the general life of nature, and "sees into the life of things". It will appear at once how strikingly the author has anticipated the chief phase of the Hegelian Dialectic and how greatly he has emphasized the Doctrine of the Logos; a Doctrine which has always found favour with almost all the profound thinkers of Islam, and in recent times readvocated by M. Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, probably the profoundest theologian among modern Indian Muhammadans. The chapter ends with a fanciful discussion about the meanings of the different letters of the word 'Allah'; each letter of the word, he says, marks a separate Divine illumination.

The third chapter is a brief discussion of the nature of the attribute. The author's views on this interesting

question are very important, because it is here that his doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu idealism. He finds attribute as an agency which gives us knowledge of the state of things. Elsewhere he says that this distinction of attributes of the underlying reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested because here every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is supposed to inhere. The otherness is due to the existence of combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because there is no combination of disintegration there. It should be observed how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of Maya; he believes that the material world has real existence; it is the outward husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is none the less real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not the real entity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a conception furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in understanding the material world. Berkeley and Fichte will so far agree with our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically Hegelian doctrine—identity of Thought and Being.

In the thirty-seventh chapter of the second volume of his book, he clearly says that Idea is the stuff of which this universe is made; Thought, Idea, Notion, is the material of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this doctrine he says, "Dost thou not look to thine own self? Where is the reality in which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It

is but the idea." Hence nature is nothing but the crystallized idea. He would give his hearty assent to the results of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason but, unlike him, he would make this very idea the essence of the universe, Kant's *Ding an sich* to him is a pure nonentity; there is nothing behind this collection of attributes, the attributes are not the real things, the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it is the other self of the Absolute itself. Nature is the idea of God, a something necessary for His Knowledge of Himself. While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being, our author calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be noted that the author's phrase '*aalam-i-Sifaat*' ('world of attributes'), which he uses for the material world, is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that the distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal, and does not at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful because it facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at all real. It will be understood that the author recognizes the birth of Empirical Idealism only tentatively and does not admit the absoluteness of the distinction.

These remarks should not lead us to understand that the author does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in itself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says that the material world is the thing in itself; it is the "other", the external excretion of the thing in itself. The *Ding an sich* and its external expression or the production of its self-diremption are really identical,

he says; how could one express the other? In one word, he means by *Ding an sich* or *Zaat* the Pure, the Absolute Being, and sees it through its manifestations or external expression. He says that as long as we do not realize the identity of attribute and reality, the material world, or the world of attributes, seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is brought home to us the veil is removed. We see *Zaat* itself everywhere and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature then appears in her true light; all otherness is removed, and we are at one with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases and the inquisitive attitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the person who has realized this identity, discoveries of science bring no new information, and religion with her role of supernatural authority has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation.

After these profound remarks the author proceeds to classify the different Divine Names and Attributes which have received expression in nature or the crystallized *Uloohiyyat*—a doctrine similar to that of the Vedanta. His classification is as follows:

(1) *Al-Zaatiyya*: Allah, Al-Ahad, Al-Waahid, Al-Fard, Al-Witr, Al-Samad.

(2) *Al-Jalaliyya*: Al-Kabir-al-Mut'aal, Al-Aziz-al-Azeem, Al-Jalil-al Qahhar

(3) *Al-Kamaaliyya*: Al-Rahman, Al-Malik, Al-Rabb, Al Muhaimin, Al-Khaliq, Al-Samia.

(4) *Al-Jamaaliyya*: Al-Aleem, Al-Raheem, Al-Salaam, Al-Mumin, Al-Baari, Al-Musawwir.

Each of these names and attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the soul of the perfect man. How these illuminations take place and how they reach the soul is not explained by the author. His silence about these matters throws into relief the mystical portion of his views and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship.

Before considering the author's views of particular Divine Names and Attributes, we should note that his conception of God implied in the above classification is very similar to that of Schleiermacher. While the German theologian reduced all the Divine attributes to one single attribute of power our author sees the danger of advancing a God, free from all attributes which "are nothing more than views of Him from different human standpoints, the various appearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite intelligence according to how we look at it from different sides of the spiritual landscape". In his absolute existence He is beyond the limitations of names and attributes, but when He externalizes Himself, when He leaves His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and attributes appear sealed on her fabric.

Let us now consider what the author teaches about particular Divine Names and Attributes. The first essential name is Allah, or *Uloohiyyat* (Divinity), which forms the subject of the fourth chapter; Divinity means the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in that sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence. Divinity being the highest manifestation of Pure

Being, the difference between them is that the latter is visible to the eye, but its where is invisible, while the traces of the former are visible, itself is invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallized Divinity, nature is not the real divinity, hence Divinity is invisible and its traces in the form of nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author illustrates, is water ; nature is crystallized water or ice, but ice is not water. The *Zaat* is visible to the eye (another proof of our author's Natural Realism or Absolute Idealism), although all its attributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as they are in themselves ; their shadows or their effects are only known. For instance, generosity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of giving to the poor is known and seen. This is due to the attributes being incorporated in the very essence of *Zaat*. If the expression of the attributes in its real nature has been possible, its separation from the *Zaat* would have been possible also.

After these remarks on the Divinity, the author proceeds to explain the other Essential Names of God—the Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The Absolute Oneness marks the first step of pure Thought from the darkness of cecity (the internal or the original Maya of the Vedanta) to the light of manifestation. Although this movement is not attended with any external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow unversality. Look at a wall, says the author; you see the whole wall but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that contribute to its formation. The wall

is a unity—but a unity that comprehends diversity; so the *Zaat* or Pure Being is a unity, but a unity which is the soul of diversity.

The third movement of the Absolute Being is *wahediyyat*, or Simple Oneness is free from all particular names and attributes, but there is no distinction between them; one is the essence of the other. The *uloohiyyat* is similar to Simple Oneness, but its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even contradictory; as generous is contradictory to revengeful. The third step, or, as Hegel would say, Voyage of the Being has another appellation, *Rahmaniyyat* (Mercy). The first Mercy, the author says, is the Evolution of the Universe from Himself and the manifestations of His own self in every atom of the result of His own self-direction. The author makes this point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allah): ice or condensed water is mercy, a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere the author calls water the origin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This instance leads the author to guard against the error of looking upon God as immanent in nature or living through the sphere of material existence. He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent because He is Himself the existence. He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent because He is Himself the existence. Eternal existence is the other self of God, it is a light through which He sees Himself. As the originator of an idea is existent in that idea,

so God is present in nature. The difference between God and man (as one may say) is that His Ideas materialized themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that Hegel would use the same line of argument in freeing himself from the accusations of Pantheism.

The remarks of Mercy are followed by brief notice of the word *Rabubiyyat* (Providence). He defines it as a sum of all that existence stands in need of. Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name. The natural philosopher would express the same thing differently. He would speak of the same phenomena and resulting from the activity of a certain force of nature. Our author would call it a manifestation of *Rabubiyyat*, but unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate the unknowability of that force. He would say that there is nothing behind it, it is the Absolute Being itself. This brief chapter ends with some verses of his own composition, one of which is given here, though marred in the rendering:

> "All that is, owes its existence to you, and you owe your existence to all that is."

Another Sufi has expressed a similar thought still more boldly:

> "I owe to God as much as God owes to me."

We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The Arabian Prophet, says the author, was once questioned about the place of God before creation. He said that God,

before creation, existed in *Amaa* (blindness). It is the nature of this blindness or primal darkness which the author now proceeds to examine. The chapter is particularly interesting, because the word translated into modern phraseology would be "the unconsciousness". This single word impresses upon us the foresightedness with which the author anticipates metaphysical doctrine of modern Germany. He says that the Unconsciousness is the reality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any descending movement; it is free from the attributes of God and creation. It does not stand in need of any name or quality because it is beyond the sphere of relations. It is distinguished from the absolute blindness because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of coming down towards manifestation.

This brief but very interesting chapter ends with a very important caution. He says that when we speak of the priority of God and posterity of creation, our words must not be construed to imply time or space and time, are themselves creations, and how can one piece of creation intervene between God and His creation? Hence our words before, after, where, whence, etc., in this sphere of thought, should not be construed to imply time or space. The *Zaat* or the real Being is beyond the grasp of human conceptions, no category of material existence can be applicable to it, because as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena cannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of noumena. It is a matter of regret that the author does not touch here upon the anthropomorphic conceptions of God inculcated by positive religion, but

ends his chapter with some verses which run as follows:

> "O Thou who are one having the effect of two. Thou has comprehended under Thyself all the beauties of perfection, but owing to their being heterogeneous to one another, they became contradictories which became one in three."

The 13th, 14th and 15th chapters are nothing but a jumble of mystical phraseology. We have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has three stages: the first is the meditation of the name which the author calls the illumination of names. He remarks that "when God illuminates a certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the dazzling splendour of that name, and when thou calleth God, the call is responded to by the man". The effect of this illumination would be, in Schopenhauer's language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it must not be confounded with physical death, because the individual goes on living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after he has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries in a pantheistic mood:

> "She was I and I was she and there was no one to separate us."

The second stage of the spiritual illumination is what the author calls the Illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the power of receptivity possessed by him—

a fact which classifies man according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of life and thus participate in the soul of the universe. The effect of this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the magnitude of things (as Christ often did). In this verse the perfect man receives illuminations from all the Divine attributes, crosses the sphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of (*Zaat*), Essence—Absolute Existence.

As we have already noticed, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its absoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process of particularization of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which has its own peculiarly illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is the end of our author's spiritual ethics ; man has become perfect, he has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or has learnt what Hegel calls the Absolute Philosophy. "He becomes the paragon of perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the universe." He is the point where *Abudiyyat* (Man-ness) and *al-Wahidiyyat* (God-ness) become one and result in the birth of the god-man.

Although the author devotes a separate chapter to the perfect man in the second volume of his book, yet we will consider that chapter here in order to secure a continuous view of his doctrine. Here he unfolds his Doctrine of Self-diremption in a new dress. He says that the perfect man is the pivot around

which revolves all the "heavens" of existence, and the sum of the realities of material existence corresponds to his unity. The *Arsh* corresponds to his heart; the *Kursi* (the Chair) to his I-ness; *Sidrat al-Muntaha* (the Plum Tree) to his spiritual position; the *Qalam* (Pen) to his intellect; the *Lauh Mahfuz* (the Preserved Tablet) to his mind; the elements to his temperament; matter to his faculty of perception, and to the space he occupies; the *Attas* (Heaven) to his opinion; the starry heaven to his intelligence; the seventh heaven to his will; the sixth to his imagination; the fifth to his perseverance; the fourth to his understanding; the third to his fancy; the second to his reflection and the first to his memory of the above-mentioned correspondences; the author has very obscure explanations and goes on to enumerate all the phases of material existence in order to explain the truth that the perfect man is truly a microcosm and moves in every sphere of thought and being.

Angels.—His doctrine implies that angels have not a separate existence of their own; all have their source in the faculties of the perfect man; in one word they are personifications of his faculties. The *Qalb* of the perfect man is the source of Israfeel (the source of life), his intellect the source of Gabriel (the source of revelation), that part of his nature which is subject to the illusions of fear, the source of Izraeel (the angel of fear), his will the source of Meekayil and his reflection the source of the rest of the angels. The interpretation of these phrases is doubtful, but it seems that what are called angels are nothing

but different phases of the activity of the different powers of his nature. How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the author does not tell us, but he says that at every stage he has a peculiar spiritual experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or agitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the *Qalb* (heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical diagram of *Qalb* and explains it by saying that it is the eye which sees the names, the attributes, and the Absolute Being successively. It owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind (*Nafs wa Ruh*) and becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the ultimate realities of existence. Perhaps Dr. Schnekel's sense of the word 'conscience' would approach our author's meaning of the word. All that the *Qalb* or the source of what the Vedanta calls the Higher Knowledge reveals is not seen by the individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience, as the Sufis of this school hold, is not permanent; moments of spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold, cannot be at our command. The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has realized himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual realization is over, man is man and God is God. Had the experience been permanent, a great

moral force would have been lost and society overturned.

Let us now sum up the author's Doctrine of the Trinity. We have seen the three movements of the Absolute Being, of the first three categories of Pure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with external manifestation which is the self-diremption of the Essence into God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect man who shares in both the Divine and human attributes. The author holds that the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe, hence in his view appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand that in the god-man, the Absolute Being which had left its Absoluteness, returns unto itself, and but for the god-man it could not have done so, for then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which God sees Himself is due to the principle of differences in the nature of the Absolute Being itself. He recognizes the principle in the following verse:

> "If you say God is one, you are right, but if you say that He is two, this is also true.
>
> "If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the real nature of man."

The perfect man, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he receives illumination from all the essential names, on the other hand all the Divine attributes reappear in him. These atttributes are:

(1) Independent life, or existence.

(2) Knowledge which is a form of life, as the author proves from a verse of the Quran.

(3) Will—the principle of particularization or the manifestation of the Being. The author defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God according to the requirements of the Essence, hence it is a particular form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are different names for love, the last is the love in which the lover and the beloved, the knower and the known, merge into each other and become identical. This form of love, the author says, is the Absolute Essence; as Christianity teaches God is love. The author guards here against the error of looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined.

(4) Power which expresses itself in self-diremption-creation. The author controverts Shaikh Muhy al-Din Ibn Arabi's position that the universe existed before its creation in the knowledge of God, as Hamilton holds. He says, this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds that the universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self of God.

(5) The Word or the reflected being. Every possibility is the word of God; hence nature is the materialization of the word of God. It has different names—the tangible word, the sum of the realities of

the man, the arrangement of the Divinity, the spread of Oneness, the expression of the unknown, the Phases of Beauty, the trace of names and attributes, and the object of God's knowledge.

(6) The Power of hearing.

(7) The Power of seeing.

(8) Beauty—that which seems less beautiful in nature (the reflected beauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has no real existence; it is merely a relative deformity.

(9) Glory or beauty in its intensity.

(10) Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore Unlimited and Infinite.

We now have the doctrine of the perfect man completed. All through the author has maintained his argument by an appeal to different verses of the Quran, and to the several traditions of the Prophet the authenticity of which he never doubts. Although he reproduces the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, except that his god-man is Muhammad instead of Christ, he never alludes to his having been influenced by Christian theology. He looks upon the doctrine as something common between the two forms of religion and accuses Christianity of a blasphemous interpretation of the doctrine—of regarding the Personality of God as split up into three distinct personalities. Our own belief, however, is that this splendid doctrine has not been well understood by the majority of Islamic and Christian thinkers. The doctrine is another way of stating that the Absolute Unity must have in itself a prin-

ciple of difference in order to evolve diversity out of itself. Almost all the attacks of Muhammadan theologians are directed against vulgar beliefs while the truth of real Christianity has not sufficiently been recognized. I believe no Islamic thinker will object to the deep meaning of the Trinity as explained by this author, or will hesitate in approving Kant's interpretation of the Doctrine of Redemption. Shaikh Muhy al-Din Ibn Arabi says that the error of Christianity does not lie in making Christ God but in making God Christ.

After these remarks on the Doctrine of Trinity let us now review the remainder of the author's treatise. His principal doctrine is complete before us, but he has got something more to say. He devotes a separate chapter to the He-ness, the second movement of the Absolute Being, but drops no new remark here. He then goes on to consider the I-ness, the third movement of the Absolute, and defines it and says that 'I' and 'He' are but the outside and the inside of the same thing. In the three succeeding chapters the author considers the words 'Eternity' and 'Uncreatableness', and guards against the error of understanding them as implying time. The 31st chapter goes under the heading of "The Days of God", by which phrase the author means the different manifestations of the Absolute. The Absolute Being has two phases; in Himself He is one and Unchangeable, but in the second phase He is the cause of all diversity—nay, is the diversity. That which appears is not unreal, it is the Absolute Being itself. It is interesting to observe that the author uses here

the word *Tahul*, which means Evolution implying the identity of the object under all its diverse forms. The first volume ends here with brief notices of the Quran, the Old Testament, the Book of Psalms and the Bible. The author's remarks on the different Books are very interesting, but are not directly connected with the main theory he propounds. We, therefore, proceed to estimate the value of his philosophical labour. While summing up his Doctrine of the Perfect Man, we have seen that, although he has anticipated many of the chief doctrines of modern German philosophy, particularly Hegelianism, yet he is not a systematic thinker at all. He perceives the truth, but being unequipped with the instrumentality of a sound philosophical method, he cannot advance positive proofs for his positon, or rather cannot present his views in a systematic unity. He is keenly alive to the necessity of philosophical precision yet his mysticism constantly leads him to drop vague, obscure remarks savouring of Platonic poetry rather than philosophy. His book is a confused jumble of metaphysics, religion, mysticism and ethics, very often excluding all likelihood of analysis. In his defence of the Islamic institutions he implies that religion is something quite different from metaphysics, yet in his general treatment he is firmly convinced of their identity that he regards religion as applied metaphysics, and to a great extent anticipates the views of the modern Neo-Hegelian school of England. Amidst the irregularity and general want of clearness his chief doctrine, however, is sufficiently clear—a doctrine which makes the principal

merit of our author, and brings him out as the triumphant possessor of the deep metaphysical meaning of the Trinity. In the grip of mysticism he has dropped remarks which might be developed so as to result in a philosophical system, but it is a matter for regret that this sort of idealistic speculation did not find favour much with later Islamic thinkers.

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II

LEBENSLAUF*

I was born on the 3rd of Dhi-Qa'd, 1294 A.H. (1876 A.D.)† at Sialkot—Punjab (India). My education began with the study of Arabic and Persian. A few years after I joined one of the local schools and began my University career, passing the first Public examination of the Punjab University in 1891. In 1893 I passed the Matriculation and joined the Scotch Mission College, Sialkot, where I studied for two years, passing the Intermediate Examination of the Punjab University in 1895. In 1897 and 1899, respectively, I passed my B.A. and M.A. from the Lahore Government College. During the course of my University career I had the good fortune to win several gold and silver medals and scholarships. After my M.A. I was appointed McLeod Arabic Reader in the Punjab University Oriental College where I lectured on History and Political Economy for about 3 years. I was then appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Lahore Government College. In 1905 I got leave of absence for three years in order to complete my studies in Europe where I am at present residing.

* This is the introductory note which prefaces Iqbal's Thesis, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, as submitted to Munich University. It is interesting as giving certain information about Iqbal in his own words. *Ed.*

† There is still a good deal of confusion about the date of Iqbal's birth. Prof. Marek of Prague University has dealt with the subject in an interesting note in Archiv Orientalni, 1958. Mr. Wahiduddin has also dealt with the subject in his *Roozgar-i-Faqir*. They agree that the correct date is as given by Iqbal here. The 3rd of Dhi-Qa'd 1294 A.H. corresponds to 9th November 1877 and this should be accepted as the correct date of birth. *Ed*

III

ISLAM AS A MORAL AND POLITICAL IDEAL

There are three points of view from which a religious system can be approached: the standpoint of the teacher, that of the expounder, and that of the critical student. I do not pretend to be a teacher whose thought and action are, or ought to be, in perfect harmony in so far as he endeavours to work out, in his own life, the ideals which he places before others, and thus influences his audience more by example than by precept. Nor do I claim the high office of an expounder who brings to bear a subtle intellect upon his task, endeavours to explain all the various aspects of the principles he expounds and works with certain pre-suppositions, the truth of which he never questions. The attitude of mind which characterises a critical student is fundamentally different from that of the teacher and the expounder. He approaches the subject of his inquiry free from all pre-suppositions, and tries to understand the organic structure of a religious system, just as a biologist would study a form of life or a geologist a piece of mineral. His object is to apply methods of scientific research to religion, with a view to discover how the various elements in a given structure fit in with one another, how each factor functions individually, and how their relation with one another determines the functional value of the whole. He

looks at the subject from the standpoint of history and raises certain fundamental questions with regard to the origin, growth and formation of the system he proposes to understand. What are the historical forces, the operation of which evoked, as a necessary consequence, the phenomenon of a particular system? Why should a particular religious system be produced by a particular people? What is the real significance of a religious system in the history of the people who produced it, and in the history of mankind as a whole? Are there any geographical causes which determine the original locality of a religion? How far does it reveal the in-most soul of a people, their social, moral and political aspirations? What transformation, if any, has it worked in them? How far has it contributed towards the realization of the ultimate purpose revealed in the history of man? These are some of the questions which the critical student of religion endeavours to answer, in order to comprehend its structure and to estimate its ultimate worth as a civilising agency among the forces of historical evolution.

I propose to look at Islam from the standpoint of the critical student. But I may state at the outset that I shall avoid the use of expressions current in popular Revelation Theology; since my method is essentially scientific and consequently necessitates the use of terms which can be interpreted in the light of everyday human experience. For instance, when I say that the religion of a people is the sum-total of their life-experience finding a definite expression through the medium of a great personality,

I am only translating the fact of Revelation into the language of science. Similarly, inter-action between individual and universal energy is only another expression for the feeling of prayer, which ought to be so described for purposes of scientific accuracy. It is because I want to approach my subject from a thoroughly human standpoint, and not because I doubt the fact of Divine Revelation as the final basis of all religion, that I prefer to employ expressions of a more scientific content. Islam is moreover the youngest of all religions, the last creation of humanity. Its founder stands out clear before us; he is truly a personage of history and lends himself freely even to the most searching criticism. Ingenious legend has weaved no screens round his figure; he is born in the broad daylight of history; we can thoroughly understand the inner spring of his actions; we can subject his mind to a keen psychological analysis. Let us then, for the time being, eliminate the supernatural element and try to understand the structure of Islam as we find it.

I have just indicated the way in which a critical student of religion approaches his subject. Now, it is not possible for me, in the short space at my disposal, to answer, with regard to Islam, all the questions which as a critical student of religion I ought to raise and answer in order to reveal the real meaning of this religious system. I shall not raise the question of the origin and the development of Islam. Nor shall I try to analyse the various currents of thought in the pre-Islamic Arabian society, which found a final focus in the utterances

of the Prophet of Islam. I shall confine my attention to the Islamic ideal in its ethical and political aspects only.

To begin with, we have to recognise that every great religious system starts with certain propositions concerning the nature of man and the universe. The psychological implication of Buddhism, for instance, is the central fact of pain as a dominating element in the constitution of the universe. Man, regarded as an individuality, is helpless against the forces of pain, according to the teachings of Buddhism. There is an indissoluble relation between pain and the individual consciousness which, as such, is nothing but a constant possibility of pain. Freedom from pain means freedom from individuality. Starting from the fact of pain, Buddhism is quite consistent in placing before man the ideal of self-destruction. Of the two terms of this relation, pain and the sense of personality, one (*i.e.*, pain) is ultimate; the other is a delusion from which it is possible to emancipate ourselves by ceasing to act on those lines of activity, which have a tendency to intensify the sense of personality. Salvation, then, according to Buddhism, is inaction; renunciation of self and unworldliness are the principal virtues. Similarly, Christianity, as a religious system, is based on the fact of sin. The world is regarded as evil and the taint of sin is regarded as hereditary to man, who, as an individuality is insufficient and stands in need of some supernatural personality to intervene between him and his Creator. Christianity, unlike Buddhism, regards human personality as something

real, but agrees with Buddhism in holding that man, as a force against sin, is insufficient. There is, however, a subtle difference in the agreement. We can, according to Christianity, get rid of sin by depending upon a Redeemer; we can free ourselves from pain, according to Buddhism, by letting this insufficient force dissipate or lose itself in the universal energy of nature. Both agree in the fact of insufficiency and both agree in holding that this insufficiency is an evil; but while the one makes up the deficiency by bringing in the force of a redeeming personality, the other prescribes its gradual reduction until it is annihilated altogether. Again, Zoroastrianism looks upon nature as a scene of endless struggle between the powers of evil and the powers of good, and recognises in man the power to choose any course of action he likes. The universe, according to Zoroastrianism, is partly evil, partly good; man is neither wholly good nor wholly evil, but a combination of the two principles—light and darkness continually fighting against each other for universal supremacy. We see then that the fundamental pre-suppositions, with regard to the nature of the universe and man, in Buddhism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism, respectively, are the following:—

(1) There is pain in nature and man regarded as an individual is evil (Buddhism).

(2) There is sin in nature and the taint of sin is fatal to man (Christianity).

(3) There is struggle in nature; man is a mixture of the struggling forces and is free to range himself on the side of the powers of good which will eventually

prevail (Zoroastrianism).

The question now is, what is the Muslim view of the universe and man? What is the central idea in Islam which determines the structure of the entire system? We know that sin, pain and sorrow are constantly mentioned in the Quran. The truth is that Islam looks upon the universe as a reality and consequently recognises as reality all that is in it. Sin, pain, sorrow, struggle are certainly real, but Islam teaches that evil is not essential to the universe; the universe can be reformed; the elements of sin and evil can be gradually eliminated. All that is in the universe is God's, and the seemingly destructive forces of nature become sources of life, if properly controlled by man, who is endowed with the power to understand and to control them.

These and other similar teachings of the Quran, combined with the Quranic recognition of the reality of sin and sorrow, indicate that the Islamic view of the universe is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Modern psychometry has given the final answer to the psychological implications of Buddhism. Pain is not an essential factor in the constitution of the universe, and pessimism is only a product of a hostile social environment. Islam believes in the efficacy of well-directed action; hence the standpoint of Islam must be described as melioristic—the ultimate presupposition and justification of all human effort at scientific discovery and social progress. Although Islam recognises the fact of pain, sin and struggle in nature, yet the principal fact which stands in the way of man's ethical progress is, according to Islam, nei-

ther pain, nor sin, nor struggle. It is fear to which man is a victim owing to his ignorance of the nature of his environment and want of absolute faith in God. The highest stage of man's ethical progress is reached when he becomes absolutely free from fear and grief.

The central proposition which regulates the structure of Islam, then, is that there is fear in nature, and the object of Islam is to free man from fear. This view of the universe indicates also the Islamic view of the metaphysical nature of man. If fear is the force which dominates man and counteracts his ethical progress, man must be regarded as a unit of force, an energy, a will, a germ of infinite power, the gradual unfoldment of which must be the object of all human activity. The essential nature of man, then, consists in will, not intellect or understanding.

With regard to the ethical nature of man too, the teaching of Islam is different from those of other religious systems. And when God said to the angels—"I am going to make a Viceroy on the earth," they said: "Art Thou creating one who spills blood and disturbs the peace of the earth, and we glorify Thee and sing Thy praises?" God answered: "I know what you do not know." This verse of the Quran, read in the light of the famous tradition that every child is born a Muslim—peaceful, indicates that according to the tenets of Islam man is essentially good and peaceful—a view explained and defended, in our own times, by Rousseau—the great father of modern political thought. The opposite view, the doctrine of the depravity of man held by the Church

of Rome, leads to the most pernicious religious and political consequences. Since if man is elementally wicked, he must not be permitted to have his own way; his entire life must be controlled by external authority. This means priesthood in religion and autocracy in politics. The Middle Ages in the history of Europe drove this dogma of Romanism to its political and religious consequences, and the result was a form of society which required terrible revolutions to destroy it and to upset the basic presuppositions of its structure. Luther, the enemy of despotism in religion, and Ruosseau, the enemy of despotism in politics, must always be regarded as the emancipators of European humanity from the heavy fetters of popedom and absolutism, and their religious and political thought must be understood as a virtual denial of the Church dogma of human depravity. The possibility of the elimination of sin and pain from the evolutionary process and faith in the natural goodness of man are the basic propositions of Islam, as of modern European civilisation, which has, almost unconsciously, recognised the truth of these propositions in spite of the religious system with which it is associated. Ethically speaking, therefore, man is naturally good and peaceful. Metaphysically speaking, he is a unit of energy, which cannot bring out its dormant possibilities owing to its misconception of the nature of its environment. The ethical ideal of Islam is to disenthral man from fear, and thus to give him a sense of his personality, to make him conscious of himself as a source of power. This idea of man as an individuality of

infinite power determines, according to the teachings of Islam, the worth of all human action. That which intensifies the sense of individuality in man is good, that which enfeebles it is bad. Virtue is power, force, strength; evil is weakness. Give man a keen sense of respect for his own personality, let him move fearless and free in the immensity of God's earth, and he will respect the personalities of others and become perfectly virtuous. It is not possible for me to show in the course of this paper, how all the principal forms of vice can be reduced to fear. But we will now see the reason why certain forms of human activity, e.g., self-renunciation, poverty, slavish obedience which sometimes conceals itself under the beautiful name of humility and unworldliness—modes of activity which tend to weaken the force of human individuality—are regarded as virtues by Buddhism and Christianity, and altogether ignored by Islam. While the early Christians glorified in poverty and unworldliness, Islam looks upon poverty as a vice, and says: "Do not forget thy share in the world." The highest virtue from the standpoint of Islam is righteousness which is defined by the Quran in the following manner:—

"It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces in prayers towards east and west, but righteousness is of him who believeth in God and the last day and the angels and the scriptures and the Prophets, who give the money for God's sake unto his kindered and unto orphans and the needy and to strangers and to those who ask and for the redemption of captives; of those who are constant at prayer, and of those who

perform their covenant when they have covenanted, and behave themselves patiently in adversity and in times of violence."

It is, therefore, evident that Islam, so to speak, transmutes the moral values of the ancient world, and declares the preservation, intensification of the sense of human personality to be the ultimate ground of all ethical activity. Man is a free responsible being, he is the maker of his own destiny, his salvation is his own business. There is no mediator between God and man. God is the birthright of every man. The Quran, therefore, while it looks upon Jesus Christ as the spirit of God, strongly protests against the Christian doctrine of Redemption, as well as the doctrine of an infallible visible head of the Church—doctrines which proceed upon the assumption of the insufficiency of human personality and tend to create in man a sense of dependence, which is regarded by Islam as a force obstructing the ethical progress of man. The law of Islam is almost unwilling to recognise illegitimacy, since the stigma of illegitimacy is a great blow to the healthy development of independence in man. Similarly, in order to give man an early sense of individuality the law of Islam has laid down that a child is an absolutely free human being at the age of fifteen.

To this view of Muslim ethics, however, there can be one objection. If the development of human individuality is the principal concern of Islam, why should it tolerate the institution of slavery? The idea of free labour was foreign to the economic consciousness of the ancient world. Aristotle looks

upon it as a necessary factor in human society. The Prophet of Islam, being a link between the ancient and the modern world, declared the principle of equality and though, like every wise reformer, he slightly conceded to the social conditions around him in retaining the name slavery, he quietly took away the whole spirit of this institution. That slaves had equal opportunity with other Muhammadans, is evidenced by the fact that some of the greatest Muslim warriors, kings, premiers, scholars, and jurists were slaves. During the days of the early Caliphs slavery by purchase was quite unknown; part of public revenue was sent apart for purposes of manumission, and prisoners of war were either freely dismissed or freed on the payment of ransom. Omar set all slaves at liberty after his conquest of Jerusalem. Slaves were also set at liberty as a penalty for culpable homicide and in expiation of a false oath taken by mistake. The Prophet's own treatment of slaves was extraordinarily liberal. The proud aristocratic Arab could not tolerate the social elevation of a slave even when he was manumitted. The democratic ideal of perfect equality, which had found the most uncompromising expression in the Prophet's life, could only be brought home to an extremely aristocratic people by a very cautious handling of the situation. He brought about a marriage between an emancipated slave and a free Qureish woman, a relative of his own. This marriage was a blow to the aristocratic pride of this free Arab woman; she could not get on with her husband, and the result was a divorce, which made her the more helpless, since no respectable

Arab would marry the divorced wife of a slave. The ever-watchful Prophet availed himself of this situation and turned it to account in his efforts at social reform. He married the woman himself, indicating thereby that not only a slave could marry a free woman, but also a woman divorced by him could become the wife of a man no less than the greatest Prophet of God. The significance of this marriage in the history of social reform in Arabia is, indeed, great. Whether prejudice, ignorance or want of insight has blinded European critics of Islam to the real meaning of this union, it is difficult to guess.

In order to show the treatment of slaves by modern Muhammadans, I quote a passage from the English translation of the autobiography of the late Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan :—

"For instance," says the Amir, "Framurz Khan, a Chatrali slave, is my most trusted Commander-in-Chief at Herat, Nazir Muhammad Safar Khan, another Chitrali slave, is the most trusted official of my Court; he keeps my seal in his hand to put to any document and to my food and diet; in short, he has the full confidence of my life, and my kingdom is in his hands. Parwana Khan, the late Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Jan Muhammad Khan, the late Lord of Treasury, two of the highest officials of the kingdom in their lifetime, were both of them my slaves."

The truth is that the institution of slavery is a mere name in Islam, and the idea of individuality reveals itself as a guiding principle in the entire system of Muhammadan law and ethics.

Briefly speaking, then, a strong will in a strong body is the ethical ideal of Islam. But let me stop here for a moment, and see whether we, Indian Musalmans, are true to this ideal. Does the Indian Muslim possess a strong will in a strong body? Has he got the will to live? Has he got sufficient strength of character to oppose those forces which tend to disintegrate the social organism to which he belongs? I regret to answer my questions in the negative. The reader will understand, that in the great struggle for existence it is not principally number which makes a social organism survive. Character is the ultimate equipment of man, not only in his efforts against a hostile natural environment, but also in his contest with kindred competitors after a fuller, richer, ampler life. The life-force of the Indian Muhammadan, however, has become woefully enfeebled. The decay of the religious spirit, combined with other causes of a political nature over which he had no control, has developed in him a habit of self-dwarfing, a sense of dependence and, above all, that laziness of spirit, which an enervated people call by the dignified name of 'contentment' in order to conceal their own enfeeblement. Owing to his indifferent commercial morality he fails in economic enterprise; for want of a true conception of national interest and a right appreciation of the present situation of his community among the communities of this country, he is working, in his private as well as public capacity, on lines which, I am afraid, must lead him to ruin. How often do we see that he shrinks from advocating a cause, the significance of which is truly national,

simply because his standing aloof pleases an influential Hindu, through whose agency he hopes to secure a personal distinction? I unhesitatingly declare that I have greater respect for an illiterate shopkeeper, who earns his honest bread and has sufficient force in his arms to defend his wife and children in times of trouble, than the brainy graduate of high culture, whose low, timid voice betokens the dearth of soul in his body, who takes pride in his submissiveness, eats sparingly, complains of sleepless nights and produces unhealthy children for his community, if he does produce any at all. I hope I shall not be offending the reader when I say that I have a certain amount of admiration for the devil. By refusing to prostrate himself before Adam whom he honestly believed to be his inferior, he revealed a high sense of self-respect, a trait of character, which, in my opinion, ought to redeem him from his spiritual deformity, just as the beautiful eyes of the toad redeem him from his physical repulsiveness. And I believe God punished him not because he refused to make himself low before the progenitor of an enfeebled humanity, but because he declined to give absolute obedience to the will of the Almighty Ruler of the Universe. The ideal of our educated young men is mostly service, and service begets, specially in a country like India, that sense of dependence which undermines the force of human individuality. The poor among us have, of course, no capital; the middle class people cannot undertake joint economic enterprise owing to mutual mistrust; and the rich look upon trade as an occupation beneath their dignity. Truly economic depen-

dence is the prolific mother of all the various forms of vice. Even the vices of the Indian Muhammadan indicate the weakness of life-force in him. Physically too he has undergone dreadful deterioration. If one sees the pale, faded faces of Muhammadan boys in schools and colleges, one will find the painful verification of my statement. Power, energy, force, strength, yes physical strength, is the law of life. A strong man may rob others when he has got nothing in his own pocket; but a feeble person, he must die the death of a mean thing in the world's awful scene of continual warfare. But how to improve this undesirable state of things? Education, we are told, will work the required transformation. I may say at once that I do not put much faith in education as a means of ethical training—I mean education as understood in this country. The ethical training of humanity is really the work of great personalities, who appear, from time to time, during the course of human history. Unfortunately, our present social environment is not favourable to the birth and growth of such personalities of ethical magnetism. An attempt to discover the reason of this dearth of personalities among us will necessitate a subtle analysis of all the visible and invisible forces which are now determining the course of our social evolution—an enquiry which I cannot undertake in this paper. But all unbiassed persons will easily admit that such personalities are now rare among us. This being the case, education is the only thing to fall back upon. But what sort of education? There is no absolute truth in education, as there is none in

philosophy or science. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge is a maxim of fools. Do we ever find a person rolling in his mind the undulatory theory of light simply because it is a fact of science? Education, like other things, ought to be determined by the needs of the learner. A form of education which has no direct bearing on the particular type of character which you want to develop is absolutely worthless. I grant that the present system of education in India gives us bread and butter. We manufacture a number of graduates and then we have to send titled mendicants to Government to beg appointments for them. Well, if we succeed in securing a few appointments in the higher branches of service, what then? It is the masses who constitute the backbone of the nation; they ought to be better fed, better housed and properly educated. Life is not bread and butter, alone; it is something more; it is a healthy character reflecting the national ideal in all its aspects. And for a truly national character, you ought to have a truly national edcaution. Can you expect free Muslim character in a young boy who is brought up in an aided school and in complete ignorance of his social and historical tradition? You administer to him doses of Cromwell's history; it is idle to expect that he will turn out a truly Muslim character. The knowledge of Cromwell's history will certainly create in him a great deal of admiration for that Puritan revolutionary; but it cannot create that healthy pride in his soul which is the very life-blood of a truly national character. Our educated young man knows all about Wellington and Gladstone, Voltaire and Luther. He will tell you

that Lord Roberts worked in the South African war like a common soldier at the age of eighteen; but how many of us know that Muhammad II conquered Constantinople at the age of twenty-two? How many of us have even the faintest notion of the influence of our Muslim civilisation over the civilisation of modern Europe? How many of us are familiar with the wonderful historical productions of Ibn Khaldun or the extraordinarily noble character of the great Mir Abdul Qadir of Algeria? A living nation is living because it never forgets its dead. I venture to say, that the present system of education in this country is not at all suited to us as a people. It is not true to our genius as a nation, it tends to produce an un-Muslim type of character, it is not determined by our national requirements, it breaks entirely with our past, and appears to proceed on the false assumption that the ideal of education is the training of human intellect rather than human will. Nor is this superficial system true to the genius of the Hindus. Among them it appears to have produced a number of political idealists, whose false reading of history drives them to the upsetting of all conditions of political order and social peace. We spend an immense amount of money every year on the education of our children. Well, thanks to the King-Emperor, India is a free country; every body is free to entertain any opinion he likes—I look upon it as a waste. In order to be truly ourselves, we ought to have our own schools, our own colleges, and our own universities, keeping alive our social and historical traditions, making us good and peaceful

citizens and creating in us that free but law-abiding spirit which evolves out of itself the noblest types of political virtue. I am quite sensible of the difficulties that lie in our way, all that I can say is that if we cannot get over our difficulties, the world will soon get rid of us.

Having discussed in the last issue of this review the ethical ideals of Islam, I now proceed to say a few words on the political aspect of the Islamic ideal. Before, however, I come to the subject, I wish to meet an objection against Islam so often brought forward by our European critics. It has been said that Islam is a religion which implies a state of war and can thrive only in a state of war. Now, there can be no denying that war is an expression of the energy of a nation; a nation which cannot fight cannot hold its own in the strain and stress of selective competition, which constitutes an indispensable condition of all human progress: Defensive war is certainly permitted by the Quran; but the doctrine of aggressive war against unbelievers is wholly unauthorized by the Holy Book of Islam. Here are the words of the Quran :—

"Summon them to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and kindly warning, dispute them in the kindest manner. Say to those who have been given the book and to the ignorant: 'Do you accept Islam'? Then, if they accept Islam they are guided aright: but if they turn away then thy duty is only preaching; and God's eye is on His servants."

All the wars undertaken during the life-time of the Prophet were defensive. His war against the

Roman Empire in 628 A.D. began by a fatal breach of international law on the part of the Government at Constantinople who killed the innocent Arab envoy sent to their Court. Even in defensive wars he forbids wanton cruelty to the vanquished. I quote here the touching words which he addressed to his followers when they were starting for a fight :—

"In avenging the injuries inflicted upon us, disturb not the harmless votaries of domestic seclusion, spare the weakness of the female sex, injure not the infant at the breast, or those who are ill in bed. Abstain from demolishing the dwellings of the unresisting inhabitants, destroy not the means of their subsistence, nor their fruit trees, and touch not the palm."

The history of Islam tells us that the expansion of Islam as a religion is in no way related to the political power of its followers. The greatest spiritual conquests of Islam were made during the days of our political decrepitude. When the rude barbarians of Mongolia drowned in blood the civilisation of Baghdad in 1258 A. D., when the Muslim power fell in Spain and the followers of Islam were mercilessly killed or driven out of Cordova by Ferdinand in 1236, Islam had just secured a footing in Sumatra and was about to work the peaceful conversion of the Malay Archipelago.

"In the hours of its political degradation," says Professor Arnold, "Islam has achieved some of its most brilliant conquests. On two great historical occasions, infidel barbarians have set their foot on

the necks of the followers of the Prophet, the Seljuk Turks in the eleventh and the Mongols in the thirteenth century, and in each case the conquerors have accepted the religion of the conquered." "We undoubtedly find," says the same learned scholar elsewhere, "that Islam gained its greatest and most lasting missionary triumphs in times and places in which its political power has been weakest, as in South India and Eastern Bengal."

The truth is that Islam is essentially a religion of peace. All forms of political and social disturbance are condemned by the Quran in the most uncompromising terms. I quote a few verses from the Quran :—

"Eat and drink from what God has given you and run not on the face of the earth in the matter of rebels.

"And disturb not the peace of the earth after it has been reformed ; this is good for you if you are believers.

"And do good to others as God has done good to thee, and seek not the violation of peace in the earth, for God does not love those who break the peace.

"That is the home in the next world which we build for those who do not mean rebellion and disturbance in the earth, and the end is for those who fear God.

"Those who rebelled in cities and enhanced disorder in them, God visited them with His whip of punishment."

One sees from these verses how severely all forms of political and social disorders are denounced by the Quran. But the Quran is not satisfied with mere denunciation of the evil of *fesad.* It goes to the very root of this evil. We know that both in ancient and modern times, secret meetings have been a constant source of political and social unrest. Here is what the Quran says about such conferences: "O believers, if you converse secretly—that is to say, hold secret conference, converse not for purpose of sin and rebellion." The ideal of Islam is to secure social peace at any cost. All methods of violent change in society are condemned in the most unmistakable language. Tartushi—a Muslim lawyer of Spain—is quite true to the spirit of Islam when he says: "Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of anarchy." "Listen to him and obey him," says the Prophet of God in a tradition mentioned by Bukharee, "even if a negro slave is appointed to rule over you." Muslim mentions another important tradition of the Prophet on the authority of Arfaja, who says: "I heard the Prophet of God say, when you have agreed to follow one man then if another man comes forward intending to break your stick (weaken your strength) or to make you disperse in disunion, kill him."

Those among us who make it their business to differ from the general body of Musalmans in political views ought to read this tradition carefully, and if they have any respect for the words of the Prophet, it is their duty to dissuade themselves from this mean traffic in political opinion which, though perhaps it brings a little personal gain to them, is exceedingly

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harmful to the interests of the community. My object, in citing these verses and traditions is to educate political opinion on strictly Islamic lines. In this country we are living under a Christian Government. We must always keep before our eyes the example of those early Muhammadans who, persecuted by their own countrymen, had to leave their home and to settle in the Christian State of Abyssinia. How they behaved in that land must be our guiding principle in this country where an over-dose of Western ideas has taught people to criticise the existing Government with a dangerous lack of historical perspective. And our relation with the Christians are determined for us by the Quran, which says :—

"And thou wilt find nearer to the friendship of the believers those men who call themselves Christians. This is because among them there are learned men and hermits, and they are never vain."

Having thus established that Islam is a religion of peace, I now proceed to consider the purely political aspect of the Islamic ideal—the ideal of Islam as entertained by a corporate individuality. Given a settled society, what does Islam expect from its followers regarded as a community? What principles ought to guide them in the management of communal affairs? What must be their ultimate object and how it is to be achieved? We know that Islam is something more than a creed, it is also a community, a nation. The membership of Islam as a community is not determined by birth, locality or naturalisation; it consists in the identity of belief. The expression

'Indian Muhammadan', however convenient it may be, is a contradiction in terms; since Islam in its essence is above all conditions of time and space. Nationality with us is a pure idea; it has no geographical basis. But inasmuch as the average man demands a material centre of nationality, the Muslim looks for it in the holy town of Mecca, so that the basis of Muslim nationality combines the real and the ideal, the concrete and the abstract. When, therefore, it is said that the interests of Islam are superior to those of the Muslim, it is meant that the interests of the individual as a unit are subordinate to the interests of the community as an external symbol of the Islamic principle. This is the only principle which limits the liberty of the individual, who is otherwise absolutely free. The best form of Government for such a community would be democracy, the ideal of which is to let man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as practicable. The Caliph of Islam is not an infallible being; like other Muslims he is subject to the same law; he is elected by the people and is deposed by them if he goes contrary to the law. An ancestor of the present Sultan of Turkey was sued in an ordinary law court by a mason, who succeeded in getting him fined by the town Qazee. Democracy, then, is the most important aspect of Islam regarded as a political ideal. It must, however, be confessed that the Muslims, with their ideal of individual freedom, could do nothing for the political improvement of Asia. Their democracy lasted only 30 years and disappeared with their political expansion. Though the principle of

election was not quite original in Asia (since the ancient Parthian Government was based on the same principle) yet somehow or other it was not suited to the nations of Asia in the early days of Islam. It was, however, reserved for a Western nation politically to vitalize the countries of Asia. Democracy has been the great mission of England in modern times, and English statesmen have boldly carried this principle to countries which have been, for centuries, groaning under the most atrocious forms of despotism. The British Empire is a vast political organism, the vitality of which consists in the gradual working out of this principle. The permanence of the British Empire as a civilising factor in the potitical evolution of mankind is one of our greatest interests. This vast Empire has our fullest sympathy and respect, since it is one aspect of our own political ideal that is being slowly worked out in it. England, in fact, is doing one of our own great duties, which unfavourable circumstances did not permit us to perform. It is not the number of Muhammadans which it protects, but the spirit of the British Empire that makes it the greatest Muhammadan Empire in the world.

To return now to the political constitution of the Muslim society. Just as there are two basic propositions underlying Muslim ethics, so there are two basic propositions underlying Muslim political constitution :—

(1) The law of God is absolutely supreme. Authority, except as an interpreter of the law, has no place in the social structure of Islam. Islam has a horror of personal authority. We regard it as ini-

mical to the unfoldment of human individuality. The Shias, of course, differ from the Sunnis in this respect. They hold that the Caliph or Imam is appointed by God and his interpretation of the Law is final; he is infallible and his authority, therefore, is absolutely supreme. There is certainly a grain of truth in this view; since the principle of absolute authority has functioned usefully in the course of the history of mankind. But it must be admitted that the idea works well in the case of primitive societies and reveals its deficiency when applied to higher stages of civilisation. Peoples grow out of it, as recent events have revealed in Persia, which is a Shia country, yet demands a fundamental structural change in her Government by the introduction of the principle of election.

(2) The absolute equality of all the members of the community. There is no aristocracy in Islam. "The noblest among you," says the Prophet, "are those who fear God most." There is no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system. Islam is a unity in which there is no distinction, and this unity is secured by making men believe in the two simple propositions—the unity of God and the mission of the Prophet—propositions which are certainly of a supernational character, but which, based as they are on the general religious experience of mankind, are intensely true to the average human nature. Now, this principle of the equality of all believers made early Musalmans the greatest political power in the world. Islam worked as a levelling force; it gave the individual a sense of his inward power; it elevated

those who were socially low. The elevation of the down-trodden was the chief secret of the Muslim political power in India. The result of the British rule in this country has been exactly the same; and if England continues true to this principle it will ever remain a source of strength to her as it was to her predecessors.

But are we Indian Musalmans true to this principle in our social economy? Is the organic unity of Islam intact in this land? Religious adventurers set up different sects and fraternities, ever quarrelling with one another; and then there are castes and sub-castes like the Hindus! Surely we have out-Hindued the Hindu himself; we are suffering from a double caste system—the religious caste system, sectarianism, and the social caste system, which we have either learned or inherited from the Hindus. This is one of the quiet ways in which conquered nations revenge themselves on their conquerors. I condemn this accursed religious and social sectarianism; I condemn it in the name of God, in the name of humanity, in the name of Moses, in the name of Jesus Christ, and in the name of him—a thrill of emotion passes through the very fibre of my soul when I think of that exalted name—yes, in the name of him who brought the final message of freedom and equality to mankind. Islam is one and indivisible; it brooks no distinctions in it. There are no Wahabies, Shias or Sunnies in Islam. Fight not for the interpretations of the truth, when the truth itself is in danger. It is foolish to complain of stumbling when you walk in the darkness of night. Let all come forward and

contribute their respective shares in the great toil of the nation. Let the idols of class-distinctions and sectarianism be smashed for ever; let the Musalmans of the country be once more united into a great vital whole. How can we, in the presence of violent internal disputes, expect to succeed in persuading others to our way of thinking? The work of freeing humanity from superstition—the ultimate ideal of Islam as a community, for the realisation of which we have done so little in this great land of myth and superstition—will ever remain undone if the emancipators themselves are becoming gradually enchained in the very fetters, from which it is their mission to set others free.

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IV

POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ISLAM

Pre-Islamic Arabia was divided into various tribes continually at war with one another. Each tribe had its own chief, its own god and its own poet, whose tribal patriotism manifested itself chiefly in the glorification of the virtues of his own tribe. Though these primitive social groups recognised, to a certain extent, their kinship with one another, yet it was mainly the authority of Muhammad and the cosmopolitan character of his teaching which shattered the aristocratic ideals of individual tribes, and welded the dwellers of tents into one common ever-expanding nationality. For our purposes, however, it is necessary to notice, at the outset, the features of the Arabian system of tribal succession, and the procedure followed by the members of the tribe on the death of their chief. When the Chief or Shaikh of an Arab tribe died all the elders of the tribe met together, and, sitting in a circle, discussed the matter of succession. Any member of the tribe could hold the chieftainship if he were unanimously elected by the elders and heads of great families. The idea of hereditary monarchy, as Von Kremer has pointed out, was quite foreign to the Arab mind, though the principle of seniority which, since Ahmad I, has received legal recognition in the constitution of modern Turkey, did certainly influence the election. When the tribe was equally divided between two

leaders, the rival sections separated from each other until one of the candidates relinquished his claim; otherwise the sword was appealed to. The Chief thus elected could be deposed by the tribe if his conduct necessitated deposition. With the expansion of the Arab conquest, and the consequent enlargement of mental outlook, this primitive custom gradually developed into a Political Theory carefully constructed, as we shall see, by the constitutional lawyers of Islam through reflective criticism on the revelations of the political experience.

True to this custom, the Prophet of Arabia left no instructions with regard to the matter of his succession. There is a tradition that the old Amir, son of Tufail, came to the Prophet and said, "If I embrace Islam what would my rank be? Wilt thou give me the command after thee?" "It does not belong to me," said the Prophet, "to dispose of the command after me." Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his chief companions therefore, in consequence of the danger of internal disruption, was rather hurriedly and irregularly elected. He then rose and addressed the people thus:—

"O people! Now I am ruler over you, albeit not the best amongst you. If I do well, support me; if ill, then set me right. Follow the true wherein is faithfulness, eschew the false wherein is treachery. The weaker amongst you shall be as the stronger with me, until that I shall have redressed his wrong; and the stronger shall be as the weaker until, if the Lord will, I shall have taken from him that which he hath wrested. Leave not off to fight in the way of the

Lord; whosoever leaveth off, him verily shall the Lord abase. Obey me as I obey the Lord and his Prophet, wherein I disobey, obey me not."

Omar, however, afterwards held that the hurried election of Abu Bakr, though very happy in its consequences and justified by the need of the time, should not form a precedent in Islam; for, as he is reported to have said (Dozy, I, p. 121), an election which is only a partial expression of the people's will is null and void. It was, therefore, early understood that Political Sovereignty *de facto* resides in the people; and that the electorate by their free act of unanimous choice embody it in a determinate personality in which the collective will is, so to speak, individualised, without investing this concrete seat of power with any privilege in the eye of the law except legal control over the individual wills of which it is an expression. The idea of universal agreement is, in fact, the fundamental principle of Muslim constitutional theory. "What the Muslim community considers good," said the Prophet, "God also considers good." It is probably on the authority of this saying of the Prophet that Al-Ash'ari developed his political dogma—"That error is impossible in the united deliberations of the whole community." After the death of Abu Bakr, Omar, who acted as Chief Judge during his predecessor's Caliphate, was universally elected by the people. In 644 A.D. he was mortally wounded by a Persian slave, and committed his trust, before he died, to seven electors—one of them being his own son to nominate his successor, with the condition that their choice must be unanimous, and that none of

them must stand as a candidate for the Caliphate. It will be seen, from Omar's exclusion of his own son from the candidature, how remote was the idea of hereditary monarchy from the Arabian political consciousness. The choice of this council, however, fell upon one of the councillors, Uthman, who was consequently nominated, and the nomination afterwards confirmed by the people. The caliphate of Uthman is really the source of the three great religio-political parties with their respective political theories which each party, finding itself in power, attempted to realise in one or the other of the provinces of the Arab Empire. Before, however, I proceed to describe these theories, I want to draw attention to the following two points :—

(1) That the Muslim Commonwealth is based on the absolute equality of all Muslims in the eye of the law. There is no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system. In his latter days the Prophet once ascended the pulpit and said to the people :—

"Muslims! If I have struck anyone of you, here is my back that he may strike me. If anyone has been wronged by me, let him return injury for injury. If I have taken anybody's goods, all that I have is at his disposal." A man arose and claimed a debt of three dirhams (about three shillings). "I would much rather," said the Prophet, "have the shame in this world than in the next." And he paid him on the spot.

The law of Islam does not recognise the apparently natural differences of race, nor the historical

differences of nationality. The political ideal of Islam consists in the creation of a people born of a free fusion of all races and nationalities. Nationality, with Islam, is not the highest limit of political development; for the general principles of the law of Islam rest on human nature, not on the peculiarities of a particular people. The inner cohesion of such a nation would consist not in ethnic or geographic unity, not in the unity of language or social tradition, but in the unity of the religious and political ideal; or, in the psychological fact of "like-mindedness", as St. Paul would say. The membership of this nation, consequently, would not be determined by birth, marriage, domicile or naturalisation. It would be determined by a public declaration of "like-mindedness", and would terminate when the individual has ceased to be like-minded with others. The ideal territory for such a nation would be the whole earth. The Arabs, like the Greeks and the Romans endeavoured to create such a nation or the world-state by conquest, but failed to actualise their ideal. The realisation of this ideal, however, is not impossible; for the ideal nation does already exist in germ. The life of modern political communities finds expression, to a great extent, in common institutions, Law and Government; and the various sociological circles, so to speak, are continually expanding to touch one another. Further, it is not incompatible with the sovereignty of individual States, since its structure will be determined, not by physical force, but by the spiritual force of a common ideal.

(2) That according to the law of Islam there is no

distinction between the Church and the State. The State with us is not a combination of religious and secular authority, but it is a unity in which no such distinction exists. The Caliph is not necessarily the high-priest of Islam; he is not the representative of God on earth. He is fallible like other men, and is subject, like every Muslim, to the impersonal authority of the same law. The Prophet himself is not regarded as absolutely infallible by many Muhammadan theologians (e.g., Abu Ishaq, Tabari). In fact, the idea of personal authority is quite contrary to the spirit of Islam. The Prophet of Arabia succeeded in commanding the absolute submission of an entire people; yet no man has depreciated his own authority more than he. "I am," he says, "a man like you; like you my forgiveness also depends on the mercy of God." Once in a moment of spiritual exaltation, he is reported to have said to one of his companions, "Go and tell the people—he who says—there is only one God—will enter the paradise," studiously omitting the second half of the Muslim creed—"And Muhammed is his Prophet." The ethical importance of this attitude is great. The whole system of Islamic ethics is based on the idea of individuality; anything which tends to repress the healthy development of individuality is quite inconsistent with the spirit of Islamic law and ethics. A Muslim is free to do anything he likes, provided he does not violate the law. The general principles of this law are believed to have been revealed; the details, in order to cover the relatively secular cases, are left to the interpretation of professional lawyers. It is, therefore, true to

say that the entire fabric of Islamic law, actually administered, is really judge-made law, so that the lawyer performs the legislative function in the Muslim constitution. If, however, an absolutely new case arise which is not provided for in the law of Islam, the will of the whole Muslim community becomes a further source of law. But I do not know whether a general council of the whole Muslim community was ever held for this purpose.

I shall now describe the three great political theories to which I have alluded above. I shall first take up the Sunni view.

I. ELECTIVE MONARCHY

The Caliph and the People.

During the days of the early Caliphate things were extremely simple. The Caliphs were like private individuals, sometimes doing the work of an ordinary constable. In obedience to the Quranic verse—" and consult them in all matters"—they always consulted the more influential companions of the Prophet, in judicial and executive matters, but no formal ministers existed to assist the Caliph in his administrative work. It was not until the time of the House of Abbas that the Caliphate became the subject of scientific treatment. In my description of the Sunni view I shall mainly follow Al-Mawardy—the earliest Muslim constitutional lawyer who flourished during the reign of the Abbasi Caliph Al-Qadir. Al-Mawardy divides the whole Muslim community into two classes, (1) the electors, (2) the candidates for election. The qualifications absolutely necessary for a candidate are thus

enumerated by him :

1. Spotless character.

2. Freedom from physical and mental infirmity. The predecessor of the present Sultan of Turkey was deposed under this condition.

3. Necessary legal and theological knowledge in order to be able to decide various cases. This is true in theory ; in practice the power of the Caliph, especially in later times, was divided.

4. Insight necessary for a ruler.

5. Courage to defend the empire.

6. Relationship with the family of the Quraish. This qualification is not regarded as indispensable by modern Sunni lawyers on the ground that the Prophet never nominated any person as his successor.

7. Full age (Al-Ghazali). It was on this ground that the chief judge refused to elect Al-Muqtadir.

8. Male sex (Al-Baidawi). This is denied by the Khawarij who hold that a woman can be elected as Caliph.

If the candidate satisfies these conditions, the representative of all influential families, doctors of law, high officials of the State and commanders of the Army, meet together and nominate him to the Caliphate. The whole assembly then proceeds to the mosque where the nomination is duly confirmed by the people. In distant places representatives of the elected Caliph are permitted to receive homage on behalf of the Caliph. In the matter of election the people of the capital, however, have no precedence over other

people, though, in practice, they have a certain amount of precedence, since they are naturally the first to hear of the Caliph's death. After the election, the Caliph usually makes a speech, promising to rule according to the law of Islam. Most of these speeches are preserved. It will be seen that the principle of representation is, to a certain extent, permitted in practical politics; in the law of property, however, it is expressly denied. For instance, if B dies in the lifetime of his father A and his brother C, leaving issue, the whole property of A goes to C. The children of B have no claim; they cannot represent their father, or "stand in his shoes".

From a legal standpoint, the Caliph does not occupy any privileged position. In theory, he is like other members of the Commonwealth. He can be directly sued in an ordinary law court. The second Caliph was once accused of appropriating a larger share in the spoils of war, and he had to clear his conduct before the people, by production of evidence according to the law of Islam. In his judicial capacity he is open to the criticism of every Muslim. Omar I was severely reprimanded by an old woman who pointed out to him that his interpretation of a certain Quranic verse was absolutely wrong. The Caliph listened to her argument, and decided the case according to her views.

The Caliph may indicate his successor who may be his son; but the nomination is invalid until confirmed by the people. Out of the fourteen Caliphs of the House of Umayya only four succeeded in securing their sons as successors. The Caliph cannot secure

the election of his successor during his own lifetime. Ibn Athir tells us that Abdul Malik—the Umayya Caliph endeavoured to do so, but Ibn Musayyib the great Mekkan lawyer, strongly protested against the Caliph's behaviour. The Abbasi Caliph Hadi, however, succeeded in securing the election of his son Ja'far, but after his death the majority declared for Harun. In such a case, when the people declare for another Caliph, the one previously elected must, on penalty of death, immediately renounce his right in public.

If the Caliph does not rule according to the law of Islam, or suffers from physical or mental infirmity, the Caliphate is forfeited. Usually one influential Muhammadan stands up in the mosque after the prayer, and speaks to the congregation giving reasons for the proposed deposition. He declares deposition to be in the interest of Islam, and ends his speech by throwing away his finger-ring with the remark: "I reject the Caliph as I throw away this ring." The people then signify their assent in various ways, and the deposition is complete.

The question whether two or more rival Caliphates can exist simultaneously is discussed by Muslim lawyers. Ibn Jama holds that only one Caliphate is possible. Ibn Khaldun holds that there is nothing illegal in the co-existence of two or more Caliphates, provided they are in different countries. Ibn Khaldun's view is certainly contrary to the old Arabian idea, yet in so far as the Muslim Commonwealth is governed by an impersonal authority, *i.e.*, law, his position seems to me to be quite a tenable one. More-

over, as a matter of fact, two rival Caliphates have existed in Islam for a long time and still exists.

Just as a candidate for the Caliphate must have certain qualifications, so, according to Al-Mawardy, the elector also must be qualified. He must possess: (1) Good reputation as an honest man. (2) Necessary knowledge of State affairs. (3) Necessary insight and judgment.

In theory all Muslims, men and women, possess the right of election. There is no property qualification. In practice, however, women and slaves did not exercise this right. Some of the early lawyers seem to have recognised the danger of mass-elections as they endeavour to show that the right of election resides only in the tribe of the Prophet. Whether the seclusion of women grew up in order to make women incapable of exercising a right which in theory could not be denied to them, I cannot say.

The elector has the right to demand the deposition of the Caliph, or the dismissal of his officials if he can show that their conduct is not in accordance with the law of Islam. He can, on the subject, address the Muslim congregation in the mosque after the prayer. The mosque, it must be remembered, is the Muslim Forum, and the institution of daily prayer is closely connected with the political life of Muslim communities. Apart from its spiritual and social functions, the institution is meant to serve as a ready means of constant criticism of the State. If, however, the elector does not intend to address the congregation, he can issue a judicial inquiry concerning the

conduct of any State official, or any other matter which affects the community as a whole. The judicial inquiry as a rule, does not mention the name of any individual. I quote an illustration in order to give an idea of this procedure :—

"In the name of God, most merciful and clement. What is the opinion of the doctors of law, the guides of the people, on the encouragement of the Zimmis, and on the assistance we can demand from them, whether as clerks to the Amirs entrusted with the administration of the country, or as collectors of taxes? . . . Explain the above by solid proofs, establish the orthodox belief by sound arguments, and give your reasons. God will reward you."

Such judicial inquiries are issued by the State as well, and when the lawyers give conflicting decisions, the majority prevails. Forced election is quite illegal. Ibn Jama, an Egyptian lawyer, however, holds that forced election is legal in times of political unrest. The opportunist view has no support in the law of Islam; though, undoubtedly, it is based on historical facts. Tartushi, a Spanish lawyer, would probably hold the same view, for he says: "Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of anarchy."

Let us now consider the relation between the elected and the elector. Al-Mawardy defines this relation as "Aqd"—binding together, contract in consequence of which the Caliph has to do certain duties, *e g.*, to define the religion, to enforce the law of Islam, to levy customs and taxes according to the law of Islam, to pay annual salaries and properly to direct

the State treasury. If he fulfils these conditions, the people have mainly two duties in relation to him, *viz.*, to obey him, and to assist him in his work. Apart from this contract, however, Muslim lawyers have also enumerated certain cases in which obedience to the Caliph is not necessary.

The origin of the State then, according to Al-Mawardy, is not force, but free consent of individuals who unite to form a brotherhood, based upon legal equality, in order that each member of the brotherhood may work out the potentialities of his individuality under the law of Islam. Government, with him, is an artificial arrangement, and is divine only in the sense that the law of Islam—believed to have been revealed—demands peace and security.

The Caliph, after his election, appoints the principal officials of the State, or confirms those previously in office. The following are the principal State officials with their duties defined by the law :—

(1) The Wazir, the Prime Minister—either with limited or unlimited powers. The Wazir with unlimited powers must possess the same qualifications as the Caliph, except that, according to Al-Mawardy, he need not necessarily belong to the Quraish tribe. He must be thoroughly educated especially in Mathematics, History, and the Art of speaking. He can perform all the functions of the Caliph, except that he cannot nominate the Caliph's successor. He can, without previous sanction of the Caliph, appoint officers of the various departments of the State. The Wazir with limited powers cannot do so. The dis-

missal of the Wazir with unlimited powers means the dismissal of all officials appointed by him ; while the dismissal of the Wazir with limited powers does not lead to the dismissal of the officials appointed by him. More than one Wazir with unlimited powers cannot be appointed. The governors of various provinces can appoint their own Wazirs. A non-Muhammadan may be appointed Wazir with limited powers. The Shiah dynasty of the Obaidies appointed a Jew to this position. An Egyptian poet expresses their sentiments as follows :—

"The Jews of our time have reached the goal of their ambition—Theirs is all honour theirs is all gold—O people of Egypt I advise you to become Jews ; God himself has become a Jew."

(2) Next to the Wazir the most important executive officers of the State were governors of various provinces. They were appointed by the Caliph with limited or unlimited powers. The governor with unlimited powers could appoint sub-governors to adjoining smaller provinces. For instance, the sub-governor of Sicily was appointed by the governor of Spain and that of Sind by the governor of Basra. This was really an attempt to create self-governing Muslim colonies. The officer in charge was, so to speak, a miniature caliph of his province ; he appointed his own Wazir, Chief Judge and other State officers. Where special commander of the provincial army was not appointed, the governor, ex-officio, acted as the commander. This, however, was an error, since the governors become gradually powerful and frequently asserted their independence. But in his

capacity of the commander the governor had no right to raise the salaries of his soldiers except in very special circumstances. It was his duty to send all the money to the central treasury after defraying the necessary State expenses. If the provincial income fell short of the expenses, he could claim a contribution from the central treasury. If he is appointed by the Caliph, the death of the latter is not followed by his dismissal; but if he is appointed by the Wazir, the death of the Wazir means the dismissal of all governors appointed by him, provided they are not newly confirmed in their respective posts.

The governor with limited powers was a purely executive officer. He had nothing to do with judicial matters, and in criminal matters too his authority was very much limited.

Muslim lawyers, however, recognise a third kind of gevernorship, *i.e.*, by usurpation. But the usurper must fulfil certain conditions before his claim is legally justified.

(3) Commanders of armies. Here too the distinction of limited and unlimited powers is made, and the duties of commanders, subordinate officers, and soldiers are clearly defined.

(4) The Chief Judge. The Chief Judge could be appointed by the Caliph or the Wazir. According to Abu Hanifa in some cases and according to Abu Jafir Tabary, a non-Muslim can be appointed to administer the law of his co-religionists. The Chief Judge, as representative of the law of Islam can depose the Caliph—he can kill his own creator. His

death means the dismissal of his staff; but the death of the sovereign is not followed by the dismissal of the judges appointed by him. During an interregnum a judge can be elected by the people of a town, but not during the sovereign's lifetime.

(5) President of the Highest Court of Appeal and general control. The object of this institution was to hear appeals and to exercise a general supervision over all the departments of the State. Abdul Malik—the Umayya Caliph and the founder of this court—personally acted as the president, though more difficult cases he transferred to Qazi Abu Idris. In later times, the president was appointed by the Caliph. During the reign of the Abbasi Caliph Al-Muqtadir, his mother was appointed President, and she used to hear appeals, on Fridays, surrounded by Judges, priests and other notables. In one respect, the President of this court differed from the Chief Judge. He was not bound by the letter of the law like the Qazi; his decisions were based on general principles of natural justice, so that the President was something like the keeper of the Caliph's conscience. He was assisted by a council of judges and lawyers whose duty was to discuss every aspect of the case before the President announced his decision. The importance of this institution may be judged from the fact that it was among the few Muslim institutions which the Normans retained after their conquest of Sicily in the eleventh century.

II. THE SHI'AH VIEW

According to the Shi'ah view the State is of divine origin, and the Caliph or, as they call, Imam,

governs by divine right. This view arose among an obscure Arabian sect known as the Saba'ites whose founder Abdulla ibn Saba was a Jew of Sana in Yemen. In the time of Uthman he became a convert to Islam, and finally settled in Egypt where he preached his doctrine. This doctrine harmonised with the pre-Islamic habits of political thought in Persia, and soon found a permanent home in that country. The Imam, according to the Persians, is not elected (the Shi'ahs of Oman, however, adopted the elective principle and held that the Imam might be deposed) but appointed by God. He is the reincarnation of Universal Reason, he is endowed with all perfections, his wisdom is superhuman and his decisions are absolute and final. The first Imam, Ali, was appointed by Muhammad; Ali's direct descendants are his divinely ordained successors. The world is never without a living Imam whether visible or invisible. The 12th Imam, according to the Shi'ahs, suddenly disappeared near Kufa, but he will come again and fill the world with peace and prosperity. In the meantime, he communicates his will, from time to time, through certain favoured individuals—called Gates—who hold mysterious intercourse with him. Now this doctrine of the absence of the Imam has a very important political aspect which few students of Islam have fully appreciated. Whether the Imam really disappeared or not, I do not know; but it is obvious that the dogma is a clever way of separating the Church and the State. The absent Imam, as I have pointed out above, is absolute authority in all matters; the present executive authorities are, therefore, only guar-

dians of the estate which really belongs to the Imam, who, as such, inherits the property of deceased intestates in case they leave no heirs. It will therefore be seen that the authority of the Shah of Persia is limited by the authority of the Mullas—the representatives of the absent Imam. As a mere guardian of the estate he is subject to the religious authority though as the chief executive authority he is free to adopt any measure for the good of the estate. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Mullas took an active part in the recent constitutional reforms in Persia.

III. THE KHAWARIJ—REPUBLICANISM

I shall be very brief in my account of the Khawarij, since the history of their opinions is yet to be worked out. The first Muslims who were so called were the notorious 12,000 who revolted against Ali after they had fought under him at the battle of Siffin. They were offended at his submitting the decision of his right to the Caliphate to the arbitration of men when, in their opinion, it ought to have been submitted to the law of God—the Quran. "The nation," they said to Ali, "calls us to the book of God; you call us to the sword." Shahristani divides them into twenty-four sects, differing slightly from one another in legal and constitutional opinion, *e.g.*, that the ignorance of the law is a valid excuse; that the adulterer should not be stoned, for the Quran nowhere mentions this punishment; that the hiding of one's religious opinions is illegal; that the Caliph should not be called the commander of the faithful; that there is nothing illegal in having two or more Caliphs in one and the same time. In East Africa

and Mazab—South Algeria—they still maintain the simplicity of their republican ideal. Broadly speaking, the Khawarij can be divided into three classes :—

(1) Those who hold that there must be an elected Caliph, but it is not necessary that he should belong to a particular family or tribe. A woman or even a slave could be elected as Caliph provided he or she is a good Muslim ruler. Whenever they found themselves in power, they purposely elected their Caliph from among the socially lowest members of their community. (2) Those who hold that there is no need of a Caliph, the Muslim congregation can govern themselves. (3) Those who do not believe in Government at all—the anarchists of Islam. To them Caliph Ali is reported to have said: "You do not believe in any Government, but there must be some Government, good or bad."

Such are, briefly, the main lines of Political Thought in Islam. It is clear that the fundamental principle laid down in the Quran is the principle of election; the details or rather the translation of this principle into a workable scheme of Government is left to be determined by other considerations. Unfortunately, however, the idea of election did not develop on strictly democratic lines, and the Muslim conquerors consequently failed to do anything for the political improvement of Asia. The form of election was certainly maintained in Baghdad and Spain, but no regular political institutions could grow to vitalise the people at large. It seems to me that there were principally two reasons for this want of political activity in Muslim countries :—

(1) In the first place the idea of election was not at all suited to the genius of the Persians and the Mongols—the two principal races which accepted Islam as their religion. Dozy tells us that the Persians were even determined to worship the Caliph as a divinity, and on being told that worship belonged to God alone, they attempted to rebel against the Caliph who would not be the centre of religious emotion.

(2) The life of early Muslims was a life of conquest. The whole energy was devoted to political expansion which tends to concentrate political power in fewer hands, and thus serves as an unconscious handmaid of despotism. Democracy does not seem to be quite willing to get on with Empire—a lesson which the modern English Imperialist might well take to heart.

In modern times—thanks to the influence of Western political ideas—Muslim countries have exhibited signs of political life. Egypt has made progress; Persia has received a constitution from the Shah, and the Young Turkish Party too have been struggling, scheming, and plotting to achieve their object. But it is absolutely necessary for these political reformers to make a thorough study of Islamic constitutional principles, and not to shock the naturally suspicious conservatism of their people by appearing as prophets of a new culture. They would certainly impress them more if they could show that their seemingly borrowed ideal of political freedom is really the ideal of Islam, and is, as such, the rightful demand of free Muslim conscience.

(*Hindustan Review*,
Vols. XXII & XXIII, 1910-1911)

V

STRAY THOUGHTS (I)

The result of all philosophical thought is that absolute knowledge is an impossibility. The Poet Browning turns this impossibility to ethical use by a very ingenious argument. The uncertainty of human knowledge, says the poet, is a necessary condition of moral growth, since complete knowledge will destroy the liberty of human choice.

* * *

Literary criticism sometimes precedes the creation of a great Literature. We find Lessing on the very threshold of German Literature.

* * *

> So are we drawn as wood is shoved,
> By other's sinews each way moved.

Montaigne remarks on the above lines of Horace :—

> "We go not, but we are carried, as things that float, now gliding gently, now hulling violently, according as the water is either stormy or calm."

While reading the above in Montaigne, I was put in mind of a verse by our late and lamented writer Azad, who has given an expression to this idea much more beautifully than either Horace or Mon-

taigne. Says he :—

جہاز عمر رواں پر سوار بیٹھے ھیں
سوار خاک ھیں، بے اختیار بیٹھے ھیں

Both Shakespeare and Goethe rethink the thought of Divine creation. There is, however, one important difference between them. The Realist Englishman rethinks the Individual; the Idealist German, the Universal. Faust is a seeming individual only. In reality he is humanity individualised.

* * *

As a plant growing on the bank of a stream heareth not the sweet silver-music which sustains it from beneath, so man, growing on the brink of Infinity listeneth not to the Divine undertone that maketh the life and harmony of his soul.

* * *

The attitude of toleration and even conformity without belief in dogma is probably the most incomprehensible thing to the vulgar mind. If such is your attitude, keep quiet and never try to defend your position.

* * *

Nations are born in the hearts of Poets; they prosper and die in the hands of politicians.

* * *

Democracy has a tendency to foster the spirit of

legality. This is not in itself bad; but unfortunately it tends to displace the purely moral standpoint, and to make the illegal and the wrong identical in meaning.

* * *

No religious system can ignore the moral value of suffering. The error of the builders of Christianity was that they based their religion on the fact of suffering alone, and ignored the moral value of other factors. Yet such a religious system was a necessity to the European mind in order to supplement the beautiful but one-sided Hellenic Ideal. The Greek dream of life was certainly the best, as Goethe says; but it was wanting in the colour element of suffering which was supplied by Christianity.

* * *

Life, like the arts of Poetry and Painting, is wholly expression. Contemplation without action is death.

* * *

Matthew Arnold is a very precise poet. I like, however, an element of vagueness in poetry; since the vague appears profound to the emotions.

* * *

At least in one respect sin is better than piety. There is an imaginative element in the former which is lacking in the latter.

* * *

Suffering is a gift from the gods in order to make men see the whole of life.

* * *

Self-control in individuals builds families, in communities it builds Empires.

* * *

Power is more divine than truth. God is Power. Be ye, then, like your Father Who is in heaven.

* * *

The powerful man creates environment; the feeble have to adjust themselves to it.

* * *

Matthew Arnold defines poetry as criticism of life. That life is criticism of poetry is equally true.

* * *

The fate of the world has been principally decided by minorities. The history of Europe bears ample testimony to the truth of this proposition. It seems to me that there are psychological reasons why minorities should have been a powerful factor in the history of mankind. Character is the invisible force which determines the destinies of nations, and an intense character is not possible in a majority. It is a force, the more it is distributed the weaker it becomes.

(*New Era*, 7th April, 1917)

VI

STRAY THOUGHTS (II)

1. ISLAM AND MYSTICISM

The present day Muslim prefers to roam about aimlessly in the dusky valleys of Hellenic-Persian Mysticism which teaches us to shut our eyes to the hard Reality around, and to fix our gaze on what it describes as "Illuminations"—blue, red, and yellow Reality springing up from the cells of an over-worked brain. To me this self-mystification, this Nihilism, i.e., seeking Reality in quarters where it does not exist, is a physiological symptom which gives me a clue to the decadence of the Muslim world. The intellectual history of the ancient world will reveal to you this most significant fact that the decadent in all ages have tried to seek shelter behind self-mystification and Nihilism. Having lost the vitality to grapple with the temporal, these prophets of decay apply themselves to the quest of a supposed eternal; and gradually complete the spiritual impoverishment and physical degeneration of their society by evolving a seemingly charming ideal of life which seduces even the healthy and powerful to death! To such a peculiarly constructed society as Islam the work of these sentimental obscurantists has done immense harm. Our birth, as a society repudiating the ideas of race and language as principles of social reconstruction, was due only to our subjecting ourselves to a system of Law believed to be Divine in its origin;

yet the old Mystic frankly held and secretly preached it to be merely Phenomenal; nothing more than an outer husk of the Real which is to be attained by means other than the Law of God. In most cases the observance of the Law, even though held to be Phenomenal, was retained to avoid social odium; but no student of Muslim thought and literature can deny that the tendency to ignore the Law—the only force holding together Muslim Society was the direct consequence of a false Mysticism born of the heart and brain of Persia. Thus Muslim Democracy was gradually displaced and enslaved by a sort of spiritual Aristocracy pretending to claim knowledge and power not open to the average Muslim. The danger of this Persianisation of Islam was clearly seen by the great Muslim Saint, Sheikh Ahmad Rifai (peace be on him). Writing to Abdul Sami 'Hashimi' the Sheikh says :

خبر دار اھل عجم کی زیادتیوں سے دھوکا نہ کھانا کہ ان میں بعض حد سے گزر گئے ھیں۔

Elsewhere the great Saint strikes at the very root of Persian mysticism (i.e., the distinction of inner and outer, Phenomenal and Real, to which I have alluded before) and declares :

شیخ وہ ھے جس کا ظاھر و باطن شرع ھو۔ طریقت میں شریعت ھے۔ جھوٹا اس فرقہ کو نجاست سے آلودہ کرتا ھے اور کہتا ھے کہ باطن اور ھے ظاھر اور ھے۔ (رسالہ الحکم الرفاعیہ ، ترجمہ مولانا شرر)

The Muslims of Spain, with their Aristotlean spirit and away from the enervating influences of the thought of Western and Central Asia, were comparatively much closer to the spirit of Islam than the

Muslim races of Asia, who let Arabian Islam pass through all the solvents of Ajam and finally divested it of its original character. The conquest of Persia meant not the conversion of Persia to Islam, but the conversion of Islam to Persianism! Read the intellectual history of the Muslims of Western and Central Asia from the 10th century downwards, and you will find therein verified every word that I have written above.

Such are the charms of decadence! We drink the poison and kiss the hand of those who administer it!

Remember that Islam was born in the broad day light of history. The great democratic Prophet lived and worked among intelligent men, who have transmitted to posterity every word that dropped from his sacred lips. There is absolutely nothing esoteric in his teachings. Every word of the Quran is brimful of light and joy of existence. Far from justifying any gloomy, pessimistic mysticism, it is an open assault on those religious teachings which have for centuries mystified mankind. Accept, then, the reality of the world cheerfully and grapple with it for the glorification of God and His Prophet. Do not listen to him who says there is a secret doctrine in Islam which cannot be revealed to the uninitiated. Herein lies the power of this pretender and your thraldom. See how in the spirit of Roman Christianity he builds fortifications round himself with a view to save his realms of darkness against the possible invasions of the historian. He enslaves you by exploiting your ignorance of the history of Islam;

but seeing clearly that the light of history may sometime dispel the mist of his teaching from your intellectual atmosphere, he teaches you to regard sense-perception as "the greatest veil" (العلم حجاب الاكبر). Thus this enemy of sense-reality blunts your sense for fact, and undermines the very foundations of the science of history !

Muslim youngmen! Beware of the mystifier! His noose has now been too long round your neck. The regeneration of the Muslim world lies in the strong uncompromising, ethical Monotheism which was preached to the Arabs thirteen hundred years ago. Come, then, out of the fogs of Persianism and walk into the brilliant desert—sunshine of Arabia.

2. MUSLIM DEMOCRACY

The Democracy of Europe—overshadowed by socialistic agitation and anarchical fear—originated mainly in the economic regeneration of European societies. Nietzsche, however, abhors this "rule of the herd" and, hopeless of the plebeian, he bases all higher culture on the cultivation and growth of an Aristocracy of Supermen. But is the plebeian so absolutely hopeless? The Democracy of Islam did not grow out of the extension of economic opportunity, it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebeian material Islam has formed men of the noblest type of life and Power. Is not, then, the Democracy of early Islam an experimental refutation of the ideas of

Nietzsche?

3. OUR PROPHET'S CRITICISM OF CONTEMPORARY ARABIAN POETRY

History has preserved some of the criticisms of our Prophet on contemporary Arabian poetry. But two of these criticisms are most profitable to Indian Muslims whose literature has been chiefly the work of the period of their national decadence, and who are now in search of a new literary ideal. One of these criticisms indicates to us what poetry should not be and the other what it should be:

1. Of the Poet Imra-ul-Qais who flourished about 40 years before Islam, our Prophet is reported to have said:

" اشعرالشعراء وقائدهم الی النار "

"He is the most poetic of all poets and their leader to Hell."

Now what do we find in the poetry of Imra-ul-Qais?

Sparkling wine, enervating sentiments and situations of love, heart-rending moans over the ruins of habitations long swept away by stormy winds, superb pictures of the inspiring scenery of silent deserts—and all this is the choicest expression of old Arabia. Imra-ul-Qais appeals more to imagination than to will, and on the whole acts as a narcotic on the mind of the reader. The Prophet's criticism reveals this most important art-principle—that the good in art is not necessarily identical with the good in life; it is possible for a poet to write fine poetry, and yet lead

his society to Hell. The poet is essentially a seducer; woe to his people, if instead of making the trials of life look beautiful and attractive he embellishes decadence with all the glories of health and power, and seduces his people to extinction. Out of the richness of his nature he ought to lavish on others something of the super-abundance of life and power in him, and not steal away, thief-like, the little they already, happen to possess.

2. Again the following verse of Antra of the tribe of Abs was read to our Prophet:

ولقد ابیت علی الطوی واظنه ۔ حتی انبل بہ کریم الکامل

"Verily I pass through whole nights of toil to merit a livelihood worthy of an honourable man."

The Prophet whose mission was to glorify life and to beautify all its trials was immensely, pleased, and said to his companions:

"The praise of an Arabian has never kindled in me a desire to see him, but I tell you I do wish to meet the author of this verse."

Imagine the man, a single look at whose face was a source of infinite bliss to the looker desiring to meet an infidel Arab for his verse! What is the secret of this unusual honour which the Prophet wished to give to the poet? It is because the verse is so healthful and vitalising, it is because the poet idealises the pain of honourable labour. The Prophet's appreciation of this verse indicates to us another art-principle of great value—that art is subordinate to life, not superior to it. The ultimate end of all human activity is Life—

glorious, powerful, exuberant. All human art must be subordinated to this final purpose and the value of everything must be determined in reference to its life-yielding capacity. The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force, and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to reality around—on the mastery of which alone life depends—is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium-eating in Art. The dogma of Art for the sake of Art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power.

Thus the Prophet's appreciation of Antra's verse gives us the ultimate principle for the proper evaluation of all Art.

(*New Era*,
28th July, 1917)

VII

STRAY THOUGHTS (III)

(I)

TOUCH OF HEGELIANISM IN *Lisanul Asar* AKBAR

To the great German idealist Hegel creation means the Absolute Reason leaving its absoluteness and returning to itself by visualising or objectifying itself in the form of a Universe which, in its essence, is no more than the unity of the Absolute Reason powdered up in a visible, perceptible plurality. Whether this process of return is temporal or non-temporal (for on this point Hegelians differ) it is clear that according to the Master its motive-force is the necessarily self-contradictory categories through which the Absolute Reason has to pass synthetically to regain its primeval Absoluteness. At the beginning of the process, since we are distant from the original Absoluteness the contradictions are sharp and mutually exclusive, but when we approach the end of the process their sharpness begins to disappear until we reach the Absolute Idea in which all contradictions embrace each other, and are transformed into a single unity. Thus the central idea of Hegel's Philosophy can be summed up in a few words—Infinite becoming Finite and regaining itself through a synthesis of self-evolved oppositions. The life of the universe, then, is necessarily constituted by a perpetual conflict of opposing forces. This brief sketch of Hegel's idea, I am afraid,

is not quite luminous, but I venture to hope it will assist you in realising the depth of Akbar's apparently simple verse :

جہان ہستی ہوئی محدود لاکھوں پیچ پڑتے ہیں
عقیدے عقل عنصر کے سب آپس میں لڑتے ہیں

The endless conflict of Nature's creative forces is too palpable to escape the observation of poets and thinkers. Tennyson has perhaps given it a fuller and more pathetic expression ; and our own Urfi has seized it in a majestic verse :

بچشم مصلحت بنگر مصاف نظم ہستی را
کہ ہر خارے درین وادی درفش کاویان بینی

The special feature of Akbar, however, is that in a few simple and well-chosen words he reveals to you not only the conflict, but also the cause (i.e. Limitation of the Limitless) which has generated it. And in the words عقل and عقیدہ he further suggests that this conflict is not limited to the material Plane (عنصر) only, but extends itself to the mental plane as well. In Alexander's well-known book—*Moral Order and Progress*—you will find how our ideas, ideals, beliefs and modes of life are constantly engaged in a quiet, bloodless fight, and how they displace, kill and absorb one another.

(2)

NIETZSCHE AND JALAL-UD-DIN RUMI

Comparisons, they say, are odious. I want, however, to draw your attention to a literary comparison which is exceedingly instructive and cannot be regarded as odious. Nietzsche and Maulana Jalal-

ud-din Rumi stand at the opposite poles of thought; but in the history of literature and thought it is the points of contact and departure which constitute centres of special interest. In spite of the enormous intellectual distance that lies between them these two great poet-philosophers seem to be in perfect agreement with regard to the practical bearing of their thought on life. Nietzsche saw the deçadence of the human type around him, disclosed the subtle forces that had been working for it, and finally attempted to adumbrate the type of life adequate to the task of our planet. "Not how man is presеved, but how man is surpassed," was the keynote of Nietzsche's thought. The superb Rumi—born to the Muslim world at a time when enervating modes of life and thought, and an outwardly beautiful but inwardly devitalising literature had almost completely sucked up the blood of Muslim Asia and paved the way for an easy victory for the Tartar—was not less keenly alive than Nietzsche to the poverty of life, incompetence, inadequacy and decay of the body-social of which he formed a part and parcel. See with what unerring insight he describes the corroding disease of his society and suggests the ideal type of Muslim manhood:—

دی شیخ با چراغ همی گشت گرد شهر
کز دام و در ملولم وانسانم آرزوست
زین همرهان سست عناصر دلم گرفت
شیر خدا و رستم دستانم آرزوست
گفتم که یافت می نشود جسته ایم ما
گفت آنکه یافت می نشود آنم آرزوست

(3)

I would not exchange for half a dozen systems of Philosophy this one verse of Naziri—

نیست در خشک و تر بیشه من کوتاهی
چوب هر نخل که منبر نشود دار کنم

(4)

History is a huge gramophone in which the voices of Nations are preserved.

(5)

Human Intellect—Nature's attempt at self-criticism.

(6)

Our soul discovers itself when we come into contact with a great mind. It is not until I had realised the infinitude of Goethe's mind that I discovered the narrow breadth of my own.

(7)

Belief is a great power. When I see that a proposition of mine is believed by another mind, my own conviction of its truth is thereby immensely increased.

(8)

When we fail in an enterprise we feel inclined to leave our home and try our luck in alien climes. If such is your situation, study your soul closely before deciding one way or the other. Is it because your ambition has received a fresh spur from your failure, or because you wish to hide your face from those who

have witnessed your failure. Excuse this bit of cruel psychology.

(9)

Hegel's system of Philosophly is an epic poem in prose.

(10)

I have the highest respect for Aristotle. Not only because I (living in the 20th century) know him better than the older generations of my community, but also because of his vast influence on the entire thought of my people. The tinge, however, of ingratitude revealed in his criticism of Plato's doctrine of Ideas withholds me from giving him my fullest admiration. I do not deny the element of truth in his criticism, but I do detest the spirit in which he chooses to handle his master.

(11)

A woman of superb beauty with a complete absence of self-consciousness is probably the most charming thing on God's earth.

(12)

Both God and the Devil give man opportunities, only leaving him to make use of those opportunities in the way he thinks best.

(13)

God! I thank Thee for my birth in this world of rosy dawns, flame-clad sunsets and thick forests

wherein the gloom of Nature's bygone nights rests in eternal slumber!

(14)

Philosophy ages; Poetry rejuvenates.

(15)

Science and Philosophy have limits, Art is boundless.

(16)

The soul of Oscar Wilde is more Persian than English.

(*New Era*,
18th August., 1917)

VIII

LETTER TO DR. NICHOLSON

(Lahore : dated 24-1-1921)

My dear Dr. Nicholson,

I was very glad to learn from your letter to Shafi[1] that your translation of the *Asrar-i-Khudi* had been favourably received and excited much attention in England. Some of the English reviewers, however, have been misled by the superficial resemblance of some of my ideas to those of Nietzsche.

The view of the writer in the *Athenaeum* is largely affected by some mistakes of fact for which, however, the writer does not seem to be responsible. But I am sure if he had known some of the dates of the publication of my Urdu poems referred to in his review, he would have certainly taken a totally different view of the growth of my literary activity. Nor does he rightly understand my idea of the Perfect Man which he confounds with the German thinker's Superman. I wrote on the Sufi doctrine of the Perfect Man more than twenty years ago, long before I had read or heard anything of Nietzsche. This was then published in the *Indian Antiquary*, and later in 1908 formed part of my Persian Metaphysics. The English reader ought to approach this idea not through the German thinker, but through an English thinker of

1. Late Principal Muhammad Shafi of Oriental College, Lahore.

great merit—I mean Alexander—whose Gifford lectures, delivered at Glasgow, were published last year. His chapter on Deity and God (Chapter I, Book IV, p. 341, Vol. II) is worth reading. On page 347, he says: "Deity is thus the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth. That the universe is pregnant with such a quality—we are speculatively assured. What that quality is we cannot know, for we can neither enjoy nor still less contemplate it. Our human altars still are raised to the Unknown God. If we could know what Deity is, how it feels to be Divine, we should first have to become as Gods." Alexander's thought is much bolder than mine.

I believe there is a Divine tendency in the universe, but this tendency will eventually find its complete expression in a higher man, not in a God subject to Time, as Alexander implies in his discussion of the subject. I do not agree with Alexander's view of God, but it is clear that my idea of the Perfect Man will lose much of its outlandishness in the eyes of the English reader if he approaches it through the ideas of a thinker of his own country.

But it was Mr. Dickinson's review which interested me most, and I want to make a few remarks on it. Kindly pass on this letter to him; I am sure he will be interested to know what I think of his review :—

(1) Mr. Dickinson thinks, as I understand from his private letter to me, that I have deified physical force in the poem. I am afraid he is mistaken in his view. I believe in the power of the spirit, not brute

force. When a people is called to a righteous war, it is, according to my belief, their duty to obey the call, but I condemn all wars of conquest (the story of Mianmir and the Emperor of India). Mr. Dickinson, however, is quite right when he says that war is destructive whether it is waged in the interests of Truth and Justice, or in the interests of conquest and exploitation. It must be put an end to in any case. We have seen, however, that Treaties, Leagues, Arbitrations and Conferences cannot put an end to it. Even if we secure these in a more effective manner than before, ambitious nations will substitute more peaceful forms of the exploitation of races supposed to be less favoured or less civilised. The truth is that we stand in need of a living personality to solve our social problems, to settle our disputes, and to place international morality on a surer basis. How very true are the last two paragraphs of Prof. Mackenzie's Introduction to *Social Philosophy* :

> "There can be no ideal society without ideal man : and for the production of these we require not only insight but a motive power ; fire as well as light. Perhaps, a philosophic understanding of our social problems is not even the chief want of our time. We need prophets as well as teachers, men like Carlyle or Ruskin or Tolstoy, who are able to add for us a new severity to conscience or a new breadth to duty. Perhaps we want a new Christ . . . It has been well said that the prophet of our time must be a man of the world, and not merely a voice in the wilderness. For indeed the wilderness of the present

is in the streets of our crowded cities, and in the midst of the incessant war by which we are trying to make our way upwards. It is there that the prophet must be.

"Or perhaps our chief want is rather for the poet of the new age than for its prophet—or for one who should be poet and prophet in one. Our poets of recent generations have taught us the love of nature, and enabled us to see in it the revelation of the Divine. We still look for one who shall show us with the same clearness the presence of the Divine in the human . . . We still need one who shall be fully and in all seriousness what Heine playfully called himself a "Ritter von dem Heiligen Geish," one who shall teach us to see the working out of our highest ideals in the everyday life of the world, and to find in devotion to the advancement of that life, not merely a sphere for an ascetic self-sacrifice, but a supreme object in the pursuit of which all thoughts, all passions, all delights may receive their highest development and satisfaction."

It is in the light of the above thoughts that I want the British public to read my description of the ideal man. It is not our treaties and arbitrations which will put an end to the internecine wars of the human family.

(2) Mr. Dickinson further refers to my "Be hard". This is based on the view of reality that I have taken in the poem. According to my belief, reality is a collection of individualities tending to

become a harmonious whole through conflict which must inevitably lead to mutual adjustment. This conflict is a necessity in the interests of the evolution of higher forms of life, and of personal immortality. Nietzsche did not believe in personal immortality. To those desiring it, he ruthlessly says, "Do you wish to be a perpetual burden on the shoulders of time?" He was led to say this because he had a wrong notion of time, and never tried to grapple with the ethical issue involved in the question of time. On the other hand, I look upon immortality as the highest aspiration of man on which he should focus all his energies, and consequently I recognise the need of all forms of activity, including conflict, which tend to make the human person more and more stable. And for the same consideration, I condemn speculative mysticism and inactive quietism. My interest in conflict is mainly ethical and not political whereas Nietzsche's was probably only political. Modern physical science has taught us that the atom of material-energy has achieved its present form through thousands of years of evolution. Yet it is unstable and can be made to disappear. The same is the case with the atom of mind-energy, i.e., the human person. It has achieved its present form through ions of incessant effort and conflict; yet, in spite of all this, its instability is clear from the various phenomena of mental pathology. If it has to continue intact it cannot ignore the lessons learnt from its past career, and will require the same or similar forces to maintain its stability which it has availed of before. It is possible that in its onward march nature may modify or eliminate altogether some

of the forces (e.g., conflict in the way of mutual wars) that have so far determined and helped its evolution, and introduce new forces hitherto unknown to mankind to secure its stability. But, I confess I am not an idealist in this matter and believe this time to be very distant. I am afraid mankind will not, for a very long time to come, learn the lesson that the Great European War has taught them. Thus it is clear that my purpose in recognizing the need of conflict is mainly ethical. Mr. Dickinson has unfortunately altogether ignored this aspect of the "Be hard."

(3) Mr. Dickinson further remarks that while my philosophy is universal my application of it is particular and exclusive. This is in a sense true. The humanitarian ideal is always universal in poetry and philosophy, but if you make it an effective ideal and work it out in actual life, you must start, not with poets and philosophers, but with a society exclusive in the sense of having a creed and well-defined outline, but ever enlarging its limits by example and persuasion. Such a society, according to my belief, is Islam. This society has so far proved itself a more successful opponent of the race-idea which is probably the hardest barrier in the way of the humanitarian ideal. Renan was wrong when he said that science was the greatest enemy of Islam. No, it is the race-idea which is the greatest enemy of Islam—in fact, of all humanity, and it is the duty of all lovers of mankind to stand in revolt against this dreadful invention of the Devil. Since I find that the idea of nationality based on race or territory is making headway in the world of Islam, and since I fear that the Muslims,

losing sight of their own ideal of a universal humanity, are being lured by the idea of a territorial nationality, I feel it is my duty as a Muslim and as a lover of all mankind, to remind them of their true function in the evolution of mankind. Tribal or national organizations on the lines of race or territory are only temporary phases in the unfoldment and upbringing of collective life, and as such I have no quarrel with them; but I condemn them in the strongest possible terms when they are regarded as the ultimate expression of the life of mankind. While I have the greatest love for Islam, it is in view of practical and not patriotic considerations, as Mr. Dickinson thinks, that I am compelled to start with a specific society (e.g., Islam) which, among the societies of the world, happens to be the only one suitable to my purpose. Nor is the spirit of Islam so exclusive as Mr. Dickinson thinks. In the interests of a universal unification of mankind the Quran ignores their minor differences and says, "Come let us unite on what is common to us all!"

I am afraid the old European idea of a blood-thirsty Islam is still lingering in the mind of Mr. Dickinson. All men and not Muslims alone are meant for the Kingdom of God on earth, provided they say good-bye to their idols of race and nationality, and treat one another as personalities. Leagues, mandates, treaties, like the one described by Mr. Keynes, and Imperialisms, however draped in democracy, can never bring salvation to mankind. The salvation of man lies in absolute equality and freedom of all. We stand in need of a thorough over-

hauling of the aims of science which has brought so much misery to mankind and of a total abandonment of what may be called esoteric politics which is ever planning the ruin of less clever or weaker races.

That Muslim peoples have fought and conquered like other peoples, and that some of their leaders have screened their personal ambition behind the veil of religion, I do not deny; but I am absolutely sure that territorial conquest was no part of the original programme of Islam. As a matter of fact, I consider it a great loss that the progress of Islam as a conquering faith stultified the growth of those germs of an economic and democratic organization of society which I find scattered up and down the pages of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet. No doubt, the Muslims succeeded in building a great empire, but thereby they largely repaganized their political ideals, and lost sight of some of the most important potentialities of their faith. Islam certainly aims at absorption. This absorption, however, is to be achieved not by territorial conquest but by the simplicity of its teaching, its appeal to the common sense of mankind and its aversion to abstruse metaphysical dogma. That Islam can succeed by its inherent force is sufficiently clear from the Muslim missionary work in China, where it has won millions of adherents without the help of any political power. I hope more than twenty years' long study of the world's thought has given me sufficient training to judge things impartially.

The object of my Persian poems is not to make out a case for Islam; my aim is simply to discover a

universal social reconstruction, and in this endeavour, I find it philosophically impossible to ignore a social system which exists with the express object of doing away with all the distinctions of caste, rank and race; and which, while keeping a watchful eye on the affairs of this world, fosters a spirit of unworldliness so absolutely essential to man in his relations with his neighbours. This is what Europe lacks and this is what she can still learn from us.

One word more. In my notes which now form part of your introduction to *Asrar-i-Khudi*, I deliberately explained my position in reference to Western thinkers, as I thought this would facilitate the understanding of my views in England. I could have easily explained myself in the light of the Quran and Muslim Sufis and thinkers, e.g., Ibn Arabi and Iraqi (Pantheism), Wahid Mahmud (Reality as a Plurality), Al-Jili (the idea of the Perfect Man) and Mujaddid Sarhindi (the human person in relation to the Divine Person). As a matter of fact, I did so explain myself in my Hindustani introduction to the first edition of the *Asrar*.

I claim that the philosophy of the *Asrar* is a direct development out of the experience and speculation of old Muslim Sufis and thinkers. Even Bergson's idea of time is not quite foreign to our Sufis. The Quran is certainly not a book of metaphysics, but it takes a definite view of the life and destiny of man, which must eventually rest on propositions of a metaphysical import. A statement by a modern Muslim student of philosophy of such propositions, especially when it is done in the light of

religious experience and philosophy invoked by that great book, is not putting new wine in old bottles. It is only a restatement of the old in the light of the new. It is unfortunate that the history of Muslim thought is so little known in the West. I wish I had time to write an extensive book on the subject to show to the Western student of philosophy how philosophic thinking makes the whole world kin.

Yours sincerely,
Muhammad Iqbal

IX

SOME THOUGHTS ON ISLAMIC STUDIES[1]

My dear Sahibzada,

I have read with great interest your excellent note on Islamic Studies to which, it seems, you have given a great deal of thought and attention. The subject has to be looked at from various points of view and in reference to the birth or rather rebirth of humanism in the world of Islam today. However, I beg to offer a few stray thoughts which have come to me. Before I proceed further I would state the subjects of what you call Islamic Studies as follows :—

1. To educate and train well-qualified theologians, divines, etc. (This is your first object on page 4 of your letter and I fully agree with it.)

2. To produce scholars who may, by their researches in the various branches of Muslim literature and thought, be able to trace genetically the continuity of intellectual life between Muslim culture and modern knowledge. This requires a little more elucidation. The political fall of Islam in Europe unfortunately took place, roughly speaking, at a moment when Muslim thinkers began to see the futility of deductive science and were fairly on the way to building inductive knowledge. It was practically at this

[1] This is a letter written by Allama Iqbal on 4th June, 1925 to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan, Secretary, All India Muhammadan Educational Conference, Aligarh. *Ed.*

time that Europe took up the task of research and discovery. Intellectual activity in the world of Islam practically ceased from this time and Europe began to reap the fruits of the labours of Muslim thinkers.

The Humanist movement in Europe was due to a large extent to the force set free by Muslim thought. It is not at all an exaggeration to say that the fruit of modern European humanism in the shape of modern science and philosophy are in many ways only a further development of Muslim culture. Neither the European nor the Mussalman of today realises this important fact because the extant work of Muslim thinkers still lies scattered and unpublished in the libraries of Europe, Asia and Africa. The ignorance of the Mussalmans of today is so great that they consider thoroughly anti-Islamic what has, in the main, arisen out of the bosom of their own culture. If, for instance, a Muslim savant knew that something like the theory of Einstein was seriously discussed in the scientific circles of Islam (Abul Ma'ali quoted by Averroes) the present theory of Einstein would appear to him less outlandish. Again his antipathy to modern Inductive logic would be very much diminished if he knew that the whole system of modern Logic started from Razi's well-known objection to the deductive logic of Aristotle.

The production of such scholars is absolutely necessary as they alone can help in the assimi-

lation of modern knowledge.

3. To turn out Muslim scholars well-versed in the various aspects of Muslim History, Art, General Culture and Civilisation. (This is really your third object mentioned on page 4 of your letter, which I have a bit narrowed by excluding science and philosophy from its scope.) This will include your object No. 2.

4. To produce scholars who may be fitted to carry on researches in the legal literature of Islam. As you know, our legal literature, a good deal of which is still unpublished, is simply enormous. In my opinion it should be treated as a separate branch of Muslim learning. (By law I mean the law relating to *fiqh* only.)

It is in the light of these general considerations that we should devise a scheme of Islamic Studies in the Muslim University at Aligarh.

I will now proceed to consider the practical aspect of the matter :—

The study of Muslim Theology: Our first object in which we both agree is the training of well-qualified theologians to satisfy the spiritual needs of the community. But the spiritual needs of a community change with the expansion of that community's outlook on life. The change in the position of the individual, his intellectual liberation and infinite advance in natural sciences have entirely changed the substance of modern life so that the kind of scholasticism or theological thought which satisfied a Muslim in the

Middle Ages would not satisfy him today. This does not mean an injury to the spirit of religion, but it certainly contradicts traditional views. If rejuvenation of Muslim life and the regaining of original depths are desirable then a rebuilding of theological thought is absolutely necessary. The vision of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan on this point, as on many others, was almost prophetic. As you know he himself undertook the task, which did not, and could not, prosper because it was mainly based on the philosophical thought of a bygone age. I am afraid I cannot agree with your suggested syllabus in Muslim Theology (paragraph 4 of your letter). In my opinion it is perfectly useless to institute a school of Muslim Theology on older lines unless it is your object to satisfy the more conservative portion of our community. Spiritually, the older theology is, generally speaking, a set of worn-out ideas ; educationally, it has no value in view of the rise of new, and restatement of old problems. What is needed today is intellectual activity in fresh channels and the building of a new theology and *Kalam*. This can obviously be done by men who are properly equipped for such a task. But how to produce such men ?

I fully agree with you in your suggestion that a system be devised for utilising the best material from Deoband and Lucknow. But the point is what would you do with these men after having trained them up to the Intermediate standard ? Would you make them B. A.s and M. A.s after the suggestion of Sir Thomas

Arnold? I am sure that so far as the study and development of theological thought is concerned they will not serve your purpose. These Deoband and Lucknow men who disclose a special aptitude for theological thinking should, in my opinion, be given a thorough grounding in modern thought and science before you allow them to pass through Arnold's course, which, for their purpose, will have to be very much shortened. After completing their study of modern thought and science they may be required to attend lectures on such subjects in Arnold's course as have a direct bearing on their special study, e.g., sects of Islam and Muslim Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. With this equipment they may be made University Fellows to give original lectures on Muslim Theology, *Kalam* and *Tafsir*. Such men alone will be able to found a new school of Muslim Theology in the University and serve our object No. 1. My suggestion, therefore, is that if you wish to satisfy the more conservative portion of our society you can start with a school of Theology on older lines as suggested in paragraph 4 of your letter, but your ultimate aim must be gradually to displace it by the work of original thinkers produced in the manner I have suggested.

Coming now to our second object, those among the Lucknow and Deoband men who disclose a special aptitude for purely scientific research should be given a thorough grounding in Mathematics, Science or Philosophy according to their respective aptitudes. After having completed their study in modern science and thought they may be permitted

to pass through Arnold's course, which will have to be shortened for their purpose also. For instance, a man who has studied Physical Science only should be called upon to attend lectures on "Science in the Muslim World", Arnold's No. 3 in the M.A. course. You can then make him a University Fellow to devote all his time to researches in the particular science he has studied.

Coming to our third object, Arnold's full course should be opened to those who do not happen to possess a special aptitude for science or philosophy but want a general training in the principles of Muslim culture and civilisation. But this need not be confined to men from Deoband or Nadwa only. Your own University men with a better knowledge of Arabic may take it up. I would find a place for Muslim art and architecture in this course.

Coming to our fourth objec, i.e., the study of Mohammedan Law and Legal History, we should pick up more brilliant men from Deoband and Lucknow, who happen to possess a legal mind and disclose a special aptitude for legal subtleties. In view of the fact that the whole system of Mohammedan Law stands in need of constructive readjustment we should give them a thorough grounding in modern Jurisprudence and principles of legislation and perhaps also in modern Economics and Sociology. You can make them Ll.B.s if you like and then permit them to pass through Arnold's course, which will have to be shortened in their case also. For instance, they may be required to attend lectures on such subjects as Muslim Political Theory and

Development of Muslim Jurisprudence. Some of them may be allowed to take up the profession of law. Others may accept your University Fellowship and devote themselves to legal research work. The present state of the administration of Mohammedan Law in this country is simply deplorable and there are difficulties which can be solved through legislative agencies only. Mohammedan professional lawyers thoroughly well-grounded in the principles of Mohammedan Law will be of the greatest help both in court and council.

Briefly my suggestions are : I accept the course of study suggested by Sir Thomas Arnold. But the whole of it should be opened only to those candidates who do not disclose a aptitude for Law, Theology and Science. In so far as the study of Theology is concerned, I allow your suggestions (paragraph 4 of your letter), but consider it is only a tentative measure to be displaced eventually by the work of original thinkers, who shall have to be trained in the manner I have suggested in the course of my letter. For these men as well as for those who take up the study of Law and special Sciences, Arnold's course will have to be shortened according to their needs. It is hardly necessary here to point out that a workable knowledge of German and French is absolutely necessary for those who take up the study of Muslim thought, literature, art, history and even of theology.

Yours sincerely,
Muhammad Iqbal

X

SELF IN THE LIGHT OF RELATIVITY

I

The ease with which we perceive external things hides from us the mystery of human perception. According to modern science all that is necessary for an act of perception happens inside the observer ; yet the things perceived appear outside, and even at an enormous distance from the observer, as in the case of a star. If the star is a mere interpretation of the happenings within, then why does it look external? You may say that it looks external because it is external. I do not contend this point. The star may be a reality situated outside me in an absolute space. My point is that if the account of perception given by modern science is correct, the star ought not to look external.

II

But is the thing known independent of the act of knowledge? Or, is the act of knowledge a constitutive element in the making of the object? Objective reality as understood by Physical Science is entirely independent of the act of knowledge. Knowing does not make any difference to it. It is there whether one knows it or not. In studying its behaviour the act of knowledge can be ignored. Thus, Physics ignored Metaphysics in the sense of a theory of knowledge in its onward march. But this attitude of

Physical Science, though highly advantageous to itself, could not have been maintained for a long time. The act of knowledge is a fact among other facts of experience which empirical Science claims as its exclusive subject of study. Physics cannot afford to ignore Metaphysics. It must recognise it as a great ally in the organisation of experience. Happily it is not a Metaphysician but a Scientist who justifies Metaphysics—I mean Einstein, who has taught us that the knower is intimately related to the object known, and that the act of knowledge is a constitutive element in the objective reality, thus confirming in a sense, the idealistic position of Kant. A further advance in our knowledge of the relationship between the act of knowledge and the object known will probably come from Psychology.

III

The object known, then, is relative to the observing self; its size and shape change as his position and speed change. But whatever the position and speed of the observer, whatever his frame of reference, something must always remain which confronts him as his 'other'. What does this mean? Does it mean that there is something absolute in what appears to us as objective reality? No. We cannot construe ever-present externality to mean the total independence or absoluteness of what appears as external to the self. Such an interpretation would contradict the very principle which discloses its relativity. If, then, in view of the principle of relativity, the object confronting the subject is really relative, there must be some self to whom it ceases to exist as

a confronting other. This self must be non-spatial, non-temporal—Absolute, to whom what is external to us must cease to exist as external. Without such an assumption objective reality cannot be relative to the spatial and temporal self. To the Absolute Self, then, the Universe is not a reality confronting him as his 'other', it is only a passing phase of His consciousness, a fleeting moment of His infinite life. Einstein is quite right in saying that the Universe is finite, but boundless. It is finite because it is a passing phase (شان in the Quranic language) of God's extensively infinite consciousness, and boundless because the creative power of God is intensively infinite. The Quranic way of expressing the same truth is that the Universe is liable to increase. This simple truth mentioned in the Quran was the greatest blow given to the Deductive systems of thought that existed before Islam, and to the circular view of the movement of Time, common to all the Aryan modes of thought. But the age of the Quran was hardly ready to assimilate it.

IV

We have seen that the Universe does not confront the Absolute Self in the same way as it confronts the human self. To Him it is a phase of His consciousness, to us it presents itself as an independent reality. But is the human self also a phase of God's consciousness, or something more substantial than a mere idea? The nature of self is such that it is self-centred and exclusive. Are, then, the Absolute Self and the human self so related to each other that they mutually exclude each other? Pringle-Pattison

deplores that the English language possesses only one word—creation—to express the relation of God and the Universe on the one hand, and the relation of God and the self of man on the other. The Arabic language is, however, more fortunate in this respect. It has two words to express this relation, i.e., *khalq* and *amr*. The former is used by the Quran to indicate the relation of the Universe of matter to God, and the latter indicates the relation of the human self to the Divine Self. All that we can say in answer to the extremely difficult question raised above is that the *amr* is not related to God in the same way as the *khalq* is. The *amr* is distinct but not isolated from God. But I confess I cannot intellectually apprehend this relationship any more than Rumi, who says:

اتصال بے تخیل بے قیاس　　　هست رب الناس را با جان ناس

V

The next question is whether it is possible for the human observer to reach the Divine point of view, and to realise the freedom from the universe as a confronting "other". The mystic says it is possible to reach a super-intellectual standpoint, and his method is to escape from the conditions which make the movement of intellect possible. The mystic method has attracted some of the best minds in the history of mankind. Probably there is something in it. But I am inclined to think that it is detrimental to some of the equally important interests of life, and is prompted by a desire to escape from the arduous task of the conquest of matter through intellect. The

surest way to realise the potentialities of the world is to associate with its shifting actualities. I believe that Empirical Science—association with the visible —is an indispensable stage in the life of contemplation. In the words of the Quran, the Universe that confronts us is not "باطل". It has its uses, and the most important use of it is that the effort to overcome the obstruction offered by it sharpens our insight and prepares us for an insertion into what lies below the surface of phenomena. As the poet Naziri says:

نه هر مغزے که بوید نکهت از مصر و یمن گیرد
مشام تیز باید تا نصیب از پیرهن گیرد

A keen insight is needed to see the non-temporal behind the perpetual flux of things. The mystic forgets that reality lives in its own appearances and that the surest way to reach the core of it lies through its appearances. The Prophet of Arabia was the first to protest against this unhealthy Asiatic mysticism, and to open our eyes to the great fact of change within and without through the appreciation of which alone it is desirable to reach the eternal. The Quran describes God as کل یوم هو فی شان, and fixes our gaze on change and variety as the greatest "Signs" of God. Thus the Quran has its own method for the elevation of the human self to the Divine standpoint. But I can only suggest this method in the following paragraph:

VI

"The impulse which drives me into the wide world is precisely the same as that which drives so

many into monasteries—the desire for self realisation." So says Count Keyserling in his Diary recently translated into English. The Count is quite right. The world of matter which confronts the self of man as its "other" is an indispensable obstruction which forces our being into fresh formations. I am afraid, however, that the Count's view of self realisation is one-sided. He tells us further, "I want to let the climate of the Tropics, the Indian modes of consciousness, the Chinese code of life, and many other factors which I cannot envisage in advance, to work their spell on me, one after the other, and then watch what will become of me." Now, such a process may bring about the realisation of our intellectual self. It may give us an acute thinker who can work out the spell of impressions into a coherent system of ideas, but it cannot shape our clay into an ideal human being. The intellectual self is only one aspect of the activity of our total self. The realisation of the total self comes not by merely permitting the wide world to throw its varied impressions on our mind, and then watching what becomes of us. It is not merely by receiving and intellectually shaping the impressions, but mainly by moulding the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes that the total self of man realises itself as one of the greatest energies of nature. In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without losing its own identity, and transcends the limits of space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation.

(*Crescent*, Lahore, 1925)

XI

McTAGGART'S PHILOSOPHY

I was reading the other day Mr. Dickinson's Memoir of the late and lamented Dr. McTaggart, that philosopher-saint whose lectures on Kant and Hegel I had the privilege to attend as an advanced student of Trinity College, Cambridge, about a quarter of a century ago. I should like to note a few points which occurred to me while reading this interesting book, whose value is very much enhanced by the personal reminiscences of those who had the good fortune of coming into contact with that great thinker.

"As we have pointed out more than once," says Mr. Dickinson, "the origin of McTaggart's philosophy was not in his intellect but in his emotion." This is true, perhaps more or less true of all thinkers if we look at McTaggart as a thinker torn asunder from the general current of British thought. In order to understand the true significance of his philosophy we must put him back into that current.

Agnosticism is not a permanent mode of thought. It comes and goes. The British mind tried to escape from it in two ways. One is the total elimination of what is called the ultimate Reality. The 'Unknown and Unknowable' of Herbert Spencer simply does not exist. Why, then, look for it? The universe is nothing but perishable phenomena without any

eternal reality behind it. The other way is that an Eternal Reality does exist behind the world of perishable phenomena, and is approachable by a purely speculative method. The first course was adopted by Hume, the second by Green. In opposition to British Phenomenalism, Green affirmed the existence of an Eternal Consciousness. The temporal process according to Green is unthinkable without a non-temporal consciousness, for consciousness of change cannot be identical with the process of change. But the Eternal Consciousness, so regarded, is nothing more than a kind of Newtonian space holding together the world of eternally inter-related appearances. This view makes it impossible to develop the living concrete self out of a dead immobile system of abstract relations. Bradley's philosophy is the logical outcome of Green. The criterion of reality is coherence and freedom from contradiction. Applying this test, the world of appearance—time, change, movement, multiplicity—turns out to be a mere illusion. The ultimate Reality is one and immutable. This is the ancient Hindu doctrine of Maya and the Greek Parmenides. But how did this illusion originate? Nobody knows. Bradley, however, admits in spite of the contradictions involved in the notion of self, that the human self must, in some sense, be real. In what sense is it real? He does not explain. McTaggart reaches the Absolute by means of Dialectic method, but he does not stop at the Absolute. The Absolute, according to him, further differentiates itself into concrete egos. The universe is not an illusion, it is a system of real selves, which cannot be regarded as

mere predicates or adjectives of the Absolute. As he wrote to me in December, 1919:

"I agree with you, as you know, in regarding quite untenable the view that finite beings are adjectives of the Absolute. Whatever they are, it is quite certain to me that they are not that."

In this aspect of his teaching McTaggart is much more genuinely British than either Bradley or Green or Bosanquet. Indeed he was to Hegel as Leibnitz was to Spinoza. Thus the character of McTaggart's philosophy was determined, not so much by his private emotions as by the intellectual difficulties as well as the un-British character of Neo-Hegelian thought in England. It also determined by what he called the needs of his country. I quote from another letter of 1920, which he appears to have written after he had read Nicholson's English translation of my *Secrets of the Self*:

"I am writing to tell you with how much pleasure I have been reading your poems. Have you not changed your position very much? Surely, in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you were much more of a Pantheist and mystic.

"For my own part I adhere to my own belief that selves are the ultimate reality, but as to their true content and their true goal, my position is, as it was, that that is to be found in eternity and not in time, and in love rather than action.

"Perhaps, however, the difference is largely a question of emphasis we each lay most weight on what our own country needs. I dare say you are

right when you say that India is too contemplative. But I am sure that England—and all Europe—is not contemplative enough. That is a lesson that we ought to learn from you—and no doubt we have something to teach in return."

The point of interest in McTaggart's philosophy, however, is that in his system mystical intuition, as a source of knowledge, is much more marked than in the system of Bradley. The need of such a direct revelation is the natural outcome of the failure of a purely speculative method. An Italian writer describes McTaggart's philosophy as mystical degeneration of English Neo-Hegelianism. Nothing of the kind. Some of the greatest minds of the world have felt the need of a direct contact with the Ultimate Reality, and have indeed, in some cases, achieved such contact. Plotinus, Ghazzali, Schelling and Bergson are instances in point. In his spiritual evolution Kant himself reached that stage; but unlike Ghazzali and others he was led to achieve the Ultimate Reality as a regulative idea only. The result of his critical philosophy is that God cannot be proved to exist, but that we should act as if He does exist. Not William James but Kant was the real founder of modern Pragmatism. Will, then, the Italian writer, referred to above, describe Kant's philosophy as a pragmatic degeneration of German thought?

It must, however, be remembered in the case of McTaggart that the mystic revelation of Reality came to him as a confirmation of his thought. His system is deductive not in the sense in which the philosophy of Bergson and Plotinus is deductive. He started

with a firm conviction in the power of human reason, and that conviction remained with him to the end of his days. His illumination came, I think, as an accidental confirmation of what he had reached through pure reason. That is why he had such an unshakable faith in his philosophy. This is clear from the last words which he said to his wife: "I am grieved that we must part, but you know I am not afraid of death." Such a triumphant faith is the result of a direct revelation alone. And this revelation has nothing to do with what our psychology calls emotion; it is, as Mrs. McTaggart rightly insists, "an actual perception of the senses." Like a true mystic McTaggart rarely mentioned his experiences to others. The ultimate basis of religion is an experience which is essentially individual and incommunicable. It is because of its essentially private character that mystics talk about it for the purposes of verification only. In the history of Islamic mysticism we find many recorded instances in which some mystics have been reported to have travelled thousands of miles for the verification of a single experience. This is technically known as *tasdiq*, i.e., verification by an appeal to another man's experience. Knowledge and direct revelation are not mutually opposed: they are complementary to each other. The philosophical theologian simply tries, for the sake of less fortunate persons, to socialize through reason what is essentially individual. When the mystic Sultan Abu Sa'id met the philosopher Abu Ali ibn Sina he is reported to have said, "I see what he knows." McTaggart both knew and saw; but his

vision, I believe, did not precede his system. It did not initially inspire his thought, though it did bring to him the warmth of conviction. This, to my mind, indicates a far more powerful intellect than that of Plotinus or Bergson. Yet the vision of McTaggart, in view of its static character, is not free from the unhealthy influences of his Hegelian inspiration. But perhaps we possess no criterion to decide whether the universe in its ultimate essence is at rest or in motion.

Another point on which I would like to say a few words is McTaggart's view of the self. Hegel's indifference to personal immortality has more or less affected all those who received inspiration from him. With Bosanquet and Bradley the self is not a substance in the sense of Spinoza. It is a construction of thought, a mere predicate or adjective of the Absolute. And this self-hood, according to these thinkers, is further transcended in the Absolute. This account of self disregards even the elementary conditions of self-hood as known to living experience. The self, as known to experience, is much more than a mere predicate of the Absolute ; it is a dynamic centre of experience. By this criticism of the common Neo-Hegelian view of the self I do not mean to argue for McTaggart's view. All that I mean is to show how his mind tried to escape from the results of English Neo-Hegelianism. To McTaggart the self is a real substance. He reached the Absolute through the method of Hegel. But with him the Absolute has further determinations—i.e., egos of actual experience which participate in the

elemental eternity of the Absolute. This amounts to total dismissal of the Hegelian Absolute. But the result of this dismissal is not a return to Empiricism. It gives us not a world of interrelated appearances, but a living world of interrelated egos. Mr. Dickinson thinks that it cuts out science at one stroke. It does nothing of the kind any more than the spiritual pluralism of Leibnitz. But while I agree that the self is more than a mere predicate of the Absolute, I cannot agree with McTaggart in the view that the self is elementally immortal. From the mere fact that the individual ego is a differentiation of the eternal Absolute it, by no means, follows that, even in its finitude, the human self retains the character which belongs to its source alone. To my mind such a differentiation should give it only a capacity for immortality and not immortality itself. Personally I regard immortality as an inspiration and not something eternally achieved. Man is a candidate for immortal life which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego.

I venture here to translate for the English reader one or two passages from my poem called *The New Garden of Mystery*:

> If you say that the 'I' is a mere illusion—
> An appearance among other appearances—
> Then tell me who is the subject of this illusion?
> Look within and discover.
> The world is visible;
> Not even the intellect of an angel can comprehend it;
> The 'I' is invisible and needs no proof

Think awhile and see thine own secret
The 'I' is Truth, it is no illusion.
When it ripens, it becomes eternal
Lovers, even though separated from the Beloved, live in blissful union.

It is possible to give wings to a mere spark,
And to make it flutter for ever and for ever!
The Eternity of God is elemental and not the reward of His action!
That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul
Wins for herself by love's frenzy.
Why fear that death which comes from without?
For when the 'I' ripens into a self,
It has no danger of dissolution.
There is a more subtle inner death which makes me tremble.
This death is falling down from love's frenzy,
Saving one's spark and not giving it away freely to the heaps of chaff.

But while I disagree with McTaggart in his view of immortality, I regard this part of his work as almost apostolic. He emphasized personal immortality, even at the expense of the transcendent God of Christian theology, at a time when this important belief was decaying in Europe, and when the European man was about to face death on an enormous scale. Indeed in this aspect of his work he may be compared to the great Muslim mystic Hallaj, whose undying phrase "I am the creative Truth" was thrown as a challenge to the whole Muslim world at a time when Muslim scholastic thought was moving

in a direction which tended to obscure the reality and destiny of the human ego. Hallaj never ceased to utter what he had personally seen to be the Truth until the Mullas of Islam prevailed upon the state to imprison him and finally to crucify him. He met his death with perfect calm.

There is one more point which I would like briefly to consider here—I mean his atheism. I used to meet him almost every day in his rooms in Trinity, and very often our talk turned on the question of God. His powerful logic often silenced me, but he never succeeded in convincing me. There is no doubt, as Mr. Dickinson points out in his Memoir, that he had a positive dislike for the transcendent God of Western theology. The Absolute of the Neo-Hegelian lacks life and movement. The Eternal Consciousness of Green is hardly distinguishable from Newtonian space. How could these satisfy him? In a letter, already quoted, he wrote to me:

"As far as the life of the individual remains the same in the course of amplification and expression, I am inclined to think (for an European, you know can also be a mystic) that the solution rests in loving the same persons. But indeed it still seems to me, as it did when we first knew one another, that the solution of all problems is found only in Love."

Indeed his description of love as the essence of Reality indicates that, in spite of his thorough-going intellectualism, his soul revolted against the inert Absolute of Neo-Hegelians. Yet in a letter from which I have quoted above he seems to oppose love to action. I do not see the opposition. Love is no

passivity. It is active and creative. Indeed, on the material plane, it is the only force which circumvents death : for when death carries away one generation, love regarded as the essence of Reality is just the love of one person for another ; and further, it is the cause and not the effect of the proximity of two persons. Now it is because of its character as an active cause that in spite of variety in content of the mutual loves of various persons, it is capable of being experienced as a unity embracing the entire universe. But the crucial point is whether this central unity is an all-inclusive self. This was McTaggart's real difficulty. The self is unique and impervious. How could one self, however superior, include other selves ? The mystic poet Rumi felt the same difficulty. " Between the individual egos and their Sustainer," he says, "obtains a contact which can neither be imagined nor intellectually conceived." In his Idea of God Professor Pringle-Pattison also regards this relation as inscrutable by human intellect. But is not the individual ego himself a colony of egos ?

> Shall I point the way to the eternal secret ?
> Open thine eye on thyself
> Thou art visible and invisible, many and one !

Perhaps it is not possible intellectually to conceive this ultimate unity as an all-embracing self. It is my belief, as I have pointed out before, that McTaggart's Hegelian inspiration marred the vision which was vouchsafed him. A more serious thing happened to poor Nietzsche, whose peculiar intellectual environment led him to think that his vision of the Ultimate Ego could be realized in a world of space and time.

What grows only out of the inner depths of the heart of man he proposed to create by an artificial biological experiment. He was taken as a mad man and was placed in the hands of those who administer drugs and mixtures. As I said of him in my *Javid Nama*:

> A Hallaj! A stranger in his own land!
> Safe from the Mulla's hit, killed by the Physician's hand.

The real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self. Does Reality respond to us? It does; sometimes by reflection, sometimes by reflection rising higher than itself—i.e., the act of worship. In McTaggart's case reflection took the place of worship. The orders of Muslim mystics have invented various rules and practices by which to come into direct contact with the Ultimate Reality. The truth, however, is that neither worship nor reflection nor any kind of practices entitle a man to this response from the Ultimate Love. It depends eventually on what religion calls "grace". The philosophy of McTaggart has in fact raised the great problem of the nature of Love. How will it be solved in Europe if at all? Surely analytic psychology will never be able to solve it. Its secret lies in the pangs of separation, detachment, or, as McTaggart would say, differentiation.

If the ultimate Reality, i.e., Love, has any significance for the life of its own ego-differentiations, it must itself be an all-inclusive ego which sustains, responds, loves and is capable of being loved. In McTaggart's view there is no guarantee that the process of birth, death and rebirth will be endless.

On the other hand, he himself suggests in his *Some Dogmas of Religion* that "it may be that the process will eventually destroy itself, and merge in a perfection which transcends all time and change." In this eventuality we come back to the Absolute again, and McTaggart's system defeats its own purpose. The possibility of ego-differentiations merging again into a perfection transcending time and change must be counteracted, however remote it may be. And this can be done only by taking immortality as a hope, an inspiration, a duty, and not as an eternal fact.

My heart burns on the loneliness of God,
In order, therefore, to maintain intact His Ego-Society,
I sow in my dust the seed of self-hood,
And keep a constant vigil over my "I".[1]

(*Indian Arts and Letters*, 6, 1932)

1. *The New Garden of Mystery.*

XII

KHUSHHAL KHAN KHATTACK

(*The Afghan Warrior-Poet*)

The unification of the Afghan race—a process which is still going on before our eyes—forms one of the most interesting chapters in the history of Central Asia. Bahlol Lodhi and Sher Shah Suri in India, the Khattack poet Khushhal Khan and Pir Roshan among the frontier tribes, the late Amir Abdul Rahman Khan and his grandson King Aman Ullah Khan in Afghanistan proper, are the most outstanding figures in the history of this interesting movement. The day is not far off when some Afghan historian will tell us the story of the unity of his race much in the same way as Bolton King has told the story of the unity of Italy.

I want to place before the readers of "Islamic Culture" some specimens of Khushhal Khan's poetry, the value and importance of which is yet to be realised by the Afghans. He was born in 1613, and rose to the chieftainship of his tribe at the age of 27. He served the Emperor Shah Jahan loyally, but fell under the suspicion of Aurangzeb who imprisoned him in the fortress of Gwalior. He was released after seven years, but on his return to his native land openly revolted against the Emperor and founded the great Afghan confederacy against the Mughals. He personally went from tribe to tribe, and by

negotiations as well as his charming poetry tried to infuse something of his own burning soul into his countrymen. The diplomacy and gold of Aurangzeb, however, were too powerful for him, and he was finally compelled to retire in the Afridi country where he died at the age of 78. His was a versatile mind and he wrote on various subjects, such as poetry, philosophy, ethics, medicine and his own autobiography which is unfortunately lost. Throughout his poetry, the major portion of which was written in India, and during his struggles with the Mughals, breathes the spirit of early Arabian poetry. We find in it the same simplicity and directness of expression, the same love of freedom and war, the same criticism of life. I hope the Education Minister of Afghanistan will appoint some Afghan scholar to make a critical study of this great warrior-poet of the Pushto language and to bring out a complete edition of his works with the necessary historical notes. This must be the first literary undertaking of modern Afghanistan.

The following specimens of Khushhal Khan's poetry are taken from Captain Raverty's literal English translation which was published in 1862. The selection is sure to give the reader some idea of the poet's passionate patriotism, his aspirations, and the keenness of his observation of men. The poet has no doubt said some bitter things against Aurangzeb, but we must not forget that these are the judgments of an enemy who had passed seven long years as the Emperor's prisoner in a country of which he himself says:—

"Defend us from Hind, tho' it should teem

with all the world's luxuries besides."

A year hath passed since Aurangzeb is encamped against us,
Disordered and perplexed in appearance, and wounded in heart.
It is now year after that his nobles fall in battle ;
But his armies swept away, who shall number them!
The treasures of India have been spread out before us:
The red gold *mohurs* have been engulfed in the hills.
It would not have entered one's head in eighteen guesses
That such events would ever have happened in these parts.
Still Aurangzeb's malevolence hath not a whit diminished
Though the curse of his father it before drew down.
For this reason, also, no one can place dependence on him:
He is malignant and perfidious; a breaker of his word.
For this state of things, no other termination can be seen
Than that the Mughals be annihilated, or the Afghans undone.
If this, which is beheld, be the revolutions of destiny—

If in this be the will of the Almighty, the time is come.
Fate revolveth not in the same fashion at all times—
Now 'tis propitious to the rose; now favourable to the thorn,
At a period so pregnant with honour and glory as the present.
In what manner do these base and recreant Afghans act?
There is no deliverance in anything save the sword:
Afghans, who nourish any other idea than this, are lost, indeed.
The Afghans are superior to the Mughals at the sword,
Were but the Afghans, in intellect, a little discreet.
If the different tribes would but support each other,
Kings would have to bow down in prostration before them.
But whether it be concord or strife, or folly or wisdom,
The affairs of every one are in the hands of the Almighty.

(2)

I have beheld fortune's practices—its different usages and ways—
It clambereth unto thee with difficulty; but like a stone from a mountain, rolleth away!

(3)

Though the kind may cast him into prison, he will not grieve;
For the liberty of the free is from the beginning of time.

(4)

Let it not be, that every bad rider should mount fortune's steed:
If it be ridden by any one, at least a good horseman let him be.

(5)

Neither doth any one here seek to avail himself of my abilities and experience,
Nor are the capabilities of this country's people of any advantage unto me.
We converse together in one tongue—we speak the Pushto language;
But we do not, in the least, understand what we to one another say.
The Swatis account themselves exceeding wise, whilst they are but fools,
And 'tis amongst such a set as these, that the Almighty my lot hath cast.
Now that I have beheld the Swat valley, I have this much discovered,
That there is no tribe more abject and contemptible than the Yusufzais.
Tyranny and self-conceit seem to be the inmates of all;

And every man amongst them is covetous and ready to beg.
Although, in their dwellings, they have wealth and goods, they are hungry-eyed;
And their head-men, than the rest, are more villainous and infamous still.
'Tis said, that the water-melon deriveth its colour from the water-melon,
But their wise men and elders are more worthless than the people themselves.
The rights of the poor and helpless, they make out wrong and unjust,
If they can a single penny obtain by way of a present, or a bribe.
As to these I have seen myself; about others I am unable to speak—
They are all either bullocks or skinners, without any exception soever.

(6)

The Turanis are all turbulent, quarrelsome, and oppressive;
Liars, perjurers, and concocters of calumny and slander.
The Iranis are of a friendly disposition—they are true and faithful:
They have urbanity and breeding—are respectable and deserving.
The Afghans are malevolent and ruthless and contentious,
But give them for their modesty and valour due praise.

Whether Baluch or Hazarah, both are dirty, and abominable:
They have neither religion nor faith—may shame attend them!
Whether Hindustani or Sindhi, may their faces be blackend!
For they have neither modesty nor shame, neither bread nor meat.
The Kashmiris, whether male or female—may they all be undone!
They have none of the chattels of humanity amongst them.
Behold they are not of the human race—what are they?
May perdition swallow them—both Uzbek and Kazalbash!
The Laghmanis, Bangashis, Swatis, Tirahis—all of them,
Are dancers and fiddlers—and who will be friends with such?
Unto him, all matters are manifest, regarding other folks' ways;
Then render unto Khushhal's shrewdness, its due meed of praise.

(7)

Gentle breeze of the morn, shouldst thou pass over Khairabad,
Or should thy course lead thee by Sarae, on the banks of the Sind?
Hail them, again and again, with my greetings and salutations;

And with them, many, many expressions of my
regard and love.
Cry out unto the swift Aba-Sind with sonorous
voice;
But unto the Landdaey, mildly and whisperingly
say—
"Perhaps, I may drink, once more, a cup of thy
water;
For, whilst, I was not on Gange's nor on
Jamna's banks."
Of the climate of Hind should I complain, how
long shall I cry out?
Whilst the vileness of its water is far more
horrid still.
Shouldst thou drink water from a rivulet, it
racketh the vitals;
And that of the wells, too, is not free from
danger and peril.
Since therein, from hill streams, the cool element
is not to be had,
Defend us from Hind, tho' it should teem with
all the world's luxuries besides.

(8)

Do they belong to the Ifreet, the demon, or the
goblin race?
For, among the lineage of Adam, the Afghans
I cannot account.
Notwithstanding thou mayest give one of them
the best of counsel and advice,
Still, even the counsel of his father is not accept-
able to his heart,

The whole of the deeds of the Pathans are better
than those of the Mughals;
But they have no unity amongst them, and a
great pity it is.
The fame of Bahlol, and of Sher Shah too,
resoundeth in my ears—
Afghan Emperors of India, who swayed its
sceptre effectively and well.
For six or seven generations, did they govern so
wisely,
That all their people were filled with admiration
of them.
Either those Afghans were different, or these have
greatly changed;
Or otherwise, at present, such is the Almighty's
decree.
If the Afghans shall acquire the gift of concord
and unity,
Old Khushhal shall, a second time, grow young
therefrom.
A good name will remain behind—naught else
soever will survive:
The wicked for evil are remembered—the good,
for their virtues, in the memory live.
Shouldst thou hear of Hajaj, thou wilt also hear
the name of Noshirwan,
For justice, the unbeliever is venerated—for
tyranny, the believer is cursed.

(9)

The Afghans have gone mad about posts and
dignities;

But God preserve me from such plagues and troubles.
Unto whom belongeth the gift of discretion; to the swordsman?
Just the same as one learneth the Kuran, in the schools.
Not one amongst them is gifted with the art of prudence;
For with the dispositions of all of them I am well acquainted.
The Afghans have one very great failing, if thou but notice—
That they with the titles and dignities of the Mughals conquest.
Shame and reputation, fame and honour, are of no account;
But, certainly, they talk enough about officers, rank, and gold.
Look not towards the Mughals with the eyes of cupidity;
Even if in the habit of doing so from any other cause.
The trusty Khattaki sword is buckled round my waist;
But not the custom of servitude, in the village and in town.
The dark night of Aurangzeb's prison I hold in remembrance,
When all the night long, "O God! O God!" continually I cried.
If the Afghans would but oppose the Mughals with the sword,

Every Khattak, by the bridle-rein, should lead a Mughal away.
Amongst the Khattak, O Khushhal, no council of honour existeth;
Hence, I cannot conceive from what lineage they have sprung.

(10)

Whether it is the wise man, or the ignorant—the honest man or the robber,
I do not see anyone a true colleague united with me in my task.
A sincere friend in distress I cannot discover throughout the land;
For people merely give the empty consolation of their tongues.
Like unto the ants, directed towards the grain are the steps
Of those who favour me with their coming and their going.
Did not these ants entertain the hope of obtaining a store?
They would never make any journey in that direction at all.
Abandon not thine own stricken mountain-land, O Khushhal!
Though blood is at every footstep and in every direction shed.

(11)

If the damsels of Kashmir are famed for their beauty,

Or those of Chīn, or Ma-chīn, or Tartary, noted likewise;
Yet the sweet Afghan maidens that mine eyes have beheld,
Put all the others to shame, by their conduct and ways.
As to their comeliness, this, once for all, is the fact of the matter,
That they are, in lineage, of the tribe and posterity of Yakub.
Of the fragrance of musk, or of rosewater, they have no need—
They are as the *attar* of the perfumer, by prayer five times a day.
Whether jewels for forehead or for neck, or any other trinkets,
All these are contemptible, with their dark locks compared.
Whether veils of gold brocade, or whether silken mantles,
All are a sacrifice unto the snow-white kerchief of theirs.
The beauty of their minds excelleth their personal privacy;
Not seen in the markets, with garments open and persons exposed.
They cannot look one full in the face, through modesty,
They are unused to abuse, and the discipline of the shoe.
Khushhal hath mentioned, more or less, somewhat of the matter;

But much remaineth that may be suitable, or unsuitable to the case.

(12)

If the Afghan people are of the human race,
In disposition and ways they are very Hindus.
They are possessed of neither skill, nor intellect;
But are happy in ignorance, and in strife.
Neither do they obey words of their fathers;
Nor do they unto the teachers' instructions give ear.
When there may be one worthy man amongst them,
They are the destroyers of his head and life.
They ever lie in wait, one to injure the other;
Hence they are always by calamity remembered.
They neither possess worth, nor do others esteem them,
Though they are more numerous than locusts or than ants.
First I, then others, as many as there may be—
We all of us require aid, and a helping hand.
Whether it is valour, or whether liberality,
They have cast, through dissension, them both away.
But still, O Khushhal, thank God for this,
That they are not slaves, but free-born men.

(13)

Doth the gnat ever attain unto the high rank of the falcon,
Even though he is furnished, both with feathers and with wings?

(14)

Though all the world may agree to disparage and speak ill of him ;
Poor Khushhal in his own merits and integrity.

(15)

However tortuously the snake moveth about,
It proceedeth straight enough unto its hold.

(16)

What is it, a sound and healthy body,
Which, more than empire and sovereignty, is preferred ?
Altho' the worlds wealth is an excellent thing,
Glory and renown are, than riches, more precious still.
What are more inestimable than the most perfect thing ?
The one is purity—the other is sincerity of heart.
What is it that disenthralleth a man from sorrow ?
Yea, what is it ?—it is contentedness of mind !
Shouldst thou boast thyself of thy godliness,
That godliness, thereby, is rendered bootless and vain.
What is that, which hath a value beyond compute ?
Yea, what is it ?—it is deliberation in all our affairs.
That, which as a favour and obligation is conferred,

As generosity or liberality, was it ever accounted?
What is that, which, in this world, is a Hell indeed?
Verily, it is the society and acquaintance of a fool.
Then, O Khushhal, guard thou well thy mind;
For if there be aught good, 'tis a mind upright.

(17)

Verily, the Afghans are deficient in sense and understanding—
They are the tail-cut curs of the butcher's slaughter-house.
They have played away dominion for the gold of the Mughals;
And they lust after the offices, that the Mughals can give.
Though the camel, with its lading, hath entered their dwelling,
They are first taken up with stealing the bell from its neck.
Out upon him who first the name of Sarrahban bore,
And malediction upon the whole of them, that after follow.
The recreant occupy themselves in baseness and dishonour;
But every breath of the noble is devoted to the cause of renown.
They commence from Kandahar, and reach unto Damghar

And all are worthless and good for nothing,
who dwell between.

(18)

The Mughals whom I now set eyes upon, are not
such as were wont to be?
The day of their swords is past and gone, and
but the pen remaineth unto them:
They gain over the Afghans by gold; and by
fraud and deception entangle them;
Upon me these things have no effect, for the
favour of God is still upon me.
I am neither a fly nor a crow, that I should
hover over rottenness and filth,
The hawk or the falcon am I, that must my
heart, with my own quarry, delight;
Were there but others like unto me in this
affair, I should rejoice indeed;
But since there are none like me, with distress
and grief I am o'erwhelm'd.

(*Islamic Culture*,
May, 1928)

XIII

FOREWORD TO "MURAQQA-I-CHUGHTAI"

I welcome *Muraqqa-i-Chughtai*—Ghalib's Illustrated Edition by Mr. M. A. Rahman Chughtai—a unique enterprise in modern Indian painting and printing. Unfortunately I am not competent enough to judge the technical side of painting, and refer the reader to Dr. Cousin's admirable Introduction in which he has analysed some of the more important forces that are shaping Chughtai's artistic ideal. All that I can say is that I look upon Art as subservient to life and personality. I expressed this view as far back as 1914 in my *Asrar-i-Khudi*, and twelve years later in the poems of the *Zubur-i-Ajam*. I have tried to picture the soul-movement of the ideal artist in whom Love reveals itself as a unity of Beauty and Power :

دلبری بے قاہری جادوگری است
دلبری با قاہری پیغمبری است

From this point of view some of the more recent paintings of Mr. Chughtai are indeed remarkable. The spiritual health of a people largely depends on the kind of inspiration which their poets and artists receive. But inspiration is not a matter of choice. It is a gift, the character of which cannot be critically judged by the recipient before accepting it. It comes to the individual unsolicited, and only to socialise itself. For this reason the personality that receives,

and the life-quality of that which is received, are matters of the utmost importance for mankind. The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his song or picture, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of an Attila or a Changez. As the Prophet of Islam said of Imra'ul Qais—the greatest poet of pre-Islamic Arabia:

اشعر الشعرا و قاید هم الی النار

To permit the visible to shape the invisible, to seek what is scientifically called adjustment with nature is to recognise her mastery over the spirit of man. Power comes from resisting her stimuli, and not from exposing ourselves to their action. Resistance of what is with a view to create what ought to be, is health and life. All else is decay and death. Both God and man live by perpetual creation.

حسن را از خود برون جستن خطاست
آنچه می بایست پیش ما کجاست

The artist who is a blessing to mankind defies life. He is an associate of God and feels the contact of Time and Eternity in his soul. In the words of Fichte, he "sees all Nature full, large and abundant as opposed to him who sees all things thinner, smaller and emptier than they actually are". The modern age seeks inspiration from Nature. But Nature simply 'is' and her function is mainly to obstruct our search for 'Ought', which the artist must discover within the deeps of his own being.

And in so far as the cultural history of Islam is concerned it is my belief that, with the single exception of Architecture, the art of Islam (Music, Painting and even Poetry) is yet to be born—the art, that is to say,

which aims at the human assimilation of Divine attributes تخلقو باخلاق الله gives man infinite aspiration اجر غیر ممنون , and finally wins for him the status of God's Representative on earth.

مقام آدم خاکی نہاد دریا بند
مسافران حرم را خدا دهد توفیق

There are, however, indications to show that the young artist of the Punjab is already on the way to feel his responsibility as an artist. He is only twenty-nine yet. What his art will become when he reaches the maturer age of forty, the future alone will disclose. Meanwhile all those who are interested in his work will keenly watch his forward movement.

XIV

A PLEA FOR DEEPER STUDY OF THE MUSLIM SCIENTISTS

Sometime ago various questions arose in my mind regarding the culture of Islam as embodying the world feeling of a specific group of mankind. Is Modern Science purely Western in origin? Why did the Muslims devote themselves to architecture as a mode of self-expression; and why did they comparatively ignore music and painting? What light, if any, do their mathematics and their decorative art throw on their intellectual and emotional attitude towards the concepts of space and time? Are there any psychological conditions which determined the rise and final acceptance, as an orthodox religious dogma, of a boldly conceived Atomic theory wholly unlike the Greek theory? What is the psychological meaning of *mi'raj* in the cultural history of Islam? Professor Macdonald has recently tried to prove the existence of Buddhistic influence on the rise and growth of Atomism in Islam. But the cultural problem which I have ventured to raise is far more important than the purely historical question answered by Professor Macdonald. Similarly Professor Bevan has given us valuable historical discussion of the story of the *mi'raj*. To my mind, however, what is, culturally speaking, more important is the intense appeal that the story has always made to the average Muslim, and the manner in which Muslim thought and imagination

have worked on it. It must be something more than a mere religious dogma, for it appealed to the great mind of Dante, and through Muhyiuddin Ibn-ul-Arabi furnished a model for the sublimest part of the Divine Comedy which symbolises the culture of mediaeval Europe. The historian may rest satisfied with the conclusion that the Muslim belief in the Prophet's Ascension finds no justification in the Quran; yet the psychologist who aims at a deeper view of Islamic culture cannot ignore the fact that the outlook given by the Quran to its followers does demand the story as a formative element in the world-picture of Islam. The truth is that it is absolutely necessary to adjust their answers into a systematic whole of thought and emotion. Without this it is impossible to discover the ruling concepts of a given culture, and to appreciate the spirit that permeates it. However, a comprehensive view of the culture of Islam, as an expression of the spiritual life of its followers, is easy of achievement.

The Culture of Islam is the youngest of all Asiatic Cultures. For us moderns it is far more easy to grasp the spirit of this culture than to imagine the world-picture of those ancient cultures whose intellectual and emotional attitude it is extremely difficult to express in a modern language. The difficulty of the historian of Muslim culture is mainly due to the almost total lack of Arabic scholars trained in special sciences. European scholars have done good work in the domain of Muslim history, philology, religion and literature. Muslim philosophy too has had share of their attention; but I am afraid the work done in

philosophy is, on the whole, of a superficial kind, and often betrays ignorance of both Muslim and European thought. It is in Art as well as in the concepts of special sciences and Philosophy that the true spirit of a culture is revealed. But, for the reason mentioned above, the student of Muslim culture is yet very far from understanding the spirit of that culture. Briffault, in his *Making of Humanity* a book which every student of the history of culture ought to read, tells us that "neither Roger Bacon nor his later namesake has any title to be credited with having introduced the experimental method". And further that "The experimental method of the Arabs was by Bacon's time widespread and eagerly cultivated throughout Europe." Now, I have reasons to believe that the origin of Descartes' *Method* and Bacon's *Novum Organum* goes back to Muslim critics of Greek logic, e.g., Ibn Taimiyya, Ghazzali, Razi, and Shahabuddin Maqtul. But it is obvious that the existing material which would prove this thesis can be handled only by those Arabic scholars who have made a special study of Greek, Muslim and European logic.

Again, our ignorance of the concepts of Muslim science sometimes leads to erroneous views of modern culture. An instance of this I find in Spengler's extremely learned work, *Untergang des Abendlandes*, in which he has developed a new theory of the birth and growth of cultures while discussing the concept of number in the classical, Arabian and modern cultures, and contrasting the Greek notion of magnitude with the Arabian indeterminateness of

number, he says :—

"Number as pure magnitude inherent in the material presentness of things is paralleled by number as pure relation, and if we may characterize the Classical World, the cosmos, as being based on a deep need of visible limits and composed accordingly as a sum of material things, so we may say that our world-picture is an actualising of an infinite space in which things visible appear very nearly as realities of a lower order, limited in the presence of the illimitable. The symbol of the West is an idea of which no other culture gives even a hint, the idea of function. The function is anything rather than an expansion of, it is complete emancipation from, any pre-existent idea of number. With the function, not only the Euclidean Geometry but also the Archimedean arithmetic ceased to have any value for the really significant mathematics of Western Europe."

The last three sentences in this passage are in fact the foundation-stone on which the superstructure of Spengler's theory largely rests. Unfortunately, the thesis that no other culture gives even a hint of the idea of function is incorrect. I had a vague recollection of the idea of function in Al-Beruni, and not being a mathematician, I sought the help of Dr. Zia-ud-Din of Aligarh who very kindly gave me an English translation of Al-Berunis passage, and wrote to me an interesting letter from which I quote the following:

"Al-Beruni in his book, *Qanun-i-Masudi*, used Newton's formula of Interpolation for valuing the various intermediary angles of Trigonometry func-

tions from his tables which were calculated for every increase of fifteen minutes. He gave Geometrical proof of Interpolation formula. In the end he wrote a paragraph saying that this proof can be applied to any function whatsoever whether it may be increasing or diminishing with the increase of arguments. He did not use the word function, but he expressed the idea of function in generalising the formula of Interpolation from Trigonometrical function to any function whatsoever. I may add here that I drew the attention of Prof. Schwartzchild—Professor of Astronomy in the Gottingen University—to this passage, and he was so much surprised that he took Prof. Andrews with him to the library, and got the whole passage translated three times before he began to believe it."

It is not possible for me here to discuss Spengler's theory, and to show how materially his oversight affects his view of history. Suffice it to say that a genetic view of the cultures associated with the two great Semitic religions reveals their spiritual relationship which tends to falsify Spengler's thesis that cultures, as organic structures, are completely alien to one another. But this brief reference to one of the most important concepts of modern mathematics reminds me of عایته لاامکان فی درایته لمکان ("The extent of possibility in the science of space") of Iraqi. During my correspondence with Maulvi Syed Anwar Shah, one of the most learned traditionists in the Muslim world of today, regarding the meaning of the word "Dahr" (Time) occurring in the well-known tradition (لاتسبو الدهر ان الدهر هوالله) "Deal not in invective against

Time (with Time's vicissitudes), Lo: Time (with Time's vicissitudes) is Allah." The Maulvi Sahib referred to this manuscript; and later, at my request, very kindly sent me a copy of it. I consider it necessary to give you an account of the contents of this valuable document, partly because it will furnish additional reason for dissatisfaction with Spengler's theory, but mainly because I mean thereby to impress upon you the need of Oriental research in concepts of special sciences as developed in the world of Islam. Moreover it is likely that this small manuscript of great value may lead to the opening up of a fresh field of inquiry about the origins of our concepts of space and time, the importance of which has only recently been realised by modern Physics.

There is, however, some doubt about the authorship of the booklet. Haji Khalifah attributes it to one Sh. Mahmud whom I have not been able to trace. About the middle of the text the following sentence occurs :—

این مخدره غیبی . . . چون بمشاطگی بیان این بنده ضعیف بآحرز مائیان
جلوه کند امیدوارم که تشنگان جرعه حقیقت در ایام اخرالزمان از دست
این ساقی عراقی جمال زلال شیرین مشاهده نمایند۔

Personally I am inclined to think that in this manuscript we are in a more intimate touch with the Persian Sufi Iraqi whose freedom of thought and action brought on him the odium of the orthodox both in Egypt and India. However the reason why he was led to reduce his thoughts to writing is thus explained :—

وبایستے که این اسرار عزیز در صمیم جان وسریدائے دل مکنون و مخزون

داشتمے - نه از راه بخل بل از راه عزت و نفاست ولیکن عذر در جلوه کردن
این مخدره عذرا آنست که وقتے در اثنائے سخن و برمی دل برزبان لفظ
مکان رفت - وچون لفظ مکان در اخبار آمده است انکار نباید کرد ولیکن
مکان را بباید شناخت که عبارت از چیست تاتشبیه از راه خیزد پس جماعتے
از کور دلان شور بخت چون لفظ مکان شنیدند از سر تعصب وحسد وعناد
وجحود این کلم را دست آویز ساختند وبر لجانیدن مامیان بستند - ورقم
تشبیه برما کشیدند و تکفیر مافتوائے نوشتند پس ناچار از بهر برات ساخت
دل خود از غبار تشبیه این مخدره عذرا از ابدان عالمیان عالم طبیعت
عرض بایست کردن و این یوسف باجمال بان کوران جلوه بایستے داد تارفع
ظن ایشان بوده باشد - اگرچه معلوم بود که درد تعصب و حسد درمان نمی
پزیرد چنانچه باران که ماده حیات است مردار راجز تباهی نمی افزاید -
ان الذین حقت علیهم کلمة ربک لایومنون ولو جاء تهم کل آیة حتٰی یدو
العذاب الالیم -

Assuming, then, that the writer is Fakhruddin Iraqi, it is significant to note that he was a contemporary of Nasir-ud-Din Tusi. Tusi's work on Euclid was printed in Rome in 1594, and Jhon Wallis introduced it to the University of Oxford about the middle of the 17th century. It is Tusi's effort to improve the parallel postulate of Euclid that is believed to have furnished a basis in Europe for the problem of space which eventually led to the theories of Gauss and Reimana. Iraqi, however, was not a mathematician, though his view of space and time appears to me to be several centuries ahead of Tusi. This necessitates a very careful inquiry into the progress of mathematical thought in Islam with a view to discover whether Iraqi's conclusions were ever reached through a purely mathematical channel.

I will now proceed to summarise the substance of Iraqi's discussion of Time and Space mainly in his own words. The secret of Time and Space is the

greatest of secrets. To know it is to know the secret of the Being and attributes of God. The existence of some kind of Space in relation to God is clear from the following verses of the Quran :—

" Dost thou not see that God knoweth all that is in the Heavens and all that is in the Earth? Three persons speak not privately together, but He is their fourth; nor five, but He is their sixth; nor fewer nor more, but wherever they be He is with them". (58 : 8)

" Ye shall not be employed in affairs, nor shall ye read a text out of the Quran, nor shall ye work any work, but We will be witness, over you when you are engaged therein; and the weight of an atom on Earth or in Heaven escapeth not thy Lord; nor is there weight that is less than this or greater but it is in the Perspicuous Book." (10 : 62)

" We created man: and we know what his soul whispereth to him, and we are closer to him than his neck-vein." (50 : 15)

But we must not forget that the words proximity, contact and mutual separation, which apply to material bodies, do not apply to God. Divine life is in touch with the whole Universe on the analogy of the soul's contact with the body. The soul is neither inside nor outside the body; neither proximate to nor separate from it. Yet its contact with every atom of the body is real, and it is impossible to conceive this contact except by positing some kind of space which befits the subtleness of the soul. The existence of space in relation to the life of God, therefore, cannot be denied; only we should carefully define

the kind of space which may be predicated of the Absoluteness of God. Now there are three kinds of space—the space of material bodies, the space of immaterial beings, and the space of God. The space of material bodies is further divided into three kinds. First, the space of gross bodies of which we predicate roominess. In this space movement takes time, bodies occupy their respective places and resist displacement. Secondly, the space of subtle bodies, e.g., air and sound. In this space two bodies resist each other and their movement is measurable in terms of time which, however, appears to be different to the time of gross bodies. The air in a tube must be displaced before other air can enter into it; and the time of sound-waves is practically nothing compared to the time of gross bodies. Thirdly, we have the space of light. The light of the Sun instantly reaches the farthest limits of the Earth. Thus in the velocity of light and sound time is reduced almost to zero. It is, therefore, clear that the space of light is different to the space of air and sound. There is, however, a more effective argument than this. The light of a candle spreads in all directions in a room without displacing the air in the room; and this shows that the space of light is more subtle than the space of air which has no entry into the space of light. In view of the close proximity of these spaces, however, it is not possible to distinguish the one from the other except by purely intellectual analysis and spiritual experience. Again, in the hot water the two opposites—fire and water which appear to interpenetrate each other cannot, in view of their respective

nature, exist in the same space. The fact cannot be explained except on the supposition that the spaces of the two substances, though closely proximate to each other are never the less distinct. But while the element of distance is not entirely absent there is no possibility of mutual resistance in the space of light. The light of a candle reaches up to a certain point only and the lights of a hundred candles intermingle in the same room without displacing one another.

Having thus described the spaces of physical bodies, possessing various degrees of subtleness, Iraqi proceeds briefly to describe the main varieties of space operated upon by the various classes of immaterial beings, e.g., angels. The element of distance is not entirely absent from these spaces; for immaterial beings, while they can easily pass through stone walls, cannot altogether dispense with motion which, according to Iraqi, is evidence of imperfection in spirituality. The highest point in the scale of spatial freedom is reached by the human soul which, in its unique essence, is neither at rest nor in motion, thus passing the Divine space which is absolutely free from all dimensions, and constitutes the meeting point of all infinities.

In a similar manner Iraqi deals with time. There are infinite varieties of time relative to the varying grades of being intervening between materiality and pure spirituality. The Time of gross bodies which arises from the revolutions of the heavens is divisible into past, present, and future; and its nature is such that as long as one day does not pass away the succeeding day does not come. The time

of immaterial beings is also serial in character; but its passage is such that whole year in the time of gross bodies is not more than a day in the time of immaterial beings. Rising higher and higher in the scale of immaterial beings we reach the notion of Divine Time which is absolutely free from the quality of 'Passage' and consequently does not admit of divisibility, sequence and change. It is above eternity; it has neither beginning nor end. The 'eye' of God sees all the visible act of perception. The priority of God is not due to the priority of time, on the other hand the priority of time is due to God's priority. Thus Divine Time is what the Quran describes as the 'Mother of Books' in which the Whole of History freed from the net of casual sequence is gathered up in a single super-eternal 'now'.

From this summary of Iraqi's view you will see how a cultured Muslim Sufi intellectually interpreted his spiritual experience of time and space in an age which had no idea of the theories and concepts of modern mathematics and Physics. In fact his theory of a plural space may be taken as a primitive stage in the modern hyperspace movement which originated in Nasir-ud-Din Tusi's efforts to improve the parallel postulate of Euclid. In modern times it was Kant who first definitely suggested the idea of different spaces as you will see from the following passage which I quote from his Prolegomena :—

"That complete space (which is itself no longer the boundary of another space) has three dimensions; and that space in general cannot have more, is based on the proposition that not more than three lines can

intersect at right angles in one point . . . . That we can require a line to be drawn to infinity, a series of changes to be continued (for example, spaces passed through by motion) in indefinitum, presupposes a representation of space and time which can only attach to intuition."

But Kant was not a mathematician. It was left for professional mathematicians of the 18th and the 19th centuries finally to reach the concept of space as a dynamic appearance, and as such generable and finite. Iraqi's mind seems to be vaguely struggling with the concept of space as an infinite continuum; yet he was unable to see the full implications of his thought, partly because he was not a mathematician and partly because of his natural prejudice in favour of the traditional Aristotelian idea of a fixed Universe. If he had been able to raise the question whether dimensionality is a property of the world or a property of our knowledge of the world, he would have felt the necessity of searching examination of his own consciousness, and this would have opened up to him a line of thought much more in keeping with his sufistic standpoint. Again the interpenetration of the superspatial 'here' and the super-eternal 'now' in the Ultimate Reality suggests the modern notion of space-time which Professor Alexander, in his lectures on 'Space, Time and Deity', regards as the matrix of all things. A keener insight into the nature of time would have led Iraqi to see that time is the more fundamental of the two; and that it is not a mere metaphor to say, as Prof. Alexander does say, that time is the mind of space. Iraqi conceives God's

relation to the Universe on the analogy of the relation of the human soul to the body; but, instead of philosophically reaching this position through a criticism of the spatial and temporal aspects of experience, he simply postulates it on the basis of his spiritual experience. It is not sufficient merely to reduce space and time to a vanishing point-instant. The philosophical path that leads to God as the Omni-psyche of the universe, lies through the discovery of Living Thought as the ultimate principle of space-time. Iraqi's mind, no doubt moved in the right direction; but his Aristotelian prejudice coupled with a lack of Psychological analyses blocked his progress. With this view that Divine Time is inadequate analysis of conscious experience—it was not possible for him to discover the relation between Divine Time and serial time, and to reach, through this discovery, the essentially Islamic idea of continuous creation which means a growing universe.

(*Islamic Culture*,
April, 1929)

XV

FOREWORD TO
Persian Navigation[1]

I have read parts of Professor Hadi's book on Persian Navigation with great interest and profit. Besides the innumerable Persian, Arabic and Chinese sources, he has utilized all the available sculptural, pictorial and numismatic material in establishing the conclusion that whilst the land empire of the Sasanids perished with the fall of Yazdigird the maritime activity of the Persians continued till the Caliphate of al-Mutawakkil, when it began to be displaced by the Arabs. The author's great capacity for sustained work, his infinite patience in sifting the details of evidence, and above all his youthful enthusiasm for the subject of his study—all this is abundantly clear from the remarkable work that he has produced. I have no doubt that Professor Hadi's work is a very important contribution to modern historical research relating to Persian antiquities. It is needless to add that Professor Hadi is a brilliant Persian scholar from whose pen yet greater things are expected.

1. This is a foreword written by Iqbal to Professor Hadi Hasan's book on Persian Navigation.—*Ed.*

XVI

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on the 29th December, 1930

Gentlemen, I am deeply grateful to you for the honour you have conferred upon me in inviting me to preside over the deliberations of the All-India Muslim League at one of the most critical moments in the history of Muslim political thought and activity in India. I have no doubt that in this great assembly there are men whose political experience is far more extensive than mine, and for whose knowledge of affairs I have the highest respect. It will, therefore, be presumptuous on my part to claim to guide an assembly of such men in the political decisions which they are called upon to make today. I lead no party; I follow no leader. I have given the best part of my life to a careful study of Islam, its law and polity, its culture, its history and its literature. This constant contact with the spirit of Islam, as it unfolds itself in time, has, I think, given me a kind of insight into its significance as a world-fact. It is in the light of this insight, whatever its value, that, while assuming that the Muslims of India are determined to remain true to the spirit of Islam, I propose, not to guide you in your decisions but to attempt the humbler task of bringing clearly to your consciousness the main prin-

ciple which, in my opinion, should determine the general character of these decisions.

It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity—by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal—has been the chief formative factor in the life history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well-defined people. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam as a society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal. What I mean to say is that Muslim society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is under the pressure of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. The ideas set free by European political thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India. Our younger men, inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries, without any critical appreciation of the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe. In Europe Christianity was understood to be a purely monastic order which gradually developed into a vast church-organisation. The protest of Luther was directed against this church-organisation, not against any system of polity of a secular nature, for the obvious reason that there was no such polity associated with Christianity. And

Luther was perfectly justified in rising in revolt against this organisation ; though, I think, he did not realise that in the peculiar conditions which obtained in Europe, his revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of the universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrower systems of ethics. Thus the upshot of the intellectual movement initiated by such men as Rousseau and Luther was the break-up of the one into mutually ill-adjusted many, the transformation of a human into a national outlook, requiring a more realistic foundation, such as the notion of country and finding expression through varying systems of polity evolved on national lines, i.e., on lines which recognise territory as the only principle of political solidarity. If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems of ethics and polity. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual and has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, Church and State, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit realising itself in space and time. Europe uncritically accepted the duality of spirit and matter probably from Manichaean thought. Her best

thinkers are realising this initial mistake today, but her statesmen are indirectly forcing the world to accept it as an unquestionable dogma. It is, then, this mistaken separation of spiritual and temporal which has largely influenced European religious and political thought and has resulted practically in the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European States. The result is a set of mutually ill-adjusted States dominated by interests not human but national. And these mutually ill-adjusted States after trampling over the morals and convictions of Christianity, are today feeling the need of a federated Europe, i.e., the need of a unity which Christian church-organisation originally gave them, but which instead of reconstructing it in the light of Christ's vision of human brotherhood they considered it fit to destroy under the inspiration of Luther. A Luther in the world of Islam, however, is an impossible phenomenon ; for here there is no church-organisation similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages, inviting a destroyer. In the world of Islam we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed, but whose structure, owing to our legists' want of contact with modern world, stands today in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam. Whether Islam will assimilate and transform it, as it has assimilated and transformed before many ideas expressive of a different spirit, or allow a radical transformation of its own structure by the force of this idea, is hard to predict.

Professor Wensinck of Leiden (Holland) wrote to me the other day : "It seems to me that Islam is entering upon a crisis through which Christianity has been passing for more than a century. The great difficulty is how to save the foundations of religion when many antiquated notions have to be given up. It seems to me scarcely possible to state what the outcome will be for Christianity, still less what it will be for Islam." At the present moment the national Idea is racialising the outlook of Muslims, and thus materially counteracting the humanising work of Islam. And the growth of racial consciousness may mean the growth of standards different and even opposed to the standards of Islam.

I hope you will pardon me for this apparently academic discussion. To address this session of the All-India Muslim League you have selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations, who believes that religion is a power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as States, and finally who believes that Islam is itself Destiny and will not suffer a destiny. Such a man cannot but look at matters from his own point of view. Do not think that the problem I am indicating is a purely theoretical one. It is a very living and practical problem calculated to affect the very fabric of Islam as a system of life and conduct. On a proper solution of it alone depends your future as a distinct cultural unit in India. Never in our history has Islam had to stand a greater trial than the one which confronts it today. It is open to a people to

modify, reinterpret or reject the foundational principles of their social structure, but it is absolutely necessary for them to see clearly what they are doing before they undertake to try a fresh experiment. Nor should the way in which I am approaching this important problem lead anybody to think that I intend to quarrel with those who happen to think differently. You are a Muslim assembly and, I suppose, anxious to remain true to the spirit and ideals of Islam. My sole desire, therefore, is to tell you frankly what I honestly believe to be the truth about the present situation. In this way alone it is possible for me to illuminate, according to my light, the avenues of your political action.

What, then, is the problem and its implications? Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national polities, in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be in a minority. The proposition that religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze entirely on the world of spirit, led by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the Quran, however, is

wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experiment and necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. "Man", says Renan, "is enslaved neither by his race, nor by his religion, nor by the course of rivers, nor by the direction of mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation." Such a formation is quite possible, though it involves the long and arduous process of practically remaking men and furnishing them with a fresh emotional equipment. It might have been a fact in India if the teaching of Kabir and the Divine Faith of Akbar had seized the imagination of the masses of this country. Experience, however, shows that the various caste-units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence. The formation of

the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan's sense demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many. True statesmanship cannot ignore facts, however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognise facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as Asia really depends. India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the east and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India, it will bring peace and mutual goodwill to this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of Asia.

It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? Perhaps we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps in the higher interests of mutual co-operation we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwil-

ling to recognise that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our failure, I still feel hopeful. Events seem to be tending in the direction of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian home-lands is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty according to the teaching of the Quran, even to defend their places of worship, if need be. Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby recreating its whole past as a living operative factor in my present consciousness. Even the authors of the Nehru Report recognise the value of this higher aspect of communalism. While discussing the separation of Sind they say: "To say from the larger view-point of nationalism that no communal provinces should be created, is in a way

equivalent to saying from the still wider international view-point that there should be no separate nations. Both these statements have a measure of truth in them. But the staunchest internationalist recognises that without the fullest national autonomy it is extraordinarily difficult to create the international State. So also without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation."

Communalism in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries. India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi, is, to my mind wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead of stifling the respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them. And I have no doubt that this House will emphatically endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution. Personally, I would go further than the demands embodied in it. I would like to

see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India. The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy State. This is true in so far as the area is concerned ; in point of population the State contemplated by the proposal would be much less than some of the present Indian provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population so that the exclusion suggested will enable this consolidated State to give a more effective protection to non-Muslim minorities within its area. The idea need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory. This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India, whose military and police service has, notwithstanding unfair treatment from the British, made the British rule possible in this country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling. Thus possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India, the North-West India Muslims will prove the best defenders of India

against a foreign invasion, be the invasion one of ideas or of bayonets. The Punjab with 56 per cent Muslim population supplies 54 per cent of the total combatant troops in the Indian Army, and if the 19,000 Gurkhas recruited from the independent State of Nepal are excluded, the Punjab contingent amounts to 62 per cent of the whole Indian Army. This percentage does not take into account nearly 6,000 combatants supplied to the Indian Army by the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. From this you can easily calculate the possibilities of North West India Muslims in regard to the defence of India against foreign aggression. The Right Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri thinks that the Muslim demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim States along the north-west border is actuated by a desire to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India. I may frankly tell him that the Muslim demand is not actuated by the kind of motive he imputes to us ; it is actuated by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to secure permanent communal dominance in the whole of India.

Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim States will mean the introdution of a kind of religious rule in such States. I have already indicated to you the meaning of the word religion as applied to Islam. The truth is that Islam is not a church. It is a State conceived as a contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of

such a thing and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by this or that portion of the earth, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of social mechanism, and possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. The character of a Muslim State can be judged from what the "Times of India" pointed out some time ago in a leader on the Indian Banking Enquiry Committee. "In ancient India", the paper points out, "the State framed laws regulating the rates of interest, but in Muslim times, although Islam clearly forbids the realization of interest on money loaned, Indian Muslim States imposed no restrictions on such rates." I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.

Thus it is clear that in view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous States based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India. The conception of federation underlying the Simon Report necessitates the abolition of the Central Legislative Assembly as a popular assembly, and makes it an assembly of the representatives of federal

States. It further demands a redistribution of territory on the lines which I have indicated. And the Report does recommend both. I give my wholehearted support to this view of the matter and venture to suggest that the redistribution recommended in the Simon Report must fulfil two conditions. It must precede the introduction of the new constitution and must be so devised as finally to solve the communal problem. Proper redistribution will make the question of joint and separate electorates automatically disappear from the constitutional controversy of India. It is the present structure of the provinces that is largely responsible for this controversy. The Hindu thinks that separate electorates are contrary to the spirit of nationalism, because he understands the word nation to mean a kind of universal amalgamation in which no communal entity ought to retain its private individuality. Such a state of things, however, does not exist. Nor is it desirable that it should exist. India is a land of racial and religious variety. Add to this the general economic inferiority of the Muslims, their enormous debt, especially in the Punjab, and their insufficient majorities in some of the provinces as at present constituted, and you will begin to see clearly the meaning of our anxiety to retain separate electorates. In such a country and in such circumstances territorial electorate cannot secure adequate representation of all interests and must inevitably lead to the creation of an oligarchy. The Muslims of India can have no objection to purely territorial electorates if provinces are demarcated so as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities

possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity.

But in so far as the question of the powers of the Central Federal State is concerned, there is a subtle difference of motive in the constitutions proposed by the pundits of India and the pundits of England. The pundits of India do not disturb the Central authority as it stands at present. All that they desire is that this authority should become fully responsible to the Central Legislature which they maintain intact and where their majority will become further reinforced on the nominated element ceasing to exist. The pundits of England, on the other hand, realising that democracy in the Centre tends to work contrary to their interests and is likely to absorb the whole power now in their hands, in case a further advance is made towards responsible government, have shifted the experience of democracy from the Centre to the provinces. No doubt, they introduce the principle of federation and appear to have made a beginning by making certain proposals : yet their evaluation of this principle is determined by considerations wholly different to those which determine its value in the eyes of Muslim India. The Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most difficult problem, i.e., the communal problem. The Royal Commissioners' view of federation, though sound in principle, does not seem to aim at responsible government of federal States. Indeed it does not go beyond providing means of escape from the situation which the introduction of democracy in India has created for the British, and wholly disregards the

communl problem by leaving it where it was.

Thus it is clear, that, in so far as real federation is concerned the Simon Report virtually negatives the principle of federation in its true significance. The Nehru Report realising Hindu majority in the Central Assembly reaches a unitary form of government because such an institution secures Hindu dominance throughout India; the Simon Report retains the present British dominance behind the thin veneer of an unreal federation, partly because the British are naturally unwilling to part with the power they have so long wielded, and partly because it is possible for them, in the absence of an inter-communal understanding in India, to make out a plausible case for the retention of that power in their own hands. To my mind a unitary form of government is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India. What is called 'residuary powers' must be left entirely to self-governing States, the Central Federal State exercising only those powers which are expressly vested in it by the free consent of federal States. I would never advise the Muslims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or of Indian origin, which virtually negatives the principle of true federation or fails to recognise them as a distinct political entity.

The necessity for a structural change in the Central Government was seen probably long before the British discovered the most effective means for introducing this change. That is why at rather a late stage it was announced that the participation of the Indian Princes in the Round Table Conference was essential. It was a kind of surprise to the people

of India, particularly the minorities, to see the Indian Princes dramatically expressing their willingness at the Round Table Conference to join an all-India federation and as a result of their declaration, Hindu delegates, uncompromising advocates of a unitary form of government, quietly agreeing to the evolution of a federal scheme. Even Mr. Sastri who, only a few days before, had severely criticised Sir John for recommending a federal scheme for India, suddenly became a convert and admitted his conversion in the plenary session of the Conference, thus offering the Prime Minister of England an occasion for one of his wittiest observations in his concluding speech. All this has a meaning both for the British who have sought the participation of the Indian Princes, and for the Hindus, who have unhesitatingly accepted the evolution of an all-India federation. The truth is that the participation of the Indian Princes among whom only a few are Muslims, in a federation scheme serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it serves as an all important factor in maintaining the British power in India practically as it is ; on the other hand, it gives overwhelming majority to the Hindus in an All-India Federal Assembly. It appears to me that the Hindu-Muslim differences regarding the ultimate form of Central Government are being cleverly exploited by British politicians through the agency of the Princes, who see in the scheme prospects of better security for their despotic rule. If the Muslims silently agree to any such scheme it will simply hasten their end as a political entity in India. The policy of the Indian federation, thus created, will be practically

controlled by Hindu Princes forming the largest group in the Central Federal Assembly. They will always lend their support to the Crown in matters of Imperial concern ; and in so far as internal administration of the country is concerned, they will help in maintaining and strengthening the supremacy of the Hindus. In other words, the scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of understanding between Hindu India and British Imperialism: "You perpetuate me in India and in return I give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian communities in perpetual subjection." If, therefore, the British Indian provinces are not transformed into really autonomous states, the Princes' participation in a scheme of Indian federation will be interpreted only as a dexterous move on the part of British politicians to satisfy, without parting with any real power, all parties concerned—Muslims with the word federation, Hindus with a majority in the Centre, the British Imperialists, whether Tory or Labourite, with the substance of real power.

The number of Hindu States in India is far greater than that of Muslim States ; and it remains to be seen how the Muslim demand for 33 per cent seats in the Central Federal Assembly is to be met within a House or Houses constituted of representatives taken from British India as well as Indian States. I hope the Muslim delegates are fully aware of the implications of the federal scheme as discussed in the Round Table Conference. The question of Muslim representation in the proposed All-India Federation has not yet been discussed. "The interim report", says

Reuter's summary, "contemplates two chambers in the federal legislature, each containing representatives both of British India and States, the proportion of which will be a matter of subsequent consideration under the heads which have not yet been referred to the Sub-Committee." In my opinion the question of proportion is of the utmost importance and ought to have been considered simultaneously with the main question of the structure of the Assembly.

The best course, I think, would have been to start with a British India federation only. A federal scheme born of an unholy union between democracy and despotism cannot but keep British India in the same vicious circle of a unitary Central Government. Such a unitary form may be of the greatest advantage to the British, to the majority community in British India and to the Indian Princes ; it can be of no advantage to the Muslims, unless they get majority rights in five out of the eleven Indian provinces with full residuary powers, and one-third share of seats in the total House of the Federal Assembly. In so far as the attainment of sovereign powers by the British Indian provinces is concerned, the position of His Highness the Ruler of Bhopal, Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr. Jinnah is unassailable. In view, however, of the participation of the Princes in the Indian federation we must now see our demand for representation in the British Indian Assembly in a new light. The question is not one of Muslim share in a British Indian Assembly, but one which relates to representation of British Indian Muslims in an All-India Federal Assembly. Our demand for 33 per cent must

now be taken as a demand for the same proportion in the All-Indian Federal Assembly exclusive of the share allotted to the Muslim States entering the federation.

The other difficult problem which confronts the successful working of a federal system in India is the problem of India's defence. In their discussion of the problem the Royal Commissioners have marshalled all the deficiencies of India in order to make out a case for Imperial administration of the army. "India and Britain", say the Commissioners, "are so related that India's defence cannot now or in any future, which is within sight, be regarded as a matter of purely Indian concern. The control and direction of such an army must rest in the hands of agents of Imperial Government." Now does it necessarily follow from this that further progress towards the realisation of responsible government in British India is barred until the work of defence can be adequately discharged without the help of British officers and British troops? As things are, there is a block on the line of constitutional advance. All hopes of evolution in the Central Government towards the ultimate goal prescribed in the declaration of 20th August, 1917, are in danger of being indefinitely frustrated, if the attitude illustrated by the Nehru Report is maintained that any future change involves the putting of the administration of the army under the authority of an elected Indian Legislature. Further to fortify their argument they emphasise the fact of competing religions and rival races of widely different capacity, and try to make the problem look

insoluble by remarking that "the obvious fact that India is not in the ordinary and natural sense, a single nation is nowhere made more plain than in considering the difference between the martial races of India and the rest." These features of the question have been emphasised in order to demonstrate that the British are not only keeping India secure from foreign menace but are also the "neutral guardians" of internal security. However, in federated India, as I understand federation, the problem will have only one aspect, i.e., external defence. Apart from provincial armies necessary for maintaining internal peace, the Indian Federal Congress can maintain, on the North-West frontier, a strong Indian Frontier Army, composed of units recruited from all provinces and officered by efficient and experienced military men taken from all communities. I know that India is not in possession of efficient military officers, and this fact is exploited by the Royal Commissioners in the interest of an argument for Imperial administration. On this point I cannot but quote another passage from the Report which to my mind furnished the best argument against the position taken up by the Commissioners. "At the present moment", says the Report, "no Indian holding the King's Commission is of higher army rank than a captain. There are, we believe, 39 captains of whom 25 are in ordinary regimental employ. Some of them are of an age which would prevent their attaining much higher rank, even if they passed the necessary examination before retirement. Most of them have not been through Sandhurst, but got their Commissions during

the Great War." Now, however genuine may be the desire and however earnest the endeavour to work for this transformation, over-riding conditions have been so forcibly expressed by the Skeen Committee (whose members, apart from the Chairman and the Army Secretary, were Indians) in these words: "Progress . . . must be contingent upon success being secured at each stage and upon military efficiency being maintained, though it must in any case render such development measured and slow. A higher command cannot be evolved at short notice out of existing cadres of Indian officers, all of junior ranks and limited experience. Not until the slender trickle of suitable Indian recruits for the officer class—and we earnestly desire an increase in their numbers—flows in much greater volume, not until sufficient Indians have attained the experience and training requisite to provide all the officers for, at any rate, some Indian regiments, not until such units have stood the only test which can possibly determine their efficiency, and not until Indian officers have qualified by a successful army career for the high command, will it be possible to develop the policy of Indianisation to a point which will bring a completely Indianised army within sight. Even then years must elapse before the process could be completed."

Now I venture to ask who is responsible for the present state of things? Is it due to some inherent incapacity of our martial races, or to the slowness of the process of military training? The military capacity of our martial races is undeniable. The process of military training may be slow as compared

to other processes of human training. I am no military expert to judge this matter. But as a layman I feel that the argument, as stated, assumes the process to be practically endless. This means perpetual bondage for India, and makes it all the more necessary that the Frontier Army, as suggested by the Nehru Report, be entrusted to the charge of a committee of defence, the personnel of which may be settled by mutual understanding.

Again, it is significant that the Simon Report has given extraordinary importance to the question of India's land frontier, but has made only passing reference to its naval position. India has doubtless had to face invasions from her land frontier ; but it is obvious that her present masters took possession of her on account of her defenceless sea coast. A self-governing and free India will, in these days, have to take greater care of her sea coast than land frontiers.

I have no doubt that if a federal government is established, Muslim Federal States will willingly agree, for purposes of India's defence, to the creation of neutral Indian military and naval forces. Such a neutral military force for the defence of India was a reality in the days of Mughal rule. Indeed in the time of Akbar the India frontier was, on the whole, defended by armies officered by Hindu generals. I am perfectly sure that the scheme for a neutral Indian army, based on a federated India will intensify Muslim patriotic feeling, and finally set at rest the suspicion, if any, of Indian Muslims joining Muslims from beyond the frontier in the event of an invasion.

I have thus tried briefly to indicate the way in which the Muslims of India ought, in my opinion, to look at the two most important constitutional problems of India. A redistribution of British India, calculated to secure a permanent solution of the communal problem is the main demand of the Muslims of India. If, however, the Muslim demand of a territorial solution of the communal problem is ignored, then I support as emphatically as possible, the Muslim demands repeatedly urged by the All-India Muslim League and Muslim Conference. The Muslim of India cannot agree to any constitutional changes which effect their majority rights, to be secured by separate electorates in the Punjab and Bengal, or fail to guarantee them 33 per cent representation in any Central legislature. There were two pitfalls into which Muslim political leaders fell. The first was the repudiated Lucknow Pact which originated in a false view of Indian nationalism and deprived the Muslims of India of chances of acquiring any political power in India. The second is the narrow visioned sacrifice of Islamic solidarity in the interests of what may be called Punjab ruralism [1] resulting in a proposal which virtually reduces the Punjab Muslims to a position of minority. It is the duty of the League to condemn both the Pact and the proposal.

The Simon Report does great injustice to the Muslims in not recommending a statutory majority for the Punjab and Bengal. It would either make the

1. Reference is to the Punjab Unionist Party, formed by Sir Fazli Husain. *Ed.*

Muslims stick to the Lucknow Pact or agree to a scheme of joint electorates. The despatch of the Government of India on the Simon Report admits that since the publication of that document the Muslim community has not expressed its willingness to accept any of the alternatives proposed by the Report. The despatch recognises that it may be a legitimate grievance to deprive the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal of representation in the councils in proportion to their population merely because of weightage allowed to Muslim minorities elsewhere. But the despatch of the Government of India fails to correct the injustice of the Simon Report. In so far as the Punjab is concerned—and this is the most crucial point —it endorses the so-called carefully balanced scheme worked out by the official members of the Punjab Government which gives the Punjab Muslims a majority of two over Hindus and Sikhs combined, and a proportion of 49 per cent of the House as a whole. It is obvious that the Punjab Muslims cannot be satisfied with less than a clear majority in the total House. However, Lord Irwin and his Government do recognise that the justification for communal electorates for majority communities would not cease unless and until by the extension of franchise their voting strength more correctly reflects their population ; and further unless a two-third majority of the Muslim members in a provincial council unanimously agree to surrender the right of separate representation. I cannot, however, understand why the Government of India, having recognised the legitimacy of the Muslim grievance have not had the courage to

recommend a statutorv majority for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal.

Nor can the Muslims of India agree to any such changes, which fail to create at least Sind as a separate province, and treat the North-West Frontier Province as a province of inferior political status. I see no reason why Sind should not be united with Baluchistan and turned into a separate province. It has nothing in common with Bombay Presidency. In point of life and civilization the Royal Commissioners find it more akin to Mesopotamia and Arabia than India. The Muslim geographer Mas'udi noticed this kinship long ago when he said: "Sind is a country nearer to the dominions of Islam." The first Omayyad ruler is reported to have said of Egypt: "Egypt has her back towards Africa and face towards Arabia." With necessary alterations the same remark describes the exact situation of Sind. She has her back towards India and face towards Central Asia. Considering further the nature of her agricultural problems which can invoke no sympathy from the Bombay Government, and her infinite commercial possibilities, dependent on the inevitable growth of Karachi into a second metropolis of India, I think it unwise to keep her attached to a presidency which, though friendly today, is likely to become a rival at no distant period. Financial difficulties, we are told, stand in the way of separation. I do not know of any definite authoritative pronouncement on the matter. But assuming there are any such difficulties, I see no reason why the Government of India should not give temporary financial help to a promising province in

her struggle for independent progress.

As to the North-West Frontier Province, it is painful to note that the Royal Commissioners have practically denied that the people of this province have any right to reforms. They fall far short of the Bray Committee, and the council recommended by them is merely a screen to hide the autocracy of the Chief Commissioner. The inherent right of the Afghan to light a cigarette is curtailed merely because he happens to be living in a powder house. The Royal Commissioners' epigramatic argument is pleasant enough, but far from convincing. Political reform is light, not fire; and to light every human being is entitled whether he happens to live in a powder house or a coal mine. Brave, shrewd and determined to suffer for his legitimate aspirations, the Afghàn is sure to resent any attempt to deprive him of opportunities of self-development. To keep such a people contented is in the best interests of both England and India. What has recently happened in that unfortunate province is the result of a step-motherly treatment, shown to the people since the introduction of the principle of self-government in the rest of India. I only hope that British statesmanship will not obscure its view of the situation by hoodwinking itself into the belief that the present unrest in the province is due to any extraneous causes.

The recommendation for the introduction of a measure of reform in the North-West Frontier Province made in the Government of India's despatch is also unsatisfactory. No doubt, the despatch goes farther than the Simon Report in recommending a

sort of representative council and a semi-representative cabinet, but it fails to treat this important Muslim province on an equal footing with other Indian provinces. Indeed the Afghan is by instinct more fitted for democratic institutions than any other people in India.

I think I am now called upon to make a few observations on the Round Table Conference. Personally I do not feel optimistic as to the results of this Conference. It was hoped that away from the actual scene of communal strife and in a changed atmosphere, better counsels would prevail and a genuine settlement of the differences between the two major communities of India would bring India's freedom within sight. Actual events, however, tell a different tale. Indeed, the discussion of the communal question in London has demonstrated more clearly than ever the essential disparity between the great cultural units of India. Yet the Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national. He is reported to have said that his Government would find it difficult to submit to Parliament proposals for the maintenance of separate electorates, since joint electorates were much more in accordance with British democratic sentiments. Obviously he does not see that the model of British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations; and that a system of separate electorates is only a poor substitute for a territorial solution of the problem. Nor is the Minorities Sub-Committee likely to reach a satisfactory settlement. The whole question will have to go before

the British Parliament ; and we can only hope that the keen-sighted representatives of British nation, unlike most of our Indian politicians, will be able to pierce through the surface of things and see clearly the true fundamentals of peace and security in a country like India. To base a constitution on the concept of a homogeneous India or to apply to India principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war. As far as I can see, there will be no peace in the country until the various peoples that constitute India are given opportunities of free self-development on modern lines without abruptly breaking with their past.

I am glad to be able to say that our Muslim delegates fully realise the importance of a proper solution of what I call Indian international problem. They are perfectly justified in pressing for a solution of the communal question before the question of responsibility in the Central Government is finally settled. No Muslim politician should be sensitive to the taunt embodied in that propaganda word—communalism—expressly devised to exploit what the Prime Minister calls British democratic sentiments, and to mislead England into assuming a state of things which does not really exist in India. Great interests are at stake. We are 70 millions and far more homogeneous than any other people in India. Indeed the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a

nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift. No doubt they are anxious to become a nation, but the process of becoming a nation is a kind of travail, and in the case of Hindu India involves a complete overhauling of her social structure. Nor should the Muslim leaders and politicians allow themselves to be carried away by the subtle but placid arguments that Turkey and Iran and other Muslim countries are progressing on national, i.e., territorial lines. The Muslims of India are differently situated. The countries of Islam outside India are practically wholly Muslim in population. The minorities there belong, in the language of the Quran, "to the people of the Book". There are no social barriers between Muslims and the "people of the Book". A Jew or a Christian or a Zoroastrian does not pollute the food of a Muslim by touching it, and the law of Islam allows intermarriage with the "people of the Book". Indeed the first practical step that Islam took towards the realisation of a final combination of humanity was to call upon peoples possessing practically the same ethical ideal to come forward and combine. The Quran declares : "O people of the Book ! Come, let us join together on the word (Unity of God), that is common to us all." The wars of Islam and Christianity, and later, European aggression in its various forms, could not allow the infinite meaning of this verse to work itself out in the world of Islam. To-day it is being gradually realised in the countries of Islam in the shape of what is called Muslim Nationalism.

It is hardly necessary for me to add that the sole test of the success of our delegates is the extent to

which they are able to get the non-Muslim delegates of the Conference to agree to our demands as embodied in the Delhi Resolution.[1] If these demands are not agreed to, then a question of a very great and far reaching importance will arise for the community. Then will arrive the moment for an independent and concerted political action by the Muslims of India. If you are at all serious about your ideals and aspirations, you must be ready for such an action. Our leading men have done a good deal of political thinking, and their thought has certainly made us, more or less, sensitive to the forces which are now shaping the destinies of peoples in India and outside India. But I ask, has this thinking prepared us for the kind of action demanded by the situation which may arise in the near future? Let me tell you frankly that, at the present moment, the Muslims of India are suffering from two evils. The first is the want of personalities. Sir Malcolm Hailey and Lord Irwin were perfectly correct in their diagnosis when they told the Aligarh University that the community had failed to produce leaders. By leaders I mean men who, by divine gift or experience, possess a keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam, along with an equally keen perception of the trend of modern history. Such men are really the driving forces of a people, but they are God's gift and cannot be made to order. The second evil from which the Muslims of India are suffering is that the community is fast

1. The Resolution passed at the All-India Muslim Conference held in Delhi on 1st January, 1929 under the presidentship of the Agha Khan. This resolution recommended a federal form of Government for the subcontinent with full autonomy and residuary powers invested in the Provinces. *Ed.*

losing what is called the herd instinct. This makes it possible for individuals and groups to start independent careers without contributing to the general thought and activity of the community. We are doing today in the domain of politics what we have been doing for centuries in the domain of religion. But sectional bickerings in religion do not do much harm to our solidarity. They at least indicate an interest in what makes the sole principle of our structure as a people. Moreover, this principle is so broadly conceived that it is almost impossible for a group to become rebellious to the extent of wholly detaching itself from the general body of Islam. But diversity in political action, at a moment when concerted action is needed, in the best interests of the very life of our people, may prove fatal. How shall we, then, remedy these two evils ? The remedy of the first evil is not in our hands. As to the second evil, I think it is possible to discover a remedy. I have got definite views on the subject ; but I think it is proper to postpone their expression till the apprehended situation actually arises. In case it does arise, leading Muslims of all shades of opinion will have to meet together, not to pass resolutions but finally to determine the Muslim attitude and to show the path to tangible achievement. In this address I mention this alternative only because I wish that you may keep it in mind and give some serious thought to it in the meantime.

Gentlemen, I have finished. In conclusion I cannot but impress upon you that the present crisis in the history of India demands complete organisation

and unity of will and purpose in the Muslim community, both in your own interests as a community, and in the interests of India as a whole. The political bondage of India has been and is a source of infinite misery to the whole of Asia. It has suppressed the spirit of the East and wholly deprived her of that joy of self-expression which once made her the creator of a great and glorious culture. We have a duty towards India where we are destined to live and die. We have a duty towards Asia, especially Muslim Asia. And since 70 millions of Muslims in a single country constitute a far more valuable asset to Islam than all the countries of Muslim Asia put together, we must look at the Indian problem not only from the Muslim point of view but also from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim as such. Our duty towards Asia and India cannot be loyally performed without an organised will fixed on a definite purpose. In your own interest, as a political entity among other political entities of India, such an equipment is an absolute necessity. Our disorganised condition has already confused political issues vital to the life of the community. I am not hopeless of an intercommunal understanding, but I cannot conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present crisis. And an independent line of political action, in such a crisis, is possible only to a determined people, possessing a will focalised by a single purpose. Is it possible for you to achieve the organic wholeness of a unified will? Yes, it is. Rise above sectional interests

and private ambitions, and learn to determine the value of your individual and collective action, however directed on material ends, in the light of the ideal which you are supposed to represent. Pass from matter to spirit. Matter is diversity ; spirit is light, life and unity. One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslims. At critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not vice versa. If today you focus your vision on Islam and seek inspiration from the ever-vitalising idea embodied in it, you will be only reassembling your scattered forces, regaining your lost integrity, and thereby saving yourself from total destruction. One of the profoundest verses in the Holy Quran teaches us that the birth and rebirth of the whole of humanity is like the birth and rebirth of a single individual. Why cannot you who, as a people, can well claim to be the first practical exponents of this superb conception of humanity, live and move and have your being as a single individual ? I do not wish to mystify anybody when I say that things in India are not what they appear to be. The meaning of this, however, will dawn upon you only when you have achieved a real collective age to look at them. In the words of Quran, "Hold fast to yourself ; no one who erreth can hurt you, provided you are well guided". (5 : 104)

XVII

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore on the 21st March 1932

Gentlemen, the Muslims of India have listened to so many addresses from their political platforms that the more impatient of them have already begun to suspect our deliberations which, they think, tend to enfeeble and eventually to kill the spirit of action that lies dormant in the heart of Islam. "The present situation in the country," said one of them, "whets our appetite for action ; and if our leaders fail to point to a definite course of action, suitable to the peculiar position of the Indian Muslims, the sheer force of imitation will do its work, and make our youth thoughtlessly plunge into the stream of events." "Action," said another with characteristic youthful impatience, "does not need a previously thought out plan ; it is not subject to the logic as it emerges out of the heart of man into open space." Such is the present psychology of our youth. I am grateful to you for the confidence you have placed in me at this critical moment ; but I certainly cannot congratulate you on your choice of a man who is nothing more than a visionary idealist. Perhaps you think you need a visionary at this juncture ; for where there is no vision the people perish. Perhaps you think I am better equipped for the presidential chair of this

assembly after my experiences at the London Conference. To reveal an ideal freed from its temporal limitations is one function ; to show the way how ideals can be transformed into living actualities is quite another. If a man is temperamentally fit for the former function his task is comparatively easy, for it involves clean jump over temporal limitations which waylay the practical politician at every step. The man who has got the courage to migrate from the former to the latter function has constantly to take stock of, and often yield to, the force of those very limitations which he has been in the habit of ignoring. Such a man has the misfortune of living in the midst of perpetual mental conflict and can be easily accused of self-contradiction. However, I gladly accept the difficult position in which you have placed me, not because I consider myself fit for that position, but because the issues have fortunately become so clear that the whole thing now depends so much on the guidance of one particular individual as on the force of all the individual wills focussed on a single purpose.

Politics have their roots in the spiritual life of man. It is my belief that Islam is not a matter of private opinion. It is a society, or if you like, a civic church. It is because present-day political ideals, as they appear to be shaping themselves in India, may affect its original structure and character that I find myself interested in politics. I am opposed to nationalism as it is understood in Europe, not because, if it is allowed to develop in India, it is likely to bring less material gain to Muslims. I am opposed to it

because I see in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity. Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of man. Yet that which really matters is a man's faith, his culture, his historical tradition. These are the things which in my eyes are worth living for and dying for, and not the piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated. In view of the visible and invisible points of contact between the various communities of India I do believe in the possibility of constructing a harmonious whole whose unity cannot be disturbed by the rich diversity which it must carry within its bosom. The problem of ancient Indian thought was how the one became many without sacrificing its oneness. To-day this problem has come down from its ethical heights so the grosser plane of our political life, and we have to solve it in its reversed form, i.e., how the many can become one without sacrificing its plural character. In so far then as the fundamentals of our policy are concerned, I have got nothing fresh to offer. Regarding these I have already expressed my views in my address to the All-India Muslim League. In the present address I propose, among other things, to help you, in the first place, in arriving at a correct view of the situation as it emerged from a rather hesitating behaviour of our delegation at the final stages of the Round Table Conference. In the second place, I shall try, according to my lights, to show how far it is desirable to construct a fresh policy now that the Premier's announcement at the last London Conference has again

necessitated a careful survey of the whole situation. Let me begin with a brief history of the work of our delegation.

The first two meetings of the Minorities Committee were held on the 28th of September and the 1st of October 1931, respectively. On both occasions the meeting was adjourned for a private settlement of the communal problem. Mahatma Gandhi first told the Muslim delegation that matters could not proceed until the Muslim delegation had lifted the embargo on Dr. Ansari. Failing in this, he gave the Muslim delegation to understand that he would personally agree to Muslim demands and would try to persuade the Congress, the Hindus and the Sikhs to agree to them, provided the Muslims agreed to three things : (*i*) adult suffrage ; (*ii*) no special representation for the Untouchables ; (*iii*) Congress demand for complete independence. The Mahatma declined to refer the matter to the Congress and failed in his efforts to get the Hindus and the Sikhs to agree to this arrangement. On the 7th of October two prominent Hindu leaders proposed that the whole matter might be referred to a board of seven arbitrators. This too was rejected by Hindu and Sikh representatives. On the 8th the Minorities Committee met for the third time. In this meeting Mahatma Gandhi set to the account of the British Government his failure to bring about a communal settlement, since, according to him, they had deliberately chosen for the British Indian delegation men who, as he said, had no representative character. On behalf of the Muslim delegation, the late Sir Muhammad Shafi refuted the

Mahatma's uncalled for remarks questioning the representative character of the various delegations, and opposed the proposals put forward by him. The meeting came to an end, and, owing to the British general elections, could not meet till the 12th of November. In the meantime, private conversations recommenced on the 15th October. A prominent feature of these conversations was Sir Geoffrey Corbett's scheme relating to the Punjab. This scheme, very similar to the one I had suggested in my address to the All-India Muslim League, proposed the adoption of joint electorates with the exclusion of the Ambala Division from the Punjab. It, too, was rejected by Sikh and Hindu representatives, who could not tolerate a Muslim majority in the Punjab even with a system of joint electorates. These conversations also remaining fruitless, the representatives of the Indian minorities which constitute nearly half of India, began to consult one another on the possibility of an Indian Minorities Pact. On the 12th of November all these minorities, with the exception of Sikhs, signed a pact, which was formally handed over to the British Premier in the last meeting of the Minorities Committee held on the 13th of November.

This brief account of our informal conversations speak for itself. It is obvious that our delegates did their best to arrive at a communal settlement. The only thing which is a mystery to me, and which will perhaps ever remain a mystery, is the declaration made on the 26th of November by our spokesmen in the Federal Structure Committee to the effect that they agreed to the simultaneous introduction of

provincial autonomy and central responsibility. Whether this was due to their anxiety for conciliation and political advance of the country, or to some conflicting influences which operated on their minds, I cannot say. On the 15th of November—the day on which I dissociated from our delegation—Muslim delegates had decided not to participate in the discussions of the Federal Structure Committee. Why did they participate then in these discussions contrary to their own decision ? Were our spokesmen on the Federal Structure Committee authorised to make the declaration of 26th November ? I am not in a position to answer these questions. All that I can say is that the Muslim community considers the declaration a very grave error, and I have no doubt that this Conference will give an emphatic expression to their views on this important matter. In my address to the All-India Muslim League I raised my voice against the idea of an all-India federation. Subsequent events have shown that it is working only as a drag on the political advance of India. If the introduction of central responsibility is dependent on the completion of an all-India federation, which I fear will take a fairly long time, then the Government should immediately introduce responsible government in the British Indian provinces, so that the foundation thus delineated may, till the coming of central responsibility, fully prepare itself, by experience, to bear the weight of the federal superstructure. A great deal of spade work is needed before we can have a really modern federal State. I have reason to believe, and had suspected this some days before I

dissociated myself from our delegation, that our spokesmen were badly advised by certain English politicians in rejecting the immediate introduction of responsible government in the provinces of British India. Recently Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy has expressed the same view. He says: "I understand that the moderate leaders in London were badly advised on this matter by certain English politicians that they listened too readily to their advice and rejected the great instalment of provincial autonomy. And the curious thing is that the Mahatma was apparently ready to consider this instalment sympathetically." Who are the moderate leaders alluded to by the Lieutenant-Commander ? In view of the attitude taken up by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru in London and now in the Consultative Committee regarding the immediate introduction of provincial autonomy, it is obvious that the writer of the passage quoted could not have meant Hindu Liberals. I think he probably means Muslim moderate leaders whose declaration in the Federal Structure Committee on the 26th of November seems to me to be really responsible for the British Premier's announcement regarding the simultaneous introduction of central and provincial responsibility. And since immediate introduction of responsible Government in the provinces would have involved a definite announcement regarding the demands of our community as to majority rights in the Punjab and Bengal, we must not forget, while judging the present situation that the conduct of our own leaders is mainly responsible for the British Premier's silence which

has raised all sorts of suspicions in the mind of the Muslim community.

The next question is to explore the possibilities of shaping, if necessary, a new policy after the disappointing announcement made by the British Premier at the close of the last London Conference. Muslims have naturally grown apprehensive of Government's attitude towards the problem of communal settlement. They suspect that the Government will purchase Congress co-operation at any cost, and that its delay in conceding Muslim demands is only a cover for the possibility of finding some basis for negotiations with that body. The policy of trusting the Government in regard to political issues seems to be rapidly losing its hold on the mind of the community. The Franchise Committee has postponed consideration of matters relating to the formation of constituencies. As for the promised provisional settlement, it is obvious that no communal settlement, provisional or permanent, can satisfy the Muslim community, which does not recognise, as its basic principle, the right of the community to enjoy majority rights in provinces where it happens to be in actual majority. The continuance of separate electorates and the status of the Frontier Province are no doubt assured, but complete provincial autonomy, transfer of power from Parliament to Indian provinces, equality of federal units, classification of subjects, not into federal, central and provincial, but into federal and provincial only, majority rights in the Punjab and Bengal, unconditional separation of Sind, and one-third share in the Centre, constitute no less essential elements of our

demand. The Premier's silence on these points has only resulted in the unsound policy of war with the Congress and no peace with the rest of the country. Shall we then join the Congress in their present campaign ? My answer without a moment's hesitation is 'No'. A careful reading of the underlying motives of this movement will make it perfectly clear.

To my mind this movement has its roots in fear and resentment. The Congress leaders claim that they are the sole representatives of the peoples of India. The last Round Table Conference made it abundantly clear that they were not. This they naturally resent. They know that the British people and the rest of the world now fully realise the importance of communal settlement in India. They further know that the minorities of India have arrived at a pact, and that the British Government have given a notice to enforce a provisional settlement of their own, in case the Indians themselves failed to arrive at one. The Congress leaders fear that the British Government in their provisional settlement of the communal problem may concede to the minorities what they demand. They have, therefore, started the present campaign to bolster up a claim which has no foundation in fact, to defeat a pact which, they fear, may find a place in the coming constitution, and to force Government to settle the matter of minorities with the Congress alone. The Congress resolution in pursuance of which the civil disobedience campaign was launched made it perfectly clear that since Government had refused to regard Mahatma Gandhi as the sole representative of the country, the Congress decided

on civil disobedience. How can then a minority join a campaign which is directed as much against itself as against the Government ?

In the circumstances, therefore, to join the Congress in their present campaign is simply out of the question. But there is no denying that at the moment you are called upon to make important decisions. I am sure you are fully aware of the present state of the community's mind. Government's delay in conceding Muslim demands, and the treatment meted out to our brave Frontier brethren on the eve of the constitutional reforms in their province, are making Indian Muslims suspicious of British methods; and most people are already asking the question whether the power of a third party in India does constitute a real safeguard for the Muslim minority against a politically hostile and economically exploiting majority in India. There seems to be a deeper reason also. The rapid movement of events, and often sudden changes of situation in the political world, cannot permit an Imperial democracy, especially in the case of Party Government, to adhere for any long periods of time to definite policies. Lack of imagination is a virtue rather than a fault in a modern politician. And owing to this lack of imagination which is incapable of synthesising permanence and change in a higher political concept, modern politics is driven to live from hand to mouth. In the case of a subject country like India, therefore, co-operating communities are naturally led to think that the firmness of their political attitude in difficult times for the Government may be of little or no value in the eyes

of this or that political party which may come to power at any time in England. Whatever may be the character and ideals of political parties in England, you must base your policy on enlightened self-interest and conceive it in a spirit calculated to impress the whole British nation. It is folly to fight a battle in which there is likelihood of the fruits of victory going to those who are either hostile to, or have no sympathy with, our legitimate political aspirations. The present circumstances are such that in thinking out a line of policy with a view to get over the immediate difficulties of the community, it is your duty to see that the likelihood I apprehend is eliminated, and the benefit of the action advised by you finally accrues to your community.

Let me state the position as plainly as possible. The British undertook to give a provisional decision of the communal problem in case the communities of India did not arrive at a mutual settlement after their representatives had returned from the Second Round Table Conference. This undertaking was thoroughly consistent with the claim and the policy of the British as a third party holding the balance between the contending communities of India. The British Government's present attitude, however, would show that they do not mean to function as an impartial holder of balance in India, and are indirectly driving the Indian communities, which are mainly Hindus and Muslims, to a kind of civil war. We tried the majority community and found them unwilling to recognise the safeguards which we can forego at the risk of complete extinction as a nation determined to

live its own life. The alternative was to hope for justice from the British who, ever since they took the country from the Muslims, have claimed, as I have said above, to function as an impartial holder of balance in India. In their case, too, we find that the old British courage and straight-forwardness are replaced by a constantly shifting policy which can inspire no confidence and seems to be calculated only to facilitate their own position in India. The Muslim community is thus brought to face the question whether it is in the interests of the community that their present policy which has so far obviated British difficulties and brought no gain to the community shall continue for any further period of time. This is a question for the open Conference to decide. All that I can say at the present stage is that, if you decide to discontinue this policy, your immediate duty is to prepare the whole community for the kind of self-sacrifice without which no self-respecting people can live an honourable life. The most critical moment in the history of the Indian Muslims has arrived. Do your duty or cease to exist.

Gentlemen, I now request you to turn for a moment to two matters of gravest concern to the Muslim of India—I mean the Frontier Province and Kashmir which, I have no doubt, are uppermost in your mind.

It is indeed gratifying to see that Government have at least conceded our demand regarding the political status of North-West Frontier Province, though it remains to be seen what this status means in the actual administration of that province. Newspaper reports show that in the matter of franchise,

Government rules have been more liberal than in other provinces. The reform machinery will, it is understood, be set in full working order from the next month. What, however, has taken grace out of the whole affair is the simultaneous launching of a campaign of repression which is not essentially different from martial law. The consideration shown in the matter of constitutional issue has been more than neutralized by the severity and short-sightedness shown in the case of the administrative issue. Government may have reasons for counteracting extremist activities of certain people in that part of the country, but it has surely not been able to defend a policy of wholesale repression. During this struggle in other parts of India Britain's dealing with the situation has not been entirely devoid of restraint. In the Frontier Province alone repression has assumed forms unworthy of a civilized Government. If oral reports are true then the heart of the British official in the Frontier Province stands in need of a reform far greater in importance for the British Empire than the constitutional reform sought to be introduced into that province. There is no definite and final information about the number of arrests and prosecutions: but as it is roughly mentioned in newspapers, thousands have been arrested and convicted or interned. It is for the Government to consider whether the incongruent policies of concession and repression will result in the pacification of a proud race like the Afghans. Abdul Ghaffar Khan certainly commands a great deal of influence among the young border Afghans, but what has extended

the sphere of his influence to the farthest ends of the territory and to the ignorant folk of the Frontier villages, is the present thoughtless policy of repression. Government cannot be unaware of the fact that the all-India policy of the Indian Muslims was at this juncture, effectively keeping in check the tendencies of the Muslims of that province to join hands with those who were for an unconditional alliance with the Congress. Perhaps there have been difficulties from the Government point of view; yet I think a little different handling of the administrative action could have saved the whole situation. The political situation in the Frontier, it appears, was allowed to deteriorate during the period when a policy of relaxation was the order of the day, and attempts to deal with it in a repressive manner have been made at a time when the real remedy of the disease had been prescribed. The sooner the Government withdraws all repressive measures from the province the better for the province and the Government itself. The situation has caused deep concern to the whole Muslim community in India, and it is hardly wise for the Government not to allay Muslim feeling in this respect.

As to Kashmir it is hardly necessary for me to describe the historical background of events which have recently happened in that country. The apparently sudden resurrection of a people, in whom the ego-flame had been almost extinguished, ought to be, in spite of the suffering which it has necessarily involved, a matter of rejoicing to all those who possess an insight into the inner struggle of modern Asiatic

peoples. The cause of the people of Kashmir is absolutely just, and I have no doubt that the rebirth of this sense of reality of their own personality in an intelligent and skilful people will eventually prove a source of strength not only to the State but also to the people of India as a whole. What, however, is most deplorable is that the communal ill-feeling existing in India, and the perfectly natural sympathy of the Indian Muslims with their Kashmir brethren, led to a kind of counter-agitation among the Hindus, which, in its despair, sought to protect a barbarous administration by attributing its inevitable consequences to such wild fancies as Pan-Islamic plots and conspiracies for British occupation of Kashmir. Such agitation and the communal colour thereby given to the Kashmir question could have led ; only to one thing – resort to violent repression leading to prolonged lawlessness in the State. In parts of the Jammu Province, as newspaper reports tell us, the administration has completely broken down and it is only the presence of British troops which is keeping things in control at least in places where they are present. Oral reports of a most violent and shameful repression practised by State authorities in many places are still pouring in. Nor can commissions of enquiry be of any help in such a state of thing. The Middleton Report which admits important facts and fails to draw legitimate conclusions therefrom has already failed to satisfy Muslims. The truth is that the matter has passed the stage in which enquiries can lead to effective results. The growing sense of self-consciousness in the people all over the world is

now demanding recognition in the shape of a desire for an increasing share in the administration which governs them. Political tutelage is good for a primitive people but it is in the best interests of an administration itself not to shirk from radical reform when a change in the outlook of a people demands it. Among other things which have probably arisen from the peculiar conditions obtaining in Kashmir, the people of that country demand some kind of a popular assembly. Let us hope that the ruler of the State and the Government of India will consider the people's demands as favourably as they possibly can. I have no doubt that the new Prime Minister, with characteristic British administrative acuteness, will see into the heart of the matter, and provide scope for the activity of a fine but down-trodden people who gave some of the best intellects to ancient India, and later added a real charm to Mughal culture. There may be difficulties in the way of constitutional reform in Kashmir as in the case of our own country; but the interests of permanent peace and order demand that these difficulties must be speedily overcome. If the meaning of the present upheaval is not properly understood and its causes are sought in directions where they cannot be found, the Kashmir Government, I fear, will have made its problem much more complicated.

It is obvious, therefore, that the attitude of the British Government towards our demands and the gravity of the situation in the Frontier Province and Kashmir claim our immediate attention. But what claims our immediate attention is not our only con-

cern. We must have a clear perception of the forces which are silently moulding the future, and place a relatively permanent programme of work before the community in view of the probable direction of events in the country. The present struggle in India is sometimes described as India's revolt against the West. I do not think it is a revolt against the West; for the people of India are demanding the very institutions which the West stands for. Whether the gamble of elections, retinuses of party leaders and hollow pageants of parliaments will suit a country of peasants to whom the money-economy of modern democracy is absolutely incomprehensible, is a different question altogether. Educated urban India demands democracy. The minorities, feeling themselves as distinct cultural units and fearing that their very existence is at stake, demand safeguards, which the majority community, for obvious reasons, refuses to concede. The majority community pretends to believe in a nationalism theoretically correct, if we start from Western premises, belied by facts, if we look to India. Thus the real parties to the present struggle in India are not England and India, but the majority community and the minorities of India which can ill-afford to accept the principle of Western democracy until it is properly modified to suit the actual conditions of life in India.

Nor do Mahatma Gandhi's political methods signify a revolt in the psychological sense. These methods arise out of a contact of two opposing types of world-consciousness, Western and Eastern. The Western man's mental texture is chronological in

character. He lives and moves and has his being in time. The Eastern man's world-consciousness is non-historical. To the Western man things gradually become; they have a past, present and future. To the Eastern man they are immediately rounded off, timeless, purely present. That is why Islam which sees in the time movement a symbol of reality appeared as an intruder in the static world pictures of Asia. The British as a Western people cannot but conceive political reform in India as a systematic process of gradual evolution. Mahatma Gandhi as an Eastern man sees in this attitude nothing more than an ill-conceived unwillingness to part with power and tries all sorts of destructive negations to achieve immediate attainment. Both are elementally incapable of understanding each other. The result is the appearance of a revolt.

These phenomena, however, are merely premonitions of a coming storm, which is likely to sweep over the whole of India and the rest of Asia. This is the inevitable outcome of a wholly political civilization which has looked upon man as a thing to be exploited and not as a personality to be developed and enlarged by purely cultural forces. The peoples of Asia are bound to rise against the acquisitive economy which the West has developed and imposed on the nations of the East. Asia cannot comprehend modern Western capitalism with its undisciplined individualism. The faith which you represent recognises the worth of the individual, and disciplines him to give away his all to the service of God and man. Its possibilities are not yet exhausted. It can still create

a new world where the social rank of man is not determined by his caste or colour, or the amount of dividend he earns, but by the kind of life he lives; where the poor tax the rich, where human society is founded not on the equality of stomachs but on the equality of spirits, where an Untouchable can marry the daughter of a king, where private ownership is a trust and where capital cannot be allowed to accumulate so as to dominate the real producer of wealth. This superb idealism of your faith, however, needs emancipation from the medieval fancies of theologians and legists. Spiritually we are living in a prison house of thoughts and emotions which during the course of centuries we have woven round ourselves. And be it further said to the shame of us—men of older generation—that we have failed to equip the younger generation for the economic, political and even religious crises that the present age is likely to bring. The whole community needs a complete overhauling of its present mentality in order that it may again become capable of feeling the urge of fresh desires and ideals. The Indian Muslim has long ceased to explore the depths of his own inner life. The result is that he has ceased to live in the full glow and colour of life, and is consequently in danger of an unmanly compromise with forces which, he is made to think, he cannot vanquish in open conflict. He who desires to change an unfavourable environment must undergo a complete transformation of his inner being. God changeth not the condition of a people until they themselves take the initiative to change their condition by constantly illuminating the zone of their daily

activity in the light of a definite ideal. Nothing can be achieved without a firm faith in the independence of one's own inner life. This faith alone keeps a people's eye fixed on their goal and saves them from perpetual vacillation. The lesson that past experience has brought to you must be taken to heart. Expect nothing from any side. Concentrate your whole ego on yourself alone, and ripen your clay into real manhood if you wish to see your aspirations realized. Mussolini's maxim was: "He who has steel has everything." Be hard and work hard. This is the whole secret of individual and collective life. Our ideal is well defined. It is to win in the coming constitution a position for Islam which may bring her opportunities to fulfil her destiny in this country. It is necessary in the light of this ideal to rouse the progressive forces of the community and to organise their hitherto dormant energies. The flame of life cannot be borrowed from others; it must be kindled in the temple of one's own soul. This requires earnest preparation and a relatively permanent programme. What then shall be our future programme? I am inclined to think that it should be partly political, partly cultural. I venture to offer a few suggestions for your consideration.

First, we must frankly admit that there is yet a sort of chaos in the political thought of those who are supposed to guide the activities of the Indian Muslims in the present-day political struggle. The community, however, is not to blame for this state of things. The Muslim masses are not at all lacking in the spirit of self-sacrifice when the question of their ultimate

destiny in the country is involved. Recent history bears ample testimony to what I say. The fault is ours, not theirs. The guidance offered to the community is not always independently conceived, and the result is ruptures, sometimes at critical moments, within our political organisations. Thus these organisations cannot properly develop the kind of discipline which is so absolutely essential to the life and power of political bodies. To remedy this evil I suggest that the Indian Muslims should have only one political organisation with provincial and district branches all over the country. Call it whatever you like. What is essential is that its constitution must be such as to make it possible for any school of political thought to come into power, and to guide the community according to its own ideas and methods. In my opinion this is the only way to make reptures impossible, and to reintegrate and discipline our scattered forces to the best interests of Islam in India.[1]

Secondly, I suggest that this central organisation should immediately raise a national fund of at least 50 lakhs of rupees. No doubt we are living in hard times, but you may rest assured that the Muslims of India will not fail to respond to your call if a genuine effort is made to impress upon them the gravity of the present situation.

Thirdly, I suggest the formation of youth leagues and well-equipped volunteer corps throughout the country under the control and guidance of the Central

1. As a result of this suggestion all parties were absorbed in the Muslim League. *Ed.*

organisation. They must specially devote themselves to social service, custom reform, commercial organisation of the community and economic propaganda in towns and villages specially in the Punjab, where enormous indebtedness of Muslim agriculturists cannot be allowed to wait for the drastic remedies provided by agrarian upheavals. Things appear to have reached the breaking point as in China in 1925 when peasant leagues came into being in that country. The Simon Report admits that the peasant pays a substantial portion of his means to the State. The State, no doubt, gives him in return peace and security, trade and communication. But the net result of these blessings has been only a kind of scientific exactitude in taxation, destruction of village economy by machine-made goods and the commercialisation of crops which makes the peasant almost always fall a prey to money-lenders and commercial agents. This is a very serious matter especially in the Punjab. I want the proposed youth leagues to specialise in propaganda work in this connection, and thus to help the peasantry in escaping from its present bondage. The future of Islam in India largely depends, in my opinion, on the freedom of Muslim peasants in the Punjab. Let then the fire of youth mingle with the fire of faith in order to enhance the glow of life and to create a new world of actions for our future generations. A community is not merely a purely present and numerable whole of men and women. Indeed its life and activity as a living reality cannot be fully understood without a reference to that unborn infinity which lies asleep in the deeps of its

inner being.

Fourthly, I suggest the establishment of male and female cultural institutes in all the big towns of India. These institutes as such should have nothing to do with politics. Their chief function should be to mobilise the dormant energy of the younger generation by giving them a clear grasp of what Islam has already achieved and what it has still to achieve in the religious and cultural history of mankind. The progressive forces of a people can be roused only by placing before them a new task calculated to enlarge the individual to make him comprehend and experience the community, not as a heap of isolated fragments of life, but as a well defined whole possessing inner cohesion and solidarity. And when once these forces are roused they bring fresh vigour for new conflicts, and that sense of inner freedom which enjoys resistance and holds out the promise of a new self. These institutes must keep in close touch with our educational institutions—old and new—with a view to secure the ultimate convergence of all the lines of our educational endeavour on a single purpose. One practical suggestion I can immediately make. The Hartog Committee's interim report, now apparently forgotten in the rush of other political problems, makes the following recommendation which I consider of the utmost importance for the Muslims of India :

> "There can be no doubt that if in provinces, where the educational progress of the Muhammadan community is impeded by religious difficulties, such arrangements for religious instruc-

tion can be made as will induce that community to send its children to ordinary schools, the public system will gain both in economy and efficiency and much will be done to free the community from the handicap and the reproach of educational backwardness.

"We are fully aware that such arrangements are not easy to make and that in other countries they have given rise to much controversy. But in our opinion the time is ripe and more than ripe for a determined effort to devise practical plans." (pp. 204-205)

And again on page 206 while discussing reservations, the Report says :

"If therefore special arrangements inside the public system were made now, and possibly for some time to come, to enable the Muhammadan community to take its full share in the life and in the advance of the nation, this would not, in our opinion, be inconsistent either with sound democratic or sound educational principles. We wish we could say that no reservations are necessary and we should certainly wish that they should be as small as possible. As complications of an educational system they are undesirable in themselves, but since, in our belief, they represent a necessary alternative to leaving the Muhammadan community in its present backward state, and leaving it to take the poor chances afforded by a system of segregate institutions, we have no hesitation in embracing that alternative as justifiable on broad grounds of national policy."

The proposed cultural institutes or till their establishment the All-India Muslim Conference must see that these recommendations, based as they are on a clear perception of the present handicaps of our community, are carried into effect.

Fifthly, I suggest the formation of an assembly of *ulama* which must include Muslim lawyers who have received education in modern jurisprudence. The idea is to protect, expand and, if necessary, to reinterpret the law of Islam in the light of modern conditions, while keeping close to the spirit embodied in its fundamental principles. This body must receive constitutional recognition so that no bill affecting the personal law of Muslims may be put on the legislative anvil before it has passed through the crucible of this assembly. Apart from the purely practical value of this proposal for the Muslims of India, we must remember that the modern world, both Muslim and non-Muslim, has yet to discover the infinite value of the legal literature of Islam and its significance for a capitalistic world whose ethical standards have long abdicated from the control of man's economic conduct. The formation of the kind of assembly I propose will, I am sure, bring a deeper understanding of the usual principles of Islam at least in this country.

XVIII

SOME STUDY NOTES[1]

I was reading the other day a book called *The Emergence of Life.* The author has tried to apply mathematical method to philosophical research. His method is based on Boole's system of logic, which he further develops in the light of modern methematical investigation. After having discussed his views of time, space and life, as seen in the light of modern relativity, the author refers in his chapter on 'Non-Spatial Reality' to corporeal resurrection. I am sure this passage will interest the readers of the *Muslim Revival.*

The noteworthy point in this passage is how modern science and philosophy, becoming more and more exact, is furnishing rational foundations for certain religious beliefs which the 18th and 19th centuries science rejected as absurd and incredible. Further the Muslim reader will see that the argument in support of corporeal resurrection advanced in this passage is practically the same as put forward in the Quran over 1,300 years ago. The passage is as follows:

"Whether indeed such an apparently fantastic notion, at any rate, to the scientific mind, as to the resurrection of the body, the most wonderful and I should say, almost incredible mystery of theological

1. A portion of this art'cle was published in the "Civil and Military Gazette" of Lahore as "Corporeal Resurrection after Death." *Ed.*

teaching, one of the most astounding tenets of the Christian faith insisted upon by St. Paul and firmly held even to this day by some of the most earnest and devout scholars of our time, would ever admit of a scientific explanation, seems to me in the light of this consideration to be not altogether eliminated from the class of possible and rational beliefs. Absurd as it seems to take an extreme case, that the atoms that compose the body of a person who had been shattered to smithereens by an explosion in the trenches would by any possibility ever recombine, except by what would truly be called a miracle, there is nothing in the light of these reflections, to hinder the monads from adopting the right "time and tune" that would enable it once more to respond to one and all of the monads that had served as the chamber of its material environment."

It must be remembered that the Christian belief in resurrection is based upon the supposed fact of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, i.e., it is based on a historical event which is believed to have happened 2,000 years ago. In the Quran, resurrection is taken as a universal property of living organisms. The Quranic argument is summed up in the following verses :

"And they used to say: What! when we die and become dust and bones, shall we be raised again and our forefathers too.

"Say : Those who have gone before and after—all will be brought together at the appointed moment.

"We have made death among you and we are not helpless that we should bring the like of you and

create you in a form which you know not. *And you know your first creation. Why then do you not ponder?*" (56 : 47, 48, 60, 61, 62)

"*Do they not see how God created the first time*; then He will create again surely it is easy for Him. Say: Go about the earth *and see how He caused first creation*; so will God bring about the other creation." (29 : 19, 20)

"Does man think that we will not bring together his bones? Yea, We are powerful that we should complete all his limbs." (75 : 3, 4)

"And they say: What! when we become bones and dust, shall we be raised in a fresh form? Say: Be ye stones or iron or anything else which seems harder to you. Then they say: Who will bring us to life again? *Say: He who made you the first time.*" (17 : 49-51)

"And man says: What! when I have died, shall I be raised to life again? *Does not man consider that we created him before while he was nothing?*" (19 : 66, 67)

As may be seen from the italicised lines, the Quran bases its arguments in support of resurrection, not on any events in history, but on the personal experience of every individual. This is exactly the argument which the modernmost scientific research as quoted above, has advanced; viz, the same "time and tune" which brought the monads together the first time and caused his creation, may once more summon together, after death, the same monads and cause the second creation of man.

It may, however, be noted here that this return to life after death is nothing in the sense of the cycle of births and rebirths as commonly understood. The Quran supports the scientific view that all life is a *forward movement*. There is no coming back. Mark the following verses on the point :

"When death overtakes anyone of them, he says, my Lord ! Send me back (to the world) so that I may do good in what I have left behind. Never ! . . . In front of him there is a barrier till the day of resurrection." (23 : 99-101)

"By the moon when it becomes full ! Of a certainty you will go from stage to stage." (84 : 19, 20)

Just as the moon goes through various stages, from the crescent to the full moon, even so is man to advance from a lower to a higher form of life.

Another passage which will interest the Muslim readers of the *Muslim Revival*, I came across in a book, entitled, *Emotion as the Basis of Civilization*. This passage refers to the sense of unity in Islam as created by the institution of congregational prayer and pilgrimage. It is as follows :

"The vast difficulty of creating any sense of unity or solidarity in such a group (i.e., composed of different nations with different traditions and outlooks) is apparent. All historians declare that the amazing success of Islam in dominating the world is the astounding coherence or sense of unit in the group, but they do not explain how this miracle was worked. There can be little doubt that the most effective means was prayer. The five daily prayers when all the

faithful wherever they were, alone in the grim solitudes of the desert or in the vast assemblies in crowded city, knelt and prostrated themselves towards Mecca, uttering the same words of adoration for the one true God and of loyalty to His Prophet, produced an overwhelming effect even on the spectator and the psychological effect of thus fusing the minds of the worshippers in a common adoration and expression of loyalty is certainly stupendous. Muhammad was the first one to see the tremendous power of public prayer as a unification culture and there can be little doubt that the power of Islam is due in a large measure to the obedience of the faithful to this inviolable rule of the five prayers.

"The giving of alms to the poor was also a means of developing the sense of brotherhood. So, likewise, was the pilgrimage to Mecca . . . the pilgrimage proved in the end a great aid in unification for the men of every tribe and race, met at Mecca with a common purpose and in a common worship and a feeling of brotherhood would not but he engendered in the process."

(*The Muslim Revival*,
September, 1932)

XIX

'JAVID NAMA'
WITH A NOTE by N. M. KHAN, C.S.P.

Iqbal came to London in the winter of 1931, as a delegate to the Round Table Conference. He shared a suite of rooms with Mowlana Abdul Qadir Kasuri, in a block of flats situated in the south-western suburb. When I first came to learn that Iqbal was expected to participate in the Round Table Conference, I held consultations with some of my friends and we formed ourselves into what came to be known as the Iqbal Literary Association. Our number was not very large, but all the members were full of enthusiasm for the poetry of Iqbal. After Iqbal had arrived in London, we made it a practice to go to his rooms very frequently and to hear him talk on all sorts of subjects. Our Association decided to present an address of welcome to the great poet of the East, and I was commissioned to approach him with the request to accept our address. When I first talked on the subject to Iqbal, he showed extreme reluctance to accept such an address. He expressed himself very much averse to publicity. I argued that the move had been spontaneously initiated by Indian young men resident in England without any one from outside urging them to do so and that he should not do anything to damp their enthusiasm. He did finally agree. We got busy and arranged an afternoon reception at the Waldorf Hotel, at which

the address was presented. The reception was attended by all representative Indians and many English friends. Mahatma Gandhi came to it and so did His Highness the Aga Khan. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru was also present. The late Nawab Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana acted as the chief host at the function. It was while preparing a part of the address of welcome that I came to receive a gift from Iqbal, which I have treasured ever since. *Javid Nama* had not yet been published when I had come away from India. I asked Iqbal what the book contained. He said: "I can give you an outline of the poem if you can manage to write down the words as I utter them." He started dictating the words which I reproduce below. It took me nearly an hour to take down his words. They came out without effort and Iqbal had to pause only to give me time to write them down in my long-hand. When he came towards the end, he broke down and it was not until 15 minutes later that he became his normal self. The words were as follow:

"The book opens with a *Munajat* and begins with the Poet standing on the sea-shore about evening time, reading a few verses from Rumi. This makes the soul of Rumi to appear. The Poet puts all sorts of questions to the Spirit of Rumi, the principal question being as to how the Soul of Man passes beyond Space and Time. The idea is to give a kind of philosophy of *Mi'raj*. Then appears the Spirit of Space-Time which is pictured by the Poet as a double-faced angel, one of the two faces as dark and sleeping and the other as bright and awake.

This Spirit exercises some kind of charm on the Poet and carries him up. Both the Spirits of Rumi and the Poet swim in Space and continue to do so until the mountains of the Moon become visible. Here they hear a song from the Stars—a sort of welcome given to human beings who have the courage to pass beyond Space. They alight on the Moon and enter some of its caves. In one of the caves they meet the Spirit of the great Indian ascetic, Vishwamitra, whose name the Poet translates as Jahan Dost. The ascetic is found sitting absorbed in contemplation with a White Snake, circling round his head. Recognising Rumi, the ascetic asks as to who is the new comer. Rumi gives a short description of his companion. Thereupon the ascetic puts some questions to the new comer in order to test his spiritual attainments. One of the questions, for instance, is: "In what respect is Man superior to God?" The answer is: "In his knowledge of Death." Similarly he puts other questions and finding the answers satisfactory, he discloses certain truths about various things, entitled in the Poem—زند تا سخن از عارف هندی. They leave the cave and pass on to the valley of the Moon where they find a huge rock on which four pictures are carved. They are called the tablet of Buddha, the tablet of Jesus, the tablet of Zoroaster and the tablet of Muhammad. Descriptions of the tablets are given in the Poem. So they pass on from planet to planet. In Mars is shown a woman-prophet originally stolen from Europe as a child by the Devil and who teaches the women of Mars a new view of evolution which according to this woman-prophet

tends to eliminate the male. Her message is that the world will, eventually, be ruled by Woman and her practical advice to her sisters is, in the first place, not to marry and if they marry and have children to kill the male and retain the female children. This gives an occasion to Rumi to criticise some of the aspects of modern civilization.

"In the planet Mercury they find the spirits of Jamal-ud-din Afghani and Saeed Halim Pasha, the head of the religious reform movement in Turkey. Afghani sends a message to the people of Russia wherein the Spirit of Islam is compared with the Spirit of Bolshevism, and Karl Marx is described as a prophet without an angel.

"Passing on to another planet they find three spirits, Mansur Hallaj, Ghalib and Qurrat-ul-Ain. They are supposed to have been offered a home in Paradise which they refused to accept and preferred constant movement in the immensity of the Universe. Hallaj explains his position as a Muslim mystic. Certain questions of literary and religious nature arising from Ghalib's poetry are put to him. Qurrat-ul-Ain gives a song of her own. As a contrast to this in another planet two spirits are shown who went to seek a Home in the flames of Hell but Hell refused them admittance. They are Mir Ja'far of Bengal and Mir Sadiq of Mysore. In another planet underneath a transparent sea are shown the spirits of the Pharaoh and Kitchener. Their conversation attracts the attention of the Mahdi Soudani from Paradise. It comes down, penetrates into the sea and has a talk with Kitchener. The Spirit of the Mahdi works itself up

and finally addresses the whole of the Arabic-speaking world.

"Having passed through all the planets, the Poet enters Paradise and meets Saints as well as Kings. He finds there the palace of Sharaf-un-Nisa, daughter of Abdus Samad Khan, Governor of Lahore. One of the saints whom the Poet meets in Paradise is Shah Hamdan, the patron saint of Kashmir, who brings in certain questions with regard to the history and people of Kashmir. The Poet further meets King Nadir Shah, of Persia, Ahmad Shah Abdali of Afghanistan and Sultan Tipu.

"At the moment of leaving Paradise, the Houris of Paradise besiege the Poet and insist on his staying with them. The Poet refuses to stay. The real meaning of Muslim Paradise which is not an end in itself but a stage in the spiritual development of Man is here explained. However, a compromise is arrived at, the Houris agree to let him go provided he gave them a song which he does. He then leaves the Paradise and gradually reaches the point where Rumi leaves him for *man must enter the divine presence* alone. Here the Poet puts some very serious questions to God and finally wants a complete revelation of the destiny of his *own people* which is granted to him. The book ends with a song from the spirit of Universe.

"At the end of the book the Poet addresses his son, which is virtually an address to the coming generation."

(*Morning News*, Calcutta
Eed Number 1944)

XX

INTRODUCTION TO *Modern Afghanistan*

I am asked to write a line or two by way of a foreword to the excellent book on "Modern Afghanistan." I have great pleasure in doing so, not only because I have always regarded the Afghans as a people of inexhaustible vitality but also because I have had the privilege of personally knowing the late and lamented King Nadir Shah—that soldier-statesman, whose genius infused a new life into his people and opened their eyes to the modern world. The history of Afghanistan has yet to be read and appreciated. Mere record of events is not history, it is only material for history. Events are like words and have meanings which it is the duty of the genuine historians to discover. This work has yet to be done in regard to the history of Afghans both in India and Afghanistan. A people, who have produced such men as Muhammad Ghauri, Ala-ud-Din Khilji, Sher Shah Suri, Ahmed Shah Abdali, Amir Abdur Rehman Khan, King Nadir Shah and, above all, Maulana Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani—in many respects the greatest Muslim and certainly one of the greatest Asiatics of our times - cannot but be regarded as an important factor in the life of Asia.

For long periods in the past Balkh, Bamian, Hadda, Kabul, Ghazni and Herat have been great

centres of culture; and the earnestness of the present ruling dynasty does certainly hold out a promise that they may well revive their past glories again. Whenever I think of Afghanistan, as I quite often do, my mind conjures up before me a picture of a country I saw last autumn. I sit in a simply furnished study room which overlooks a garden. Beyond the garden a broad stretch of land rises in gentle slopes to meet the hills which lie in ever-ascending waves, one behind the other, till they culminate in the towering range of Hindu Kush. A line of huge pylons, that bring the high tension current from distant falls lies athwart the landscape; overhead the sky is painted in gorgeous colours by the approaching sunset; below the shadows move swiftly across the valley. Innumerable poplars, straight, slim and tall, sway gently in the gathering shadows as the soft evening breeze kisses their searing leaves. In the calm of that twilight, the valley, the trees, the distant villages and the mountains floating in a sea of hazy mist present a scene of dream-like beauty. Suddenly the hush of the evening is broken by the call to prayer. One by one all my companions leave their seats; transported beyond myself by the sweetening chant of the Muezzin, I am the last to reach the prayer room, where my fellow guests are already gathered, along with our royal host and the humblest of his retainers.

The little episode reveals three of the most striking qualities of the Afghans—their deep religious spirit, their complete freedom from distinction of birth and rank and the perfect balance with which they have always maintained their religious and

national ideals. This spirit of conservatism has always been, and will always remain a great source of strength to the Afghans. It keeps them in living contact with their past, without rendering them incapable of response to the call of a new age. Their conservative wisdom make them cherish their traditions; but the weight of these traditions does not, in any way, kill the forward movement of the soul within.

Only the other day, I met in Lahore a remarkable old Afghan druggist who had spent more than half a century in the West and had finally settled in Australia. He could not read and write but spoke good Australian English. "Do you still remember your Pashto?" I said. My question went straight to his heart. His slightly bedewed eyes became brighter. The memories of his youth seemed to be crowding in his mind, until they found unrestrained expression in an old Pashto love-song which for the moment transported the hoary Afghan from the scorching heat of Lahore to the cold valleys of his fatherland. The Afghan conservatism is a miracle; it is adamantive yet fully sensitive to and assimilative of new cultural forces. And this is the secret of the eternal organic health of the Afghan-type.

Afghanistan was a great commercial centre in the ancient world and remained so during the Middle Ages, till the development of sea-borne traffic in the modern world. She has occupied and will continue to occupy the key position in the politics and history of Asia. "Here", writes Professor Lyde, "we have one of the most important areas of Asia, full of

fascination to those who believe in both the national and international, but do not believe that it is the destiny of world to be for ever at war." So this plain, straight-forward and unvarnished account of the country by two brothers, who during long residence in that land, have supplemented the fruit of personal observation, by a study of the best sources and have been able to draw upon the latest official information, is doubly welcome.

The authors of the book have rightly focussed their attention upon those periods, during which the arts of peace have flourished and not upon the periods of numberless wars, invasions and internal dissensions, which at first sight appear to be the most striking feature of the history of Afghanistan. Beside providing invaluable and authentic information regarding the country, the authors have raised some very interesting questions about the position of Afghanistan in relation to cultural advancement of the world. There is no doubt that archaeological and historical research will throw a new light on our knowledge of the ancient world, but much work yet remains to be done, and I hope that Afghan scholars will diligently try to lay bare the past greatness of their country.

XXI

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ISLAM*

A.—Religion.

Is it morality touched with emotion?

Is it belief in a God or Gods with some kind of worship? Mithraism
Darkness
Mosque

(*i*) Is it wholly other worldliness? لا رهبانية الاسلام
لا تنس نصيبک من الدنیا

(*ii*) Is it fear of the invisible? لا خوف عليهم ولا هم يحزنون

(*iii*) Is it intimacy with the supersensible?

*In 1937 Iqbal handed certain papers to Mian Muhammad Shafi which contained certain notes which were to form the basis of the book 'Introduction to the study of Islam.' As his eyesight was getting weak Iqbal intended to dictate the book to Mian Muhammad Shafi. But this could not be done as Iqbal's health did not permit it. Eventually Iqbal breathed his last on 21st April, 1938 and these notes remained with Mian Muhammad Shafi. As these notes in Iqbal's handwriting were getting fainter and fainter Mian Muhammad Shafi copied them in 1947, when he was interned in Multan Central Jail. The original notes are now in the National Museum, Karachi. With the kind permission of the Curator of the Museum a photographic copy of the notes was obtained and from this photo these notes are reproduced here. In some cases it was not easy to decipher certain words.

In the *Tulu-i-Islam* of 22nd October 1958, Chaudhary Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, the Editor, published a translation of these notes. This translation differs in important details from the notes as reproduced here, especially as it is more detailed in parts. And it is very difficult to say if the additional notes which form a part of the translation were also written by Iqbal.

In any case these notes, as reproduced here, form an interesting document, and they are included in this collection in the hope that some scholar will undertake to write the book as planned by Iqbal. *Ed.*

Partly yes, but supersensible opened to be approached in a scientific spirit—
Ibn Khaldun, and idea of finality.

(*iv*) Is it some secret teaching to be handed orally (mystery)?
All early Magian religions believed in it Islam—No
Spengler, p. 246, Vol. II. قد تبين الرشد من الغی

(*v*) Religion (Origin of the word) مذہب not used in the Quran.
Words used in the Quran ملت ، منہاج ، دین
What is the meaning of دین و ملت

(*vi*) Martiman, Vol. I.

B.—Islam a protest against all religions in the old sense of the word.

(*i*) Abolition of Prophethood. Islam and time (هل اتی علی اولیا)

(*ii*) The idea of Salvation in Islam
Is it a salvation—religion?
نجات is used only once in the Koran. What is Najat?

(*iii*) No secret teaching

(*iv*) Belief in God (غیب)
Deracialisation of mankind اختلاف السنتکم الخ و شعوبا
Economic Equality ماذا قل العفو

C.—Church and State
Is Islamic community a juristic person?
Is Islamic State a juristic person?
Relation of Church and State.

What is State? Like marriage or Contract.
The Amir and the Shaikhul Islam, etc.
Hereditary monarchy. History of Islamic Priesthood.
Kerbala? Effect of it.

D.—Islam and the Woman.

E.—Islam and Capitalism.

(*i*) To the Magian culture Revelation is a mystical process in which some spirit enters the body of a person who speaks it. من ورى الحجاب
In Islam 'Wahy' (quote verses) is the universal property of life in which a man obtains contact with the ultimate springs of life. It manifests itself in 3 ways. It is abolished as a source of knowledge. In Islam contemplation of Amr spreads into thought and action. It realises the immensity of the world in which old conceptions of races, community, creed vanish into nothing. It is light. الله نور السموات والارض
It draws the world from darkness to the open day-light. وا له يخرجكم من الظلمت الى النور

(*ii*) The word Salvation (نجات)
What is Najat? Liberation from what?
not from the limitations of individuality
و لحكم فراد اے
Not liberation from the tension of consciousness.
It is relief of the Ego's loneliness in the Universe.
The conception of God الى الرفيق الا علے هو معلم (Comrade).

(*a*) Sleep liberates لا تاخذه سنته ولا نوم

(*b*) Wine liberates (اجتنبو) قم الا الله لا قليلا
Breaks the vigour of consciousness.

(*c*) Dancing too liberates غرو باللغو مرد کر ١١
All these means of escape from space and time are discouraged. You should overcome space and time by الا بسلطان الخ
Mastering actuality by understanding تفکرو فی الخلق السموات الخ
Fear of visible actuality, i.e. Space and Time is removed when we begin to understand things as causal relations.
لا خوف علیہم و لا هم یحزنون
که این جا جز ما و اونیست الخ Knowledge of world as nature—actuality
Fear overcome not by charms but by formula.

(*d*) Knowledge of world as movement—history, Sufism.

(*iii*) ایمان—Security

Reforms movement is Islam.

Ibn Taimiyya.
Abdul Wahab.

Bab Ahmaddiya	} prophethood }	All more or less magian

Syed Ahmad—Rationalism
The new movement.
The coming of the expected one مسیح وغیره

(*i*) No return.

(*ii*) Traditions—Bukhari.

XXII

NOTE ON NIETZSCHE*

The Ego

The teaching of the 'Asrar-i-Khudi' rests on two points: (*a*) That personality is the central fact of the universe. The old testament describes this ultimate fact as the great 'I am'. The Koran, however, describes the ultimate personality in much grander terms (59 : 23, 24) :—

هو الله الذی لا اله الا هو الملک القدوس السلم المومن
المهیمن العزیز الجبار المتکبر . . . و هو العزیز الحکیم - حشر

Read in this connection 'Asrar-i-Khudi'.

در معنی این که اصل نظام عالم از خودی است

Tr.—The ego is the root of all existence.

(*b*) That personality, 'I am', is the central fact in the constitution of man. This smaller or dependent 'I am' is variously described in the Koran قتور ، ضعیف ، جهول ، ظلوم ، عجول ، کفور yet it is also described as احسن التقویم the bearer of Divine trust علی نفسه بصیرة. The case of man, therefore, in spite of his constitutional shortcomings is not hopeless. On the other hand the Koran says :

*This note was dictated by Iqbal to Mr. Nazir Niyazi in the summer of 1937. Mr. Niyazi has very kindly handed over the note to Iqbal Academy, Karachi. The Academy has been kind enough to supply a copy of the note to the Editor. There is so much misunderstanding about Iqbal's indebtedness to Nietzsche that this note will be read with interest by all students of Iqbal. *Ed.*

(*i*) بلیٰ قادرین علیٰ ان نسوی بنانه
(*ii*) الحسیب الانسان ان یترک سدی

The slender 'I' which appears to be capable of dissolution by the smallest of shocks appears to have a future and can achieve permanence as an element in the constitution of the universe provided it adopts a certain mode of life. It has the quality of growth قد افلح من زکها as well as the quality of corruption و قد خاب من دسها ; it has the power to expand by absorbing the elements of the universe of which it appears to be an insignificant part, it has also the power of absorbing the attributes of God, تخلقو باخلاق الله and thus attain to the vicegerency of God on earth. The various stages of its spiritual expansion are described in the 'Asrar-i-Khudi' as follows :—

(*i*) "اطاعت" Complete surrender to the Law—
This is symbolised by the camel.
(*ii*) self-control "ضبط نفس"
(*iii*) Vicegerency of God "نیابت الهیه"

The superficial resemblance of these three parts of the growth of human 'I' with Nietzsche's 3 metamorphosis of the spirit may mislead some readers. It is therefore necessary to warn the reader of 'Asrar-i-Khudi' that Nietzsche does not at all believe in the spiritual fact which I have described as "خودی" in the poem, vide—Will to Power, Vol. 2, No. 12-20.

According to Nietzsche the 'I' is a fiction. It is true that looked at from a purely intellectual point of view this conclusion is inevitable, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* ends in the conclusion that God, immortality and freedom are mere fictions though

useful for practical purposes. Nietzsche only follows Kant in this conclusion. There is, however, another point of view, that is to say the point of view of inner experience. From this point of view the 'I' is an indubitable fact, (vide Bradley's discussion on this point) which stares us in the face in spite of our intellectual analysis of it. In this respect Leibnitz is nearer to truth than either Kant or Nietzsche—The monad or the I-atom according to him is an ultimate fact. His mistake, however, is that he regards the I-atom as something closed and windowless. This, however, is contradicted by experience, because we know that the 'I' grows and expands by education. The question, therefore, which should be raised in regard to the human 'I' is not whether it is a substance or not. The question was raised by our theologians whose philosophical discussion achieved nothing. The question which ought to be raised in my opinion is whether this weak, created and dependent Ego or 'I' can be made to survive the shock of death and thus become a permanent element in the constitution of universe. The answer that 'Asrar-i-Khudi' tries to give to this question, of course in a poetical way and not in a philosophical manner, is this that the human ego can be made permanent by adopting a certain mode of life and thereby bringing it into contact with the ultimate source of life. The various stages of its growth are mentioned in the 'Asrar-i-Khudi'. Thus in its essence 'Asrar-i-Khudi' and Nietzsche are diametrically opposed to each other. 'Asrar-i-Khudi' wholly depends on the factum of "خودی" in which Nietzsche does not believe.

THE SUPERMAN

The conception of the Superman in Nietzsche is purely materialistic. This conception may be new in European literature. It is, however, the same as the idea of the Overman in Emmerson. It is probable that Nietzsche borrowed it from the literature of Islam or of the East and degraded it by his materialism. In the literature of Islamic mysticism the expression used for the higher man is "انسان کامل". I wrote on this subject about 36 years ago immediately after leaving the College. My dissertation was published in the "Indian Antiquary" of Bombay and now forms part of my *Development of Metaphysics in Persia*. Being a thoroughgoing materialist, Nietzsche cannot use the term spirit except in the sense of life in its metaphysical manifestations. The first metamorphosis of life according to him is camel, which from his point of view is a symbol of load-bearing strength. The second is lion, that is to say the strength to kill without pity, for pity is a vice and not virtue with Nietzsche. The third metamorphosis is child, that is to say the Superman passing beyond good and evil like the child and becoming a law unto himself. This is materialism turning the human ego into a monster, which, according to Nietzsche's idea of immorality, has repeated itself and will repeat itself infinite number of times. Nietzsche fell into this error of the world repeating itself on account of his fatal error, namely that clock time is the real time. On this point again 'Asrar-i-Khudi' is opposed to Nietzsche's teaching. He never grappled with the problem of time and accepted without criticism the

old Hindu aud Greek idea of time. The time movement to him is circular. In the 'Asrar-i-Khudi' it is regarded as a straightline. Life, therefore, to Nietzsche is repetition, to 'Asrar-i-Khudi' creation. The perfection of the perfect man according to Islam consists in realising this aspect of time which can be described only as the eternal *now*. To Nietzsche there is no such thing as the eternal *now*. Further Nietzsche's Superman is a biological product. The Islamic perfect man is the product of moral and spiritual forces.

NIETZSCHE'S MATERIALISM

Nietzsche recognises no spiritual purpose in the universe. To him there is no ethical principle resident in the forces of history. Virtue, Justice, Duty, Love all are meaningless terms to him. The process of history is determined purely by economical forces and the only principle that governs is 'Might is Right'. It must be noted that Karl Marx and Nietzsche borrowed this materialistic interpretation of the historical process from the left wing followers of Hegel and accepted it without criticism. They, however, drew absolutely opposite inferences from this interpretation. Karl Marx predicts that power will eventually fall into the hands of the proletariat by the sheer force of historical causes. The proletariat therefore wrest by force the power from the hands of the rich and impose upon the world a new social order. Nietzsche on the other hand says that it is the superior man who has been robbed of power and he should assert himself and tell the inferior to remain where they should be, i.e. hewers of wood and drawers of

water. The truth is that this materialistic interpretation of the historical process has marred the teachings of both Karl Marx and Nietzsche. It has however done more harm to the teachings of Karl Marx.

THE MEANING OF KHUDI

The word 'Khudi' was chosen with great difficulty and most reluctantly. From a literary point of view it has many shortcomings and ethically it is generally used in a bad sense both in Urdu and Persian. The other words for the metaphysical fact of the 'I' are equally bad, e.g. انانیت ، نفس ، شخص ، انا. What is needed is a colourless word for self, ego, having no ethical significance. As far as I know there is no such word in either Urdu or Persian. The word 'من' in Persian is equally bad. However, considering the requirements of verse, I thought that the word 'خودی' was the most suitable. There is also some evidence in the Persian language of the use of the word 'خودی' in the simple sense of self, i.e. to say the colourless fact of the 'I'. Thus metaphysically the word 'خودی' is used in the sense of that indescribable feeling of 'I', which forms the basis of the uniqueness of each individual. Metaphysically it does not convey any ethical significance for those who cannot get rid of its ethical significance. I have already said in the *Zuboor-i-Ajam*:

گرفتم این که شراب خودی بے تلخ است
بدرد خویش نگر زهر ما بدرمان کش

> The wine of egohood is no doubt bitter, but do look to thy disease and take my poison for the sake of thy health.

When I condemn self-negation I do not mean self-denial in the moral sense; for self-denial in the moral sense is a source of strength to the ego. In condemning self-negation I am condemning those forms of conduct which lead to the extinction of the 'I' as a metaphysical force, for its extinction would mean its dissolution, its incapacity for personal immortality. The ideal of Islamic Mysticism according to my understanding is not the extinction of the 'I'. The 'فنا' in the Islamic mysticism means not extinction but complete surrender of the human ego to the Divine Ego. The ideal of Islamic mysticism is a stage beyond the stage of 'فنا' i.e. 'بقا', which from my point of view is the highest stage of self-affirmation. When I say "Be as hard as the diamond", I do not mean as Nietzsche does callousness or pitilessness. What I mean is the integration of the elements of the ego so that it may be able to obstruct the forces of destruction in its means towards personal immortality.

Ethically the word 'خودی' means (as used by me) self-reliance, self-respect, self-confidence, self-preservation, even self-assertion when such a thing is necessary, in the interests of life and the power to stick to the cause of truth, justice, duty, etc., etc., even in the face of death. Such behaviour is moral in my opinion because it helps in the integration of the forces of the Ego, thus hardening it, as against the forces of disintegration and dissolution (vide *Reconstruction*); practically the metaphysical Ego is the bearer of two main rights that is the right to life and freedom as determined by the Divine Law.

PART II—ISLAM & QADIANISM

XXIII

QADIANIS AND ORTHODOX MUSLIMS*

The issue created by the controversy between the Qadianis and the orthodox Muslims is extremely important. The Indian Muslims have only recently begun to realize its importance. I intended to address

*The religious movement of Qadianism, also known as the Ahmadiya movement amongst its followers, was started by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (18.5-1908). In the words of Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, the second successor of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder "claimed to be the Messiah for the Christian, the Mahdi for the Muslims, Krishna or the Neha Kalank Avatar for the Hindus and *Mesio Dorbhami* for the Zoroastrians. In short he was the Promised Prophet of every nation and was appointed to collect all mankind under the banner of one faith." (*Ahmadiyyat*, p. 11.) What is the relationship of this movement with Islam is explained by the author of *Ahmadiyyat* in the following words :—

"In short, Prophets are of two kinds, those who are law-bearers like Moses (on whom be peace) and those who only restore and reestablish the law after mankind have forsaken it; as, for instance Elijah, Isaiah, Ezekiel, Doniel and Jesus (on all of whom be peace). The Prophet Messiah (on whom be peace) also claimed to be a Prophet like the latter, and asserted that as Jesus was the last Khalifa (Successor) of the Mosaic dispensation, he was the last Khalifa of the Islamic dispensation. The Ahmadiya movement, therefore, occupies with respect to the other sects of Islam, the same position which Christianity occupied, with respect to the other sects of Judaism!" (*Ahmadiyyat* by Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, 5th Edition, Rabwah, Pakistan, p. 18.)

Till 1914 the movement continued under a united leadership, but in that year a rift occurred and certain prominent members of the movement seceded from the parent movement and started what is known as the Lahore branch of the movement. The Lahore branch differs from the parent movement in the matter of certain tenets, but it is unnecessary for us to describe these differences here.

Iqbal published in 1934 his views on *Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims*. Having read these Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru wrote some articles on the movement in the *Modern Review* of Calcutta. In reply to these Iqbal wrote a detailed rejoinder. About this time the *Statesman* of Calcutta wrote an article criticising Iqbal's views on Qadianism. On reading it Iqbal wrote a letter to the Editor o the *Statesman* which was published in that paper.

Criticising Iqbal's original statement the *Light*, a Qadiani Journal published from Lahore, wrote that Iqbal did not believe in the communion of man with God. In this connection a Press correspondent interviewed Iqbal and published the result of the interview in some newspapers.

an open letter to the British people explaining the social and political implications of the issue. But unfortunately my health prevented me from doing so. I am, however, glad to say a few words for the present on a matter which, to my mind, affects the entire collective life of the Indian Muslims. It must, however, be pointed out at the outset that I have no intention to enter into any theological argument. Nor do I mean to undertake a psychological analysis of the mind of the founder of the Qadiani movement; the former will not interest those for whom this statement is meant and the time for the latter has not yet arrived in India. My point of view is that of a student of general history and comparative religion.

India is a land of many religious communities; and Islam is a religious community in a much deeper sense than those communities whose structure is determined partly by the religious and partly by the race idea. Islam repudiates the race idea altogether and founds itself on the religious idea alone. Since

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The original article, the rejoinder, Iqbal's letter to the *Statesman* and the interview are all published here together as they serve to explain Iqbal's views on this movement.

There are two statements dealing with Iqbal's resignation from the All-India Kashmir Committee and his refusal to accept the chairmanship of the Tehrik-i-Kashmir. Both these statements explain reasons which led Iqbal to dissociate from these two movements to help the down-trodden people of Kashmir in gaining elementary human rights. Iqbal was always interested in the struggle of his countrymen to achieve freedom and he espoused the cause of the Kashmiris in every way he could, but as these two movements were being exploited by the leaders of the Qadiani movement for selfish objects very regretfully he decided to dissociate himself from them. These two letters are also included in this collection.

Finally there is Iqbal's letter to Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, who had after all recognised that Iqbal was right in all that he had said about the Qadiani movement. It is a pity that no copy of Pandit Nehru's letter was available for inclusion in this collection. *Ed.*

Islam bases itself on the religious idea alone, a basis which is wholly spiritual and consequently far more ethereal than blood relationship, Muslim society is naturally much more sensitive to forces which it considers harmful to its integrity. Any religious society historically arising from the bosom of Islam, which claims a new prophethood for its basis, and declares all Muslims who do not recognize the truth of its alleged revelation as Kafirs, must, therefore, be regarded by every Muslim as a serious danger to the solidarity of Islam. This must necessarily be so; since the integrity of Muslim society is secured by the Idea of the Finality of Prophethood alone.

This idea of Finality is perhaps the most original idea in the cultural history of mankind; its true significance can be understood only by those who carefully study the history of pre-Islamic Magian culture in Western and Middle Asia. The concept of Magian culture, according to modern research, includes cultures associated with Zoroastrianism. Judaism, Jewish Christianity, Chaldean and Sabean religions. To these creed-communities the idea of the continuity of prophethood was essential, and consequently they lived in a state of constant expectation. It is probable that the Magian man psychologically enjoyed this state of expectation. The modern man is spiritually far more emancipated than the Magian man. The result of the Magian attitude was the disintegration of old communities and the constant formation of new ones by all sorts of religious adventurers. In the modern world of Islam, ambitious and ignorant mullaism taking advantage of the

modern Press, has shamelessly attempted to hurl the old pre-Islamic Magian outlook in the face of the twentieth century. It is obvious that Islam which claims to weld all the various communities of the world into one single community cannot reconcile itself to a movement which threatens its present solidarity and holds the promise of further rifts in human society.

Of the two forms which the modern revival of pre-Islamic Magianism has assumed, Bahaism appears to me to be far more honest than Qadianism; for the former openly departs from Islam, whereas the latter apparently retains some of the more important externals of Islam with an inwardness wholly inimical to the spirit and aspirations of Islam. Its idea of a jealous God with an inexhaustible store of earthquakes and plagues for its opponents; its conception of the prophet as a soothsayer; its idea of the continuity of the spirit of Messiah, are so absolutely Jewish that the movement can easily be regarded as a return to early Judaism. The idea of the continuity of the spirit of Messiah belongs more to Jewish mysticism than to positive Judaism. Professor Buber who has given an account of the movement initiated by the Polish Messiah Baalshem tells us that "it was thought that the spirit of the Messiah descended upon the earth through the prophets and even through a long line of holy men stretching into the present time—the Zaddiks" (Sadiqs). Heretical movements in Muslim Iran under the pressure of pre-Islamic Magian ideas invented the words '*buruz*', '*hulul*', '*zill*' to cover this idea of a perpetual

reincarnation. It was necessary to invent new expressions for a Magian idea in order to make it less shocking to Muslim conscience. Even the phrase "promised Messiah" is not a product of Muslim religious consciousness. It is a bastard expression and has its origin in the pre-Islamic Magian outlook.

We do not find it in early Islamic religious and historical literature. This remarkable fact is revealed by Professor Wensinck's *Concordance of the Traditions of the Holy Prophet*, which covers no less than 11 collections of the traditions and 3 of the earliest historical documents of Islam. One can very well understand the reasons why early Muslims never used this expression. The expression did not appeal to them probably because they thought that it implied a false conception of the historical process. The Magian mind regarded time as a circular movement; the glory of elucidation the true nature of the historical process as a perpetually creative movement was reserved for the great Muslim thinker and historian, Ibn Khaldun.

The intensity of feeling which the Indian Muslims have manifested in opposition to the Qadiani movement is, therefore, perfectly intelligible to the student of modern sociology. The average Muslim who was the other day described as "mulla-ridden" by a writer in the 'Civil and Military Gazette' is inspired in his opposition to the movement more by his instinct of self-preservation than by a fuller grasp of the meaning of the idea of Finality in his faith. The so-called "enlightened" Muslim has seldom

made an attempt to understand the real cultural significance of the idea of Finality in Islam, and a process of slow and imperceptible Westernization has further deprived him even of the instinct of self-preservation. Some of these so-called enlightened Muslims have gone to the extent of preaching 'tolerance' to their brethren-in-faith. I can easily excuse Sir Herbert Emerson for preaching toleration to Muslims; for a modern European who is born and brought up in an entirely different culture does not, and perhaps cannot, develop the insight which makes it possible for one to understand an issue vital to the very structure of a community with an entirely different cultural outlook.

In India circumstances are much more peculiar. This country of religious communities where the future of each community rests entirely upon its solidarity, is ruled by a Western people who cannot but adopt a policy of non-interference in religion. This liberal and indispensable policy in a country like India has led to most unfortunate results. In so far as Islam is concerned, it is no exaggeration to say that the solidarity of the Muslim community in India under the British is far less safe than the solidarity of the Jewish community was in the days of Jeşus under the Romans. Any religious adventurer in India can set up any claim and carve out a new community for his own exploitation. This liberal State of ours does not care a fig for the integrity of a parent community, provided the adventurer assures it of his loyalty and his followers are regular in the payment of taxes due to the State. The meaning of this policy

for Islam was quite accurately seen by our great poet Akbar who in his usual humorous strain says :

> 'O friend ! pray for the glory of the Briton's name
> Say 'I am God' *sans* chain, *sans* cross, *sans* shame.

I very much appreciate the orthodox Hindus' demand for protection against religious reformers in the new constitution. Indeed, the demand ought to have been first made by the Muslims who, unlike the Hindus, entirely eliminate the race idea from their social structure. The Government must seriously consider the present situation and try, if possible, to understand the mentality of the average Muslim in regard to this issue which he regards as absolutely vital to the integrity of his community. After all, if the integrity of a community is threatened, the only course open to that community is to defend itself against the forces of disintegration.

And what are the ways of self-defence ?

Controversial writings and refutation of the claims of the man who is regarded by the parent community as a religious adventurer. Is it then fair to preach toleration to the parent community whose integrity is threatened and to allow the rebellious group to carry on its propaganda with impunity, even when the propaganda is highly abusive ?

If a group, rebellious from the point of view of the parent community, happens to be of some special service to Government, the latter are at liberty to reward their services as best as they can. Other com-

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munities will not grudge it. But it is too much to expect that a community should calmly ignore the forces which tend seriously to affect its collective life. Collective life is as sensitive to the danger of dissolution as individual life. It is hardly necessary to add in this connection that the mutual theological bickerings of Muslim sects do not affect vital principles on which all these sects agree with all their differences in spite of their mutual accusations of heresy.

There is one further point which demands Government's special consideration. The encouragement in India of religious adventurers, on the ground of modern liberalism, tends to make people more and more indifferent to religion and will eventually completely eliminate the important factor of religion from the life of Indian communities. The Indian mind will then seek some other substitute for religion, which is likely to be nothing less than the form of atheistic materialism which has appeared in Russia.

But the religious issue is not the only issue which is at present agitating the minds of the Punjab Muslims. There are other quarrels of a political nature to which, according to my reading, Sir Herbert Emerson hinted in his speech at the Anjuman's anniversary. These are, no doubt, of a purely political nature, but they affect the unity of Punjab Muslims as seriously as the religious issue. While thanking the Government for their enxiety to see the Punjab Muslims united, I venture to suggest a little self-examination to the Government themselves. Who is responsible, I ask, for the distinction of rural and urban Muslims—a distinction which has cut up the

Muslim community into two groups and the rural group into several sub-groups constantly at war with one another ?

Sir Herbert Emerson deplores the lack of proper leadership among the Punjab Muslims. But I wish Sir Herbert Emerson realised that the rural-urban distinction created by the Government and maintained by them through ambitious political adventurers, whose eyes are fixed on their own personal interests and not on the unity of Islam in the Punjab, has already made the community incapable of producing a real leader. It appears to me that this device probably originated in a desire rather to make it impossible for real leadership to grow. Sir Herbert Emerson deplores the lack of leardership in Muslims ; I deplore the continuation by the Government of a system which has crushed out all hope of a real leader appearing in the province.

POSTSCRIPT

I understand that this statement has caused some misunderstanding in some quarters. It is thought that I have made a subtle suggestion to the Government to suppress the Qadiani movement by force. Nothing of the kind. I have made it clear that the policy of non-interference in religion is the only policy which can be adopted by the rulers of India. No other policy is possible. I confess, however, that to my mind this policy is harmful to the interests of religious communities ; but there is no escape from it and those who suffer will have to safeguard their interests by suitable means. The best course

for the rulers of India is in my opinion, to declare the Qadianis a separate community. This will be perfectly consistent with the policy of the Qadianis themselves, and the Indian Muslim will tolerate them just as he tolerates other religions.

XXIV

REPLY TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY PANDIT JAWAHAR LAL NEHRU

On the appearance of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru's three articles in the *Modern Review* of Calcutta I received a number of letters from Muslims of different shades of religious and political opinion. Some writers of these letters want me further to elucidate and justify the attitude of the Indian Muslims towards the Ahmadis. Others ask me what exactly I regard as the issue involved in Ahmadism. In this statement I propose first to meet these demands which I regard as perfectly legitimate, and then to answer the questions raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. I fear, however, that parts of this statement may not interest the Pandit, and to save his time I suggest that he may skip over such parts.

It is hardly necessary for me to say that I welcome the Pandit's interest in what I regard as one of the greatest problems of the East and perhaps of the whole world. He is, I believe, the first nationalist Indian leader who has expressed a desire to understand the present spiritual unrest in the world of Islam. In view of the many aspects and possible reactions of this unrest it is highly desirable that thoughtful Indian political leaders should open their minds to the real meaning of what is, at the present movement, agitating the heart of Islam.

I do not wish, however, to conceal the fact either from the Pandit or from any other reader of this statement that the Pandit's articles have for the moment given my mind rather a painful conflict of feelings. Knowing him to be a man of wide cultural sympathies I cannot but incline to the view that his desire to understand the questions he has raised is perfectly genuine ; yet the way in which he has expressed himself betrays a psychology which I find difficult to attribute to him. I am inclined to think that my statement on Qadianism—no more than a mere exposition of a religious dectrine on modern lines—has embarrassed both the Pandit and the Qadianis, perhaps because both inwardly resent, for different reasons, the prospects of Muslim political and religious solidarity, particularly in India. It is obvious that the Indian nationalist whose political idealism has practically killed his sense for fact, is intolerant of the birth or a desire for self-determination in the heart of north-west Indian Islam. He thinks, wrongly in my opinion, that the only way to Indian nationalism lies in a total suppression of the cultural entities of the country through the interaction of which alone India can evolve a rich and enduring culture. A nationalism achieved by such methods can mean nothing but mutual bitterness and even oppression. It is equally obvious that the Qadianis, too, feel nervous by the political awakening of the Indian Muslims, because they feel that the rise in political prestige of the Indian Muslims is sure to defeat their designs to carve out from the *ummat* of the Arabian Prophet a new *ummat* for the Indian

prophet. It is no small surprise to me that my effort to impress on the Indian Muslims the extreme necessity of internal cohesion in the present critical moment of their history in India, and my warning them against the forces of disintegration, masquerading as reformist movements, should have given the Pandit an occasion to sympathize with such forces.

However, I do not wish to pursue the unpleasant task of analysing the Pandit's motives. For the benefit of those who want further elucidation of the general Muslim attitude towards the Qadianis, I would quote a passage from Durant's *Story of Philosophy* which, I hope, will give the reader a clear idea of the issue involved in Qadianism. Durant has in a few sentences summed up the Jewish point of view in the excommunication of the great philosopher, Spinoza. The reader must not think that in quoting this passage I mean to insinuate some sort of comparison between Spinoza and the founder of Ahmadism. The distance between them, both in point of intellect and character, is simply tremendous. The "God-intoxicated" Spinoza never claimed that he was the centre of a new organization and that all the Jews who did not believe in him were outside the pale of Judaism. Durant's passage, therefore, applies with much greater force to the attitude of Muslims towards Qadianism than to the attitude of the Jews towards the excommunication of Spinoza. The passage is as follows :

"Furthermore, religious unanimity seemed to the elders their sole means of preserving the little Jewish group in Amsterdam from disintegration, and almost

the last means of preserving the unity, and so ensuring the survival, of the scattered Jews of the world. If they had had their own State, their own civil law, their own establishments of secular force and power, to compel internal cohesion and external respect, they might have been more tolerant ; but their religion was to them their patriotism as well as their faith ; the synagogue was their centre of social and political life as well as of ritual and worship ; and the Bible whose veracity Spinoze had impugned was the 'portable fatherland' of their people ; under the circumstances they thought heresy was treason, and toleration suicide."

Situated as the Jews were—a minority community in Amsterdam they were perfectly justified in regarding Spinoza as a disintegrating factor threatening the dissolution of their community. Similarly the Indian Muslims are right in regarding the Qadiani movement, which declares the entire world of Islam as *kafir* and socially boycotts them, to be far more dangerous to the collective life of Islam in India than the metaphysics of Spinoza to the collective life of the Jews. The Indian Muslim, I believe, instinctively realizes the peculiar nature of the circumstances in which he is placed in India and is naturally much more sensitive to the forces of disintegration than the Muslims of any other country. This instinctive perception of the average Muslim is in my opinion absolutely correct and has, I have no doubt, a much deeper foundation in the conscience of Indian Islam. Those who talk of toleration in a matter like this are extremely careless in using the word "toleration"

which I fear they do not understand at all. The spirit of toleration may arise from very different attitudes of the mind of man. As Gibbon would say: "There is the toleration of the philosopher to whom all religions are equally true ; of the historian to whom all are equally useful. There is the toleration of the man who tolerates other modes of thought and behaviours because he has himself grown absolutely indifferent to all modes of thought and behaviours. There is the toleration of the weak man who, on account of sheer weakness, must pocket all kinds of insults heaped on things or persons that he holds dear." It is obvious that these types of tolerance have no ethical value. On the other hand they unmistakably reveal the spiritual impoverishment of the man who practises them. True toleration is begotten of intellectual breadth and spiritual expansion. It is the toleration of the spiritually powerful man who, while jealous of the frontiers of his own faith, can tolerate and even appreciate all forms of faith other than his own. Of this type of toleration the true Muslim alone is capable. His own faith is synthetic, and for this reason he can easily find grounds of sympathy and appreciation in other faiths. Our great Indian poet, Amir Khusro, beautifully brings out the essence of this type of toleration in the story of an idol-worshipper. After giving an account of his intense attachment to his idols the poet addresses his Muslim readers as follows :

اے کہ زبت طعنہ بہ هندو بری - هم ز وے آموز پرستش گری

Only a true lover of God can appreciate the value of devotion even though it is directed to gods

in which he himself does not believe. The folly of our preachers of toleration consists in describing the attitude of the man who is jealous of the boundaries of his own faith as one of intolerance. They wrongly consider this attitude as a sign of moral inferiority. They do not understand that the value of his attitude is essentially biological, where the members of a group feel, either instinctively or on the basis of rational argument, that the corporate life of the social organism to which they belong is in danger, their defensive attitude must be appraised in reference mainly to a biological criterion. Every thought or deed in this connection must be judged by the life value that it may possess. The question in this case is not whether the attitude of an individual or community towards the man who is declared to be a heretic is morally good or bad. The question is whether it is life-giving or life-destroying. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru seems to think that a society founded on religious principles necessitates the institution of Inquisition. This is indeed true of the history of Christianity; but the history of Islam, contrary to the Pandit's logic, shows that during the last thirteen hundred years of the life of Islam, the institution of Inquisition has been absolutely unknown in Muslim countries. The Quran expressly prohibits such an institution. "Do not seek out the shortcomings of others and carry not tales against your brethren." Indeed the Pandit will find from the history of Islam that the Jews and Christians, fleeing from religious persecution in their own lands, always found shelter in the lands of Islam. The two

propositions on which the conceptual structure of Islam is based are so simple that it makes heresy in the sense of turning the heretic outside the fold of Islam almost impossible. It is true that when a person declared to be holding heretical doctrines threatens the existing social order, an independent Muslim State will certainly take action ; but in such a case the action of the State will be determined more by political considerations than by purely religious ones. I can very well realize that a man like the Pandit, who is born and brought up in a society which has no internal cohesion, finds it difficult to conceive that a religious society can live and prosper without State-appointed commissions of enquiry into the beliefs of the people. This is quite clear from the passage which he quotes from Cardinal Newman and wonders how far I would accept the application of the Cardinal's dictum to Islam. Let me tell him that there is a tremendous difference between the inner structure of Islam and Catholicism wherein the complexity, the ultra-rational character and the number of dogmas has, as the history of Christianity shows, always fostered possibilities of fresh heretical interpretation. The simple faith of Muhammad is based on two propositions—that God is One, and that Muhammad is the last of the line of those holy men who have appeared from time to time in all countries and in all ages to guide mankind to the right ways of living. If, as some Christian writers think, a dogma must be defined as an ultra-rational proposition which for the purpose of securing religious solidarity must be assented to without any under-

standing of its metaphysical import, then these two simple propositions of Islam cannot be described even as dogmas; for both of them are supported by the experience of mankind and are fairly amenable to rational argument. The question of a heresy, which needs the verdict, whether the author of it is within or without the fold, can arise, in the case of a religious society founded on such simple propositions, only when the heretic rejects both or either of these propositions. Such heresy must be and has been rare in the history of Islam which, while jealous of its frontiers, permits freedom of interpretation within these frontiers. And since the phenomenon of the kind of heresy which affects the boundaries of Islam has been rare in the history of Islam, the feeling of the average Muslim is naturally intense when a revolt of this kind arises. This is why the feeling of Muslim Iran was so intense against the Bahais. That is why the feeling of the Indian Muslims is so intense against the Qadianis.

It is true that mutual accusations of heresy for differences in minor points of law and theology among Muslim religious sects have been rather common. In this indiscriminate use of the word *kufr* both for minor theological points of difference as well as for the extreme cases of heresy which involve the excommunication of the heretic, some present-day educated Muslims who possess practically no knowledge of the history of Muslim theological disputes, see a sign of social and political disintegration of the Muslim community. This, however, is an entirely wrong notion. The history of

Muslim theology shows that natural accusation of heresy on minor points of difference has, far from working as a disruptive force, actually given an impetus to synthetic theological thought. "When we read the history of development of Mohammadan law," says Prof. Hurgrounje, "we find that, on the one hand, the doctors of every age, on the slightest stimulus, condemn one another to the point of mutual accusations of heresy; and, on the other hand, the very same people with greater and greater unity of purpose try to reconcile the similar quarrels of their predecessors." The student of Muslim theology knows that among Muslim legists this kind of heresy is technically known as "heresy below heresy", i.e., the kind of heresy which does not involve the ex-communication of the culprit. It may be admitted, however, that in the hands of *mullas* whose intellectual laziness takes all oppositions of theological thought as absolute and is consequently blind to the unity in difference, this minor heresy may become a source of great mischief. This mischief can be remedied only by giving to the students of our theological schools a clearer vision of the synthetic spirit of Islam, and by reinitiating them into the function of logical contradiction as a principle of movement in theological dialectic. The question of what may be called major heresy arises only when the teaching of a thinker or a reformer affects the frontiers of the faith of Islam. Unfortunately this question does arise in connection with the teachings of Qadianism. It must be pointed out here that the Ahmadia movement is divided into two camps, known as the

Qadianis and the Lahoris. The former openly declare the founder to be a full prophet; the latter, either by conviction or policy, have found it advisable to preach an apparently toned-down Qadianism. However, the question whether the founder of Ahmadism was a prophet, the denial of whose mission entails what I call the "major heresy" is a matter of dispute between the two sections. It is unnecessary for my purposes to judge the merits of this domestic controversy of the Ahmadis. I believe, for reasons to be explained presently, that the idea of a full prophet whose denial entails the denier's excommunication from Islam is essential to Ahmadism; and that the present head of the Qadianis is far more consistent with the spirit of the movement than the Imam of the Lahoris. The cultural value of the idea of Finality in Islam I have fully explained elsewhere. Its meaning is simple: No spiritual surrender to any human being after Muhammad who emancipated his followers by giving them a law which is realizable as arising from the very core of human conscience. Theologically the doctrine is that the socio-political organization called "Islam" is perfect and eternal. No revelation, the denial of which entails heresy, is possible after Muhammad. He who claims such a revelation is a traitor to Islam. Since the Qadianis believe the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement to be the bearer of such a revelation, they declare that the entire world of Islam is infidel. The founder's own argument, quite worthy of a mediaeval theologian, is that the spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam must be regarded as imperfect if it is not

creative of another prophet. He claims his own prophethood to be an evidence of the prophet-rearing power of the spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam. But if you further ask him whether the spirituality of Muhammad is capable of rearing more prophets than one, his answer is "No". This virtually amounts to saying: "Muhammad is not the last Prophet; I am the last." Far from understanding the cultural value of the Islamic idea of Finality in the history of mankind generally and of Asia especially, he thinks that Finality in the sense that no follower of Muhammad can ever reach the status of Prophethood is a mark of imperfection in Muhammad's Prophethood. As I read the psychology of his mind he, in the interests of his own claim to prophethood, avails himself of what he describes as the creative spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam and at the same time deprives the Holy Prophet of his Finality by limiting the creative capacity of his spirituality to the rearing of only one prophet, i.e., the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement. In this way does the new prophet quietly steal away the Finality of one whom he claims to be his spiritual progenitor.

He claims to be *buruz* of the Holy Prophet of Islam, insinuating thereby that being a *buruz* of his, 'finality' is virtually the Finality of Muhammad; and that this view of the matter, therefore, does not violate the Finality of the Holy Prophet. In identifying the two finalities, his own and that of the Holy Prophet, he conveniently loses sight of the temporal meaning of the idea of finality. It is, however, ob-

vious that the word *buruz* in the sense even of complete likeness, cannot help him at all; for the *buruz* must always remain the other side of its original. Only in the sense of reincarnation a *buruz* becomes identical with the original. Thus if we take the argument remains ineffective; if, on the other hand, we take it to mean reincarnation of the original in the Aryan sense of the word, the argument becomes plausible; but its author turns out to be only a Magian in disguise.

It is further claimed on the authority of the great Muslim mystic, Muhyuddin Ibn al-Arabi of Spain, that it is possible for a Muslim saint to attain, in his spiritual evolution, to the kind of experience characteristic of the Prophetic consciousness. I personally believe this view of Shaikh Muhyuddin Ibn al-Arabi to be psychologically unsound; but assuming it to be correct, the Qadiani argument is based on a complete misunderstanding of his exact position. The Shaikh regards it as a purely private achievement which does not, and in the nature of things cannot, entitle such a saint to declare that all those who do not believe in him are outside the pale of Islam. Indeed, from the Shaikh's point of view, there may be more than one saint, living in the same age or country, who may attain to Prophetic consciousness. The point to be seized is that while it is psychologically possible for a saint to attain to Prophetic experience his experience will have no socio-political significance making him the centre of a new organization and entitling him to declare this organization to be the criterion of the faith or disbelief of

the followers of Muhammad.

Leaving his mystical psychology aside I am convinced from a careful study of the relevant passages of the *Futuhat* that the great Spanish mystic is as firm a believer in the Finality of Muhammad as any orthodox Muslim. And if he had seen in his mystical vision that one day in the East some Indian amateur in Sufism would seek to destroy the Holy Prophet's Finality under the cover of his mystical psychology, he would have certainly anticipated the Indian *ulama* in warning the Muslims of the world against such traitors to Islam.

Coming now to the essence of Ahmadism. A discussion of its sources and of the way in which pre-Islamic Magian ideas have, through the channels of Islamic mysticism, worked on the mind of its author would be extremely interesting from the standpoint of comparative religion. It is, however, impossible for me to undertake this discussion here. Suffice it to say that the real nature of Ahmadism is hidden behind the mist of mediaeval mysticism and theology. The Indian *ulama*, therefore, took it to be a purely theological movement and came out with theological weapons to deal with it. I believe, however, that this was not the proper method of dealing with the movement; and that the success of the *ulama* was, therefore, only partial. A careful psychological analysis of the revelations of the founder would perhaps be an effective method of dissecting the inner life of his personality. In this connection I may mention Maulvi Manzoor Elahi's collection of the founder's revelations which offer rich and varied material

for psychological research. In my opinion the book provides a key to the character and personality of the founder; and I do hope that one day some young student of modern psychology will take it up for serious study. If he takes the Quran for his criterion, as he must for reasons which cannot be explained here, and extends his study to a comparative examination of the experience of the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement and contemporary non-Muslim mystics, such as Ram Krishna of Bengal, he is sure to meet more than one surprise as to the essential character of the experience on the basis of which prophethood is claimed for the originator of Ahmadism.

Another equally effective and more fruitful method, from the standpoint of the plain man, is to understand the real content of Ahmadism in the light of the history of Muslim theological thought in India, at least from the year 1799. The year 1799 is extremely important in the history of the world of Islam. In this year fell Tippu and his fall meant the extinguishment of Muslim hopes for political prestige in India. In the same year was fought the battle of Navarino which saw the destruction of the Turkish fleet. Prophetic were the words of the author of the chronogram of Tippu's fall which visitors of Serangapatam find engraved on the wall of Tippu's mausoleum:

"Gone is the glory of Ind as well as of Roum." Thus in the year 1799 the political decay of Islam in Asia reached its climax. But just as out of the humiliation of Germany on the day of Jena arose the modern German nation, it may be said with equal

truth that out of the political humiliation of Islam in the year 1799 arose modern Islam and her problems. This point I shall explain in the sequel. For the present I want to draw the reader's attention to some of the questions which have arisen in Muslim India since the fall of Tippu and the development of European Imperialism in Asia.

Does the idea of Caliphate in Islam embody a religious institution? How are the Indian Muslims and for the matter of that all Muslims outside the Turkish Empire related to the Turkish Caliphate? Is India *Dar-ul-Islam*? What is the real meaning of the doctrine of Jihad in Islam? What is the meaning of the expression "from amongst you" in the Quranic verse: "Obey God, obey the Prophet and the masters of the affair (i.e., rulers) from amongst you?" What is the character of the tradition of the Prophet foretelling the advent of Imam Mehdi? These questions and some others which arose subsequently were, for obvious reasons, questions for Indian Muslims only. European imperialism, however, which was then rapidly penetrating the world of Islam was also intimately interested in them. The controversies which these questions created form a most interesting chapter in the history of Islam in India. The story is a long one and is still waiting for a powerful pen. Muslim politicians whose eyes were mainly fixed on the realities of the situation succeeded in winning over a section of the *ulama* to adopt a line of theological argument which, as they thought, suited the situation; but it was not easy to conquer by mere logic the beliefs which had ruled for centuries

the conscience of the masses of Islam in India. In such a situation logic can either proceed on the ground of political expediency or on the lines of a fresh orientation of texts and traditions. In either case the argument will fail to appeal to the masses. To the intensely religious masses of Islam only one thing can make a conclusive appeal, and that is divine authority. For an effective eradication of orthodox beliefs it was found necessary to find a revelational basis for a politically suitable orientation of theological doctrines involved in the questions mentioned above. This revelational basis is provided by Ahmadism. And the Ahmadis themselves claim this to be the greatest service rendered by them to the British Imperialism. The prophetic claim to a revelational basis for theological views of a political significance amounts to declaring that those who do not accept the claimant's views are infidels of the first water and destined for the flames of hell. As I understand the significance of the movement, the Ahmadi belief that Christ died the death of an ordinary mortal, and that his second advent means only the advent of a person who is spiritually "like unto him," gives the movement some sort of a rational appearance; but they are not really essential to the spirit of the movement. In my opinion they are only preliminary steps towards the idea of full prophethood which alone can serve the purposes of the movement eventually brought into being by new political forces. In primitive countries it is not logic but authority that appeals. Given a sufficient amount of ignorance, credulity which strangely enough some-

times co-exists with good intelligence, and a person sufficiently audacious to declare himself a recipient of divine revelation whose denial would entail eternal damnation, it is easy, in a subject Muslim country, to invent a political theology and to build a community whose creed is political servility. And in the Punjab even an ill-woven net of vague theological expressions can easily capture the innocent peasant who has been for centuries exposed to all kinds of exploitation. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru advises the orthodox of all religions to unite and thus to delay the coming of what he conceives to be Indian nationalism. This ironical advice assumes that Ahmadism is a reform-movement; he does not know that as far as Islam in India is concerned, Ahmadism involves both religious and political issues of the highest importance. As I have explained above, the function of Ahmadism in the history of Muslim religious thought is to furnish a revelational basis for India's present political subjugation. Leaving aside the purely religious issues, on the ground of political issues alone, I think, it does not lie in the mouth of a man like Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to accuse Indian Muslims of reactionary conservatism. I have no doubt that if he had grasped the real nature of Ahmadism he would have very much appreciated the attitude of Indian Muslims towards a religious movement which claims divine authority for the woes of India.

Thus the reader will see that the pallor of Ahmadism which we find on the cheeks of Indian Islam to-day is not an abrupt phenomenon in the

history of Muslim religious thought in India. The ideas which eventually shaped themselves in the form of this movement became prominent in theological discussions long before the founder of Ahmadism was born. Nor do I mean to insinuate that the founder of Ahmadism and his companions deliberately planned their programme. I dare say the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement did hear a voice; but whether this voice came from the God of Life and Power or arose out of the spiritual impoverishment of the people must depend upon the nature of the movement which it has created and the kind of thought and emotion which it has given to those who have listened to it. The reader must not think that I am using metaphorical language. The life-history of nations shows that when the tide of life in a people begins to ebb, decadence itself becomes a source of inspiration, inspiring their poets, philosophers, saints, statesmen, and turning them into a class of apostles whose sole ministry is to glorify by the force of a seductive art of logic, all that is ignoble and ugly in the life of their people. These apostles unconsciously clothe despair in the glittering garment of hope, undermine the traditional values of conduct and thus destroy the spiritual virility of those who happen to be their victims. One can only imagine the rotten state of a people's will who are, on the basis of divine authority, made to accept their political environment as final. Thus all the actors who participated in the drama of Ahmadism were, I think, only innocent instruments in the hands of decadence. A similar drama had already been acted in Iran; but

it did not lead, and could not have led, to the religious and political issues which Ahmadism has created for Islam in India. Russia offered tolerance to Babism and allowed the Babis to open their first missionary centre in Ishqabad. England showed Ahmadis the same tolerance in allowing them to open their first missionary centre in Woking. Whether Russia and England showed this tolerance on the ground of imperial expediency or pure broadmindedness is difficult for us to decide. This much is absolutely clear that this tolerance has created difficult problems for Islam in Asia. In view of the structure of Islam, as I understand it, I have not the least doubt in my mind that Islam will emerge purer out of the difficulties thus created for her. Times are changing. Things in India have already taken a new turn. The new spirit of democracy which is coming to India is sure to disillusion the Ahmadis and to convince them of the absolute futility of their theological invention.

Nor will Islam tolerate any revival of mediaeval mysticism which has already robbed its followers of their healthy instincts and given them only obscure thinking in return. It has, during the course of the past centuries, absorbed the best minds of Islam leaving the affairs of the state to mere mediocrities. Modern Islam cannot afford to repeat the experiment. Nor can it tolerate a repetition of the Punjab experiment of keeping Muslims occupied for half a century in theological problems which had absolutely no bearing on life. Islam has already passed into the broad daylight of fresh thought and experience; and

no saint or prophet can bring it back to the fogs of mediaeval mysticism.

Let me now turn to Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru's questions. I fear the Pandit's articles reveal practically no acquaintance with Islam or its religious history during the nineteenth century. Nor does he seem to have read what I have already written on the subject of his questions. It is not possible for me to reproduce here all that I have written before. Nor is it possible to write here a religious history of Islam in the nineteenth century without which a thorough understanding of the present situation in the world of Islam is impossible. Hundreds of books and articles have been written on Turkey and modern Islam. I have read most of this literature and probably the Pandit has also read it. I assure him, however, that no one of these writers understands the nature of the effect or of the cause that has brought about that effect. It is, therefore, necessary to indicate briefly the main currents of Muslim thought in Asia during the nineteenth century.

I have said above that in the year 1799 the political decay of Islam reached its climax. There can, however, be no greater testimony to the inner vitality of Islam than the fact that it practically took no time to realise its position in the world. During the nineteenth century were born Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in India, Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani in Afghanistan and Mufti Alam Jan in Russia. These men were probably inspired by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab who was born in Nejd in 1700, the founder of the so-called Wahabi movement which

may fitly be described as the first throb of life in modern Islam. The influence of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan remained on the whole confined to India. It is probable, however, that he was the first modern Muslim to catch a glimpse of the positive character of the age which was coming. The remedy for the ills of Islam proposed by him, as by Mufti Alam Jan in Russia, was modern education. But the real greatness of the man consists in the fact that he was the first Indian Muslim who felt the need of a fresh orientation of Islam and worked for it. We may differ from his religious views, but there can be no denying the fact that his sensitive soul was the first to react to the modern age.

The extreme conservatism of Indian Muslims which had lost its hold on the realities of life failed to see the real meaning of the religious attitude of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. In the North-West of India, a country more primitive and more saint-ridden than the rest of India, the Syed's movement was soon followed by the reaction of Ahmadism—a strange mixture of Semitic and Aryan mysticism with whom spiritual revival consists not in the purification of the individual's inner life according to the principles of the old Islamic Sufism, but in satisfying the expectant attitude of the masses by providing a 'promised Messiah.' The function of this 'promised Messiah' is not to extricate the individual from an enervating present but to make him slavishly surrender his ego to its dictates. This reaction carries within itself a very subtle contradiction. It retains the discipline of Islam but destroys the will which

that discipline was intended to fortify. Maulana Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani was a man of a different stamp. Strange are the ways of Providence. One of the most advanced Muslims of our time, both in religious thought and action, was born in Afghanistan! A perfect master of nearly all the Muslim languages of the world and endowed with the most winning eloquence, his restless soul migrated from one Muslim country to another, influencing some of the most prominent men in Iran, Egypt and Turkey. Some of the greatest theologians of our time, such as Mufti Muhammad Abduhu, and some of the men of the younger generation who later became political leaders, such as Zaghlul Pasha of Egypt, were his disciples. He wrote little spoke much and thereby transformed into miniature Jamal-ud-Dins all those who came into contact with him. He never claimed to be a prophet or a renewer; yet no other man in our time has stirred the soul of Islam more deeply than he! His spirit is still working in the world of Islam and nobody knows where it will end.

It may, however, be asked what exactly was the objective of these great Muslims. The answer is that they found the world of Islam ruled by three main forces and they concentrated their whole energy on creating a revolt against these forces:

1. *Mullaism.*—The *ulama* have always been a source of great strength to Islam. But during the course of centuries, especially since the destruction of Baghdad, they became extremely conservative and would not allow any freedom of *Ijtihad*, i.e., the forming of independent judgment in matters of law.

The Wahabi movement which was a source of inspiration to the nineteenth century Muslim reformers was really a revolt against this rigidity of the *ulama*. Thus the first objective of the nineteenth century Muslim reformers was a fresh orientation of the faith and a freedom to reinterpret the law in the light of advancing experience.

2. *Mysticism*.—The masses of Islam were swayed by the kind of mysticism which blinked actualities, enervated the people and kept them steeped in all kinds of superstition. From its high state as a force of spiritual education mysticism had fallen down to a mere means of exploiting the ignorance and the credulity of the people. It gradually and invisibly unnerved the will of Islam and softened it to the extent of seeking relief from rigorous discipline of the law of Islam. The nineteenth century reformers rose in revolt against this mysticism and called Muslims to the broad daylight of the modern world. Not that they were materialists. Their mission was to open the eye of the Muslims to the spirit of Islam which aimed at the conquest of matter and not flight from it.

3. *Muslim Kings*.—The gaze of Muslim kings was solely fixed on their own dynastic interests and so long as these were protected, they did not hesitate to sell their countries to the highest bidder. To prepare the masses of Muslims for a revolt against such a state of things in the world of Islam was the special mission of Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani.

It is not possible here to give a detailed account of the transformation which these reformers brought

about in the world of Muslim thought and feeling. One thing, however, is clear. They prepared to a great extent the ground for another set of men, i.e., Zaghlul Pasha, Mustafa Kamal and Raza Shah. The reformers interpreted, argued and explained; but the set of men who came after them, although inferior in academic learning, were men who, relying on their healthy instincts, had the courage to rush into sun-lit space and do, even by force, what the new conditions of life demanded. Such men are liable to make mistakes; but the history of nations shows that even their mistakes have sometimes borne good fruit. In them it is not logic but life that struggles restless to solve its own problems. It may be pointed out here that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and hundreds of the latter's disciples in Muslim countries were not Westernized Muslims. They were men who had sat on their knees before the *mullas* of the old school and had breathed the very intellectual and spiritual atmosphere which they later sought to reconstruct. Pressure of modern ideas may be admitted; but the history thus briefly indicated above clearly shows that the upheaval which has come to Turkey and which is likely, sooner or later, to come to other Muslim countries, is almost wholly determined by the forces within. It is only the superficial observer of the modern world of Islam who thinks that the present crisis in the world of Islam is wholly due to the working of alien forces.

Has then the world of Islam outside India, especially Turkey, abandoned Islam? Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru thinks that Turkey has ceased to be a

Muslim country. He does not seem to realise that the question whether a person or a community has ceased to be a member of Islam is, from the Muslim point of view, a purely legal question and must be decided in view of the structural principles of Islam. As long as a person is loyal to the two basic principles of Islam, i.e., the Unity of God and Finality of the Holy Prophet, not even the strictest *mulla* can turn him outside the pale of Islam even though his interpretations of the law or of the text of the Quran are believed to be erroneous. But perhaps Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru has in his mind the supposed or real innovations which the Ataturk has introduced. Let us for a moment examine these. Is it the development of a general materialist outlook in Turkey which seems inimical to Islam? Islam has had too much of renunciation ; it is time for the Muslims to look to realities. Materialism is a bad weapon against religion ; but it is quite an effective one against *mulla-craft* and Sufi-craft, which deliberately mystify the people with a view to exploit their ignorance and credulity. The spirit of Islam is not afraid of its contact with matter. Indeed the Quran says : "Forget not thy share in the world." It is difficult for a non-Muslim to understand that, considering the history of the Muslim world during the last few centuries, the progress of a materialist outlook is only a form of self-realisation. Is it then the abolition of the old dress or the introduction of the Latin script? Islam as a religion has no country; as a society it has no specific language, no specific dress. Even the recitation of the Quran in Turkish is not

without some precedent in Muslim history. Personally I regard it as a serious error of judgment; for the modern student of the Arabic language and literature knows full well that the only non-European language which has a future is Arabic. But the reports are that the Turks have already abandoned the vernacular recitation of the Quran. Is it then the abolition of polygamy or the licentiate *ulama*? According to the law of Islam the Amir of a Muslim State has the power to revoke the "permissions" of the law if he is convinced that they tend to cause social corruption. As to the licentiate *ulama* I would certainly introduce it in Muslim India if I had the power to do so. To the inventions of the myth-making *mulla* is largely due the stupidity of the average Muslim. In excluding him from the religious life of the people the Ataturk has done what would have delighted the heart of an Ibn Taimiyya or a Shah Wali Ullah. There is a tradition of the Holy Prophet reported in the *Mishkat* to the effect that only the Amir of the Muslim State and the persons appointed by him are entitled to preach to the people. I do not know whether the Ataturk ever knew of this tradition; yet it is striking how the light of his Islamic conscience has illumined the zone of his action in this important matter. The adoption of the Swiss code with its rule of inheritance is certainly a serious error which has arisen out of the youthful zeal for reform excusable in a people furiously desiring to go ahead. The joy of emancipation from the fetters of a long-standing priest-craft sometimes drives a people to untried courses of action. But Turkey as well as

the rest of the world of Islam has yet to realise the hitherto unrevealed economic aspects of the Islamic law of inheritance which Von Kremer describes as the "supremely original branch of Muslim law." Is it the abolition of the Caliphate or the separation of Church and State? In its essence Islam is not Imperialism. In the abolition of the Caliphate which since the days of Omayyads had practically become a kind of Empire it is only the spirit of Islam that has worked out through the Ataturk. In order to understand the Turkish *Ijtihad* in the matter of the Caliphate we cannot but seek the guidance of Ibn Khaldun—the great philosophical historian of Islam, and the father of modern history. I can do no better than quote here a passage from my *Reconstruction* :

"Ibn Khaldun in his famous "Prolegomena" mentions three distinct views of the idea of universal Caliphate in Islam : (*i*) That universal Imamate is a divine institution and is consequently indispensable. (*ii*) That it is merely a matter of expediency. (*iii*) That there is no need of such an institution. The last view was taken by the Khwarij, the early republicans of Islam. It seems that modern Turkey has shifted from the first to the second view, i.e., to the view of the Mu'tazila who regarded universal Imamate as a matter of expediency only. The Turks argue that in our political thinking we must be guided by our past political experience which points unmistakably to the fact that the idea of universal Imamate has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the Empire of Islam was intact. Since the break-up of this Empire independent units have arisen. The

idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the organization of modern Islam."

Nor is the idea of separation of Church and State alien to Islam. The doctrine of the major occultation of the Imam in a sense effected this separation long ago in Shia Iran. The Islamic idea of the State must not be confounded with the European idea of the separation of Church and State. The former is only a division of functions as is clear from the gradual creation in the Muslim State of the office of Shaikh-ul-Islam and Ministers; the latter is based on the metaphysical dualism of spirit and matter. Christianity began as an order of monks having nothing to do with the affairs of the world; Islam was, from the very beginning, a civil society with laws civil in their nature though believed to be revelational in origin. The metaphysical dualism on which the European idea is based has borne bitter fruit among Western nations. Many years ago a book was written in America called *If Christ Came to Chicago*. In reviewing this book an American author says:

"The lesson to be learned from Mr. Stead's book is that the great evils from which humanity is suffering to-day are evils that can be handled only by religious sentiments; that the handling of those evils has been in the great part surrendered to the State; that the State has itself been delivered over to corrupt political machines; that such machines are not only unwilling, but unable, to deal with those evils; and that nothing but a religious awakening of the citizens to their public duties can save countless

millions from misery, and the State itself from degradation."

In the history of Muslim political experience this separation has meant only a separation of functions, not of ideas. It cannot be maintained that in Muslim countries the separation of Church and State means the freedom of Muslim legislative activity from the conscience of the people which has for centuries been trained and developed by the spirituality of Islam. Experience alone will show how the idea will work in modern Turkey. We can only hope that it will not be productive of the evils which it has produced in Europe and America.

I have briefly discussed the above innovations more for the sake of the Muslim reader than for Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. The innovation specifically mentioned by the Pandit is the adoption by the Turks and Iranians of racial and nationalist ideals. He seems to think that the adoption of such ideals means the abandonment of Islam by Turkey and Iran. The student of history knows very well that Islam was born at a time when the old principles of human unification, such as blood relationship and throne-culture, were failing. It, therefore, finds the principle of human unification not in the blood and bones but in the mind of man. Indeed its social message to mankind is: "Deracialise yourself or perish by internecine war." It is no exaggeration to say that Islam looks askance at nature's race-building plans and creates by means of its peculiar institutions, an outlook which would counteract the race-building forces of nature. In the direction of human

domestication it has done in one thousand years far more important work than Christianity and Buddhism ever did in two thousand years or more. It is no less than a miracle that an Indian Muslim finds himself at home in Morocco in spite of the disparity of race and language. Yet it cannot be said that Islam is totally opposed to race. Its history shows that in social reform it relies mainly on its scheme for gradual deracialisation and proceeds on the lines of least resistance. "Verily", says the Quran, "We have made you into tribes and sub-tribes so that you may be identified; but the best among you in the eye of God is he who is the purest in life." Considering the mightiness of the problem of race and the amount of time which the deracialisation of mankind must necessarily take, the attitude of Islam towards the problem of race, i.e., stooping to conquer without itself becoming a race-making factor, is the only rational and workable attitude. There is a remarkable passage in Sir Arthur Keith's little book, *The Problem of Race*, which is worth quoting here:

"And now man is awakening to the fact that nature's primary end—race-building—is incompatible with the necessities of the modern economic world and is asking himself: What must I do? Bring race-building as practised hitherto by nature to an end and have eternal peace? Or permit nature to pursue her old course and have, as a necessary consequence—War? Man has to choose the one course or the other. There is no intermediate course possible."

It is, therefore, clear that if the Ataturk is inspired by Pan-Turanianism he is going not so much

against the spirit of Islam as against the spirit of the time. And if he is a believer in the absoluteness of races, he is sure to be defeated by the spirit of modern time which is wholly in keeping with the spirit of Islam. Personally, however, I do not think that the Ataturk is inspired by Pan-Turanianism, as I believe that his Pan-Turanianism is only a political retort to Pan-Slavonism, or Pan-Germanism, or Pan-Anglo-Saxonism.

If the meaning of the above paragraph is well understood it is not difficult to see the attitude of Islam towards nationalist ideals. Nationalism in the sense of love of one's country and even readiness to die for its honour is a part of the Muslim's faith: it comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to play the role of a political concept and claims to be a principle of human solidarity demanding that Islam should recede to the background of a mere private opinion and cease to be a living factor in the national life. In Turkey, Iran, Egypt and other Muslim countries it will never become a problem. In these countries Muslims constitute and overwhelming majority and their minorities, i.e., Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, according to the law of Islam, are either "People of the Book" or "like the People of the Book" with whom the law of Islam allows free social relations including matrimonial alliances. It becomes a problem for Muslims only in countries where they happen to be in a minority, and nationalism demands their complete self-effacement. In majority countries Islam accommodates nationalism; for there Islam and nationalism are

practically identical; in minority countries it is justified in seeking self-determination as a cultural unit. In either case, it is thoroughly consistent with itself.

The above paragraphs briefly sum up the exact situation in the world of Islam to-day. If this is properly understood it will become clear that the fundamentals of Islamic solidarity are not in any way shaken by any external or internal forces. The solidarity of Islam, as I have explained before, consists in a uniform belief in the two structural principles of Islam supplemented by the five well-known "practices of the faith." These are the first essentials of Islamic solidarity which has, in this sense, existed ever since the days of the Holy Prophet until it was recently disturbed by the Bahais in Iran and the Qadianis in India. It is a guarantee for a practically uniform spiritual atmosphere in the world of Islam. It facilitates the political combination of Muslim States, which combination may either assume the form of a world State (ideal) or of a League of Muslim States, or of a number of independent States whose pacts and alliances are determined by purely economic and political considerations. That is how the conceptual structure of this simple faith is related to the process of time. The profundity of this relation can be understood only in the light of certain verses of the Quran which it is not possible to explain here without drifting away from the point immediately before us. Politically, then the solidarity of Islam is shaken only when Muslim States war on one another: religiously it is shaken only when Muslims rebel against any of the basic beliefs and practices of

the Faith. It is in the interest of this eternal solidarity that Islam cannot tolerate any rebellious group within its fold. Outside the fold such a group is entitled to as much toleration as the followers of any other faith. It appears to me that at the present moment Islam is passing through a period of transition. It is shifting from one form of political solidarity to some other form which the forces of history have yet to determine. Events are so rapidly moving in the modern world that it is almost impossible to make a prediction. As to what will be the attitude towards non-Muslims of a politically united Islam, if such a thing ever comes is a question which history alone can answer. All that I can say is that, lying midway between Asia and Europe and being a synthesis of Eastern and Western outlooks on life, Islam has to act as a kind of intermediary between the East and the West. But what if the follies of Europe create an irreconcilable Islam? As things are developing in Europe from day to day they demand a radical transformation of Europe's attitude towards Islam. We can only hope that political vision will not allow itself to be obscured by the dictates of imperial ambition or economic exploitation. In so far as India is concerned I can say with perfect confidence that the Muslims of India will not submit to any kind of political idealism which would seek to annihilate their cultural entity. Sure of this they may be trusted to know how to reconcile the claims of religion and patriotism.

One word about His Highness the Agha Khan. What has led Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to attack

the Agha Khan it is difficult for me to discover. Perhaps he thinks that the Qadianis and the Ismailis fall under the same category. He is obviously not aware that however the theological interpretation of the Ismailis may err, they believe in the basic principles of Islam. It is true that they believe in a perpetual Imamate; but the Imam according to them is not a recipient of divine revelation. He is only an expounder of the law. It is only the other day (vide the "Star" of Allahabad, March 12, 1934) that His Highness the Agha Khan addressed his followers as follows:

> "Bear witness that Allah is One. Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah. Quran is the Book of Allah. *Kaaba* is the *Qibla* of all. You are Muslims and should live with Muslims. Greet Muslims with *Assalam-o-Alaikum*.
>
> "Give your children Islamic names. Pray with Muslim congregations in mosques. Keep fast regularly. Solemnize your marriages according to Islamic rules of *nikah*. Treat all Muslims as your brothers."

It is for the Pandit now to decide whether the Agha Khan represents the solidarity of Islam or not.

XXV

A LETTER TO THE "STATESMAN"*

I am very thankful to you for your critical leader on my statement which was published in your issue of the 14th May. The question which you have raised in your leader is a very important one, and I am really very glad that you have raised it. I did not raise it in my statement because I felt that, considering the separatist policy of the Qadianis, which they have consistently pursued in religious and social matters ever since the birth of the idea of building a new community on the foundation of a rival prophethood and the intensity of the Muslim feeling against this move, it was rather the duty of the Government to take administrative cognizance of such a fundamental difference between the Qadianis and the Muslims without waiting for a formal representation on behalf of the Muslim community of India. I was encouraged in this feeling by the Government's attitude in the matter of the Sikh community which till 1919 was not administratively regarded as a separate political unit, but which was later treated as such without any formal representation on the part of the Sikhs, in spite of the Lahore High Court's finding that the Sikhs were Hindus.

*The "Statesman" published Dr. Iqbal's statement on "Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims" along with a criticism of it in the first leader. The following letter was in reply addressed to the "Statesman" and was published on June 10, 1935.

However, now that you have raised this question I should like to offer a few observations on a matter which I regard as of the highest importance both from the British and the Muslim points of view. You want me to make it perfectly clear whether, when or where I can tolerate official cognizance of any one community's religious differences. Let me point out:

First, that Islam is essentially a religious community with perfectly defined boundaries—belief in the Finality of Muhammad's Prophethood. The last mentioned belief is really the factor which accurately draws the line of demarcation between Muslims and non-Muslims, and enables one to decide whether a certain individual or group is a part of the community or not. For example, the Brahmos believe in God, they also regard Muhammad (on whom be peace) as one of the prophets of God, yet they cannot be regarded as part and parcel of Islam because they, like the Qadianis, believe in the theory of perpetual revelation through prophets and do not believe in the Finality of Prophethood in Muhammad. No Islamic sect, as far as I know, has ever ventured to cross this line of demarcation. The Bahais in Iran have openly rejected the principle of Finality, but have at the same time frankly admitted that they are a new community and not Muslims in the technical sense of the word. According to our belief, Islam as a religion was revealed by God, but the existence of Islam as a society or nation depends entirely on the personality of the Holy Prophet. In my opinion, only two courses are open to the Qadianis, either frankly to follow the Bahais or to eschew their inter-

pretations, of the idea of Finality in Islam and to accept the idea with all its implications. Their diplomatic interpretations are dictated merely by a desire to remain within the fold of Islam for obvious political advantages.

Secondly, we must not forget the Qadianis' own policy and their attitude towards the world of Islam. The founder of the movement described the parent community as "rotten milk" and his own followers as "fresh milk", warning the latter against mixing with the former. Further, their denial of fundamentals, their giving themselves a new name (Ahmadis) as a community, their non-participation in the congregational prayers of Islam, their social boycott of Muslims in the matter of matrimony, etc., and above all their declaration that the entire world of Islam is *kafir*—all these things constitute an unmistakable declaration of separation by the Qadianis themselves. Indeed the facts mentioned above clearly show that they are far more distant from Islam than Sikhs from Hinduism, for the Sikhs at least intermarry with the Hindus, even though they do not worship in the Hindu temples.

Thirdly, it does not require any special intelligence to see why the Qadianis, while pursuing a policy of separation in religious and social matters, are anxious to remain politically within the fold of Islam. Apart from the political advantages in the sphere of Government service which accrue to them by remaining within the fold of Islam, it is obvious that in view of their present population, which, according to the last census, is fifty-six thousand

only, they are not entitled even to a single seat in any legislature of the country and cannot, therefore, be regarded as a political minority in the sense in which you seem to be using the expression. The fact that the Qadianis have not so far asked for separation as a distinct political unit shows that in their present position they do not find themselves entitled to any representation in legislative bodies. The new constitution is not without provisions for the protection of such minorities. To my mind, it is clear that in the matter of approaching the Government for separation the Qadianis will never take the initiative. The Muslim community is perfectly justified in demanding their immediate separation from the parent community. If the Government does not immediately agree to this demand, the Indian Muslims will be driven to the suspicion that the British Government is keeping the new religion in store, as it were, and delaying the separation because in view of the small number of its adherents, it is, for the present, incapable of functioning as a fourth community in the province which may effectively damage the already marginal majority of Punjab Muslims in the local legislature. The Government did not wait for a formal representation for separation by the Sikhs in 1919: why should they wait for a formal representation by the Qadianis?

XXVI

REJOINDER TO "THE LIGHT"

(1) Criticising the foregoing statement, "The Light" (a Qadiani weekly) remarked: "Like some other great thinkers, he (Dr. Iqbal) does not believe in the communion of man with God through the instrumentality of what is known as verbal revelation." Interviewed by a Press representative about this accusation, Dr. Iqbal said:

"The Light" bases its accusation on an Urdu verse of mine. ہم کلامی ہے غیریت کی دلیل

This is plain Urdu, and only means that there is a higher stage in the spiritual life of man than verbal communion. But the verse has nothing to do with the doctrine of verbal revelation as a theological doctrine for which I must refer 'The Light' to my *Reconstruction* in which I wrote on page 21:

"The organic relation of feeling and idea throws light on the old theological controversy about verbal revelation which once gave so much trouble to Muslim religious thinkers. Inarticulate feeling seeks to fulfil its destiny in idea, which in its turn tends to develop out of itself in its own visible garment. It is no mere metaphor to say that idea and word both simultaneously emerge out of the womb of feeling, though logical understandingc annot but take them in a temporal order and then create its own difficulty by regarding them as mutually isolated.

There is a sense in which the word is also revealed."

(2) Questioned about the tradition quoted by "The Light" that *mujaddids* appear at the head of every century, Dr. Iqbal replied:

The editor of "The Light" quotes a tradition which gives a mathematically exact picture of the historical process. While I do believe in man's spiritual capacity and the possibility of the birth of spiritual men, I am not sure that the historical process is so mathematical as "The Light" thinks. We can easily confess that it is beyond our intellectual capacity to understand the nature of the historical process. All that I can negatively say is that it does not appear to me to be as fixed and mathematically exact as "The Light" thinks. I am rather inclined to Ibn Khaldun's view which regards the historical process as a free creative movement and not a process which has already been worked out with definite landmarks. This view has been put forward in modern times by Bergson with much greater wealth of illustration and scientific accuracy than by Ibn Khaldun. The tradition quoted by "The Light" was probably popularised by Jalal-ud-Din Suyuti in his own interest and much importance cannot be attached to it. It is not mentioned in *Bukhari* and *Muslim*, the two books which are believed to be most reliable. It may embody a vision of the nature of the historical process by some spiritual men, but this personal vision of the individuals can form no basis for logical argument. This is the rule which expert traditionists have always observed.

(3) Questioned whether he had seen a letter

published in "The Sunrise" (another Qadiani weekly) in which the writer referred to a lecture of Dr. Iqbal and accused him of the inconsistency, the Doctor replied :

Yes : I am sorry I have no copy of the lecture in question either in the original English or in the Urdu translation which was made by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan. As far as I remember, the lecture was delivered in 1911, or perhaps earlier, I have no hesitation in admitting that about a quarter of a century ago I had hopes of good results following from this movement. Earlier still, even that eminent Muslim, the late Maulvi Chiragh Ali, the author of several English books on Islam, co-operated with the founder of the movement and, I understand, made valuable contributions to the book called *Barahin-i-Ahmadiyya*. But the real content and spirit of a religious movement does not reveal itself in a day. It takes decades to unfold itself. The internal quarrels between the two sections of the movement is evidence of the fact that even those who were in personal contact with the founder were not quite aware of how the movement would evolve itself. Personally, I became suspicious of the movement when the claim of a new prophethood, superior even to the Prophethood of the Founder of Islam, was definitely put forward, and the Muslim world was declared *kafir*. Later my suspicions developed into a positive revolt when I heard with my own ears an adherent of the movement mentioning the Holy Prophet of Islam in a most disparaging language. Not by their roots but by their fruits will you know them. If my pre-

sent attitude is self-contradictory, then, well, only a living and thinking man has the privilege of contradicting himself. Only stones do not contradict themselves, as Emerson says.

(4) Questioned about the possibility of divine inspiration and the advent of inspired reformers after the Holy Prophet, Dr. Iqbal replied :

I had better answer this question by referring you to my *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* in which I wrote on pages 120-21 :

"The idea of finality . . . should not be taken to suggest that the ultimate fate of life is complete displacement of emotion by reason. Such a thing is neither possible nor desirable. The intellectual value of the idea that it lends to create an independent critical attitude towards mystic experience by generating the belief that personal authority, claiming a supernatural origin, has come to an end in the history of man. This kind of belief is a psychological force which inhibits the growth of such authority. The function of the idea is to open up fresh vistas of knowledge in the domain of man's inner experience. Just as the first half of the formula of Islam has created and fostered the spirit of critical observation of man's outer experience by divesting the forces of Nature of that divine character with which earlier cultures had clothed them. Mystic experience, then, however unusual and abnormal, must now be regarded by the Muslim as a perfectly natural experience, open to critical scrutiny like other aspects of human experience. This is clear from the Prophet's own attitude towards Ibn Sayyad's psychic experience.

The function of Sufism in Islam has been to systematize mystic experience, though it must be admitted that Ibn Khaldun was the only Muslim who approached it in a thoroughly scientific spirit."

The opening sentence clearly shows that saints in the psychological sense of the word or men of saintly character will always appear. Whether Mirza Sahib belonged to this category or not is a separate question. Indeed as long as the spiritual capacity of mankind endures, they will rise among all nations and countries in order to show better ideals of life to man. To hold otherwise would be to fly in the face of human experience. The only difference is that the modern man has the right to a critical examination of their mystic experiences. The Finality of the Prophethood means, among other things, that all personal authority in religious life, denial of which involves damnation, has come to an end.

(5) Questioned about a letter published in the "Statesman" from Mr. Dinshaw, a Parsi gentleman, Dr. Iqbal said :

I have got nothing to say about it, except that I fully agree with his main thesis that to the Iranian element belongs a very rich role in the external as well as the internal history of Islam. This Iranian influence is so extensive that Spengler has been misled by Magian overlaying of Islam and has practically taken Islam for a Magian religion. In my *Reconstruction* I have made an attempt to divest Islam of its Magian encrustations and I hope to be able to do further work in this direction in my *Introduction to the Study of the Quran*! Magian thought and religious experience

very much permeate Muslim theology, philosophy and Sufism. Indeed there is evidence to show that certain schools of Sufism now known as Islamic have only repeated the Magian type of religious experience. I regard Magian culture as one form, among other forms of human culture, and did not use the term as a sort of stigma. It had its ruling concepts, its philosophical discussions, its truths and its errors. But when a culture begins to show signs of decay, its philosophical discussions, its concepts and its forms of religious experience become fixed and immobile. It was at that time in the history of Magian culture that Islam appeared and according to my reading of cultural history entered a strong protest against that culture. There is definite evidence in the Quran itself to show that Islam aimed at opening up new channels not only of thought but the religious experience as well. Our Magian inheritance, however, has stifled the life of Islam and never allowed the development of its real spirit and aspirations.

XXVII

STATEMENT

on his resignation of the office of President of the All-India Kashmir Committee, issued on the 20th June, 1933.

My presidentship of the All-India Kashmir Committee was a temporary arrangement. It will be recalled that the Committee was formed in order to meet a situation which had suddenly arisen in Kashmir. It was considered that the need for such a Committee would disappear before long and no constitution of the Committee was, therefore, framed ; its President having been given practically dictatorial authority.

The belief that the Kashmir Committee would not be needed as a permanent institution was, however, falsified by subsequent developments in the Kashmir situation. Most members, therefore, thought that the Committee should have a regular constitution and elect new office-bearers. This idea was reinforced by a certain amount of dissatisfaction which was felt against the composition and working of the Committee on grounds which it would be unpleasant to mention. A meeting of the Committee was therefore called in which the former President submitted his resignation which was accepted.

In a subsequent meeting of the Committee held during the last week-end, a draft constitution was placed before the members. It aimed at giving the

Committee a thoroughly representative character but was opposed by certain members. Further discussion revealed a spirit which gave me to understand that the idea of these gentlemen was to split the Committee into two bodies which would only retain a semblance of outward unity. This is what I plainly told the members before I submitted my resignation.

Unfortunately there are members in the Committee who recognise no loyalty except to the head of their particular religious sect. This was made clear by a public statement recently made by one of the Ahmadi pleaders who had been conducting the Mirpur cases. He plainly admitted that he recognised no Kashmir Committee and that whatever he or his colleagues did was done in obedience to the command of their religious leader. I confess that I interpreted this statement as a general indication of the Ahmadi attitude of mind and felt doubts about the future working of the Kashmir Committee.

I do not mean to stigmatise anybody. A man is free to develop an attitude which intellectually and spiritually suits his mind best. Indeed I have every sympathy for a man who needs a spiritual prop and finds one in the shrine of a bygone saint or in a living *pir*.

As far as I am aware there are no differences of opinion among members of the Kashmir Committee regarding the Committee's general policy. To the formation of a party on the grounds of differences in policy nobody can object. But, according to my view of the situation, the differences in the Kashmir Committee are based on considerations which, I

believe, are utterly irrelevant. I do not believe that a smooth working is possible and feel that in the best interests of all concerned the present Kashmir Committee should cease to exist.

At the same time I believe that Kashmir Muslims need the help and guidance of a Kashmir Committee in British India. If British Indian Muslims are anxious to help and guide their Kashmir brethren they are free to reconstitute a Kashmir Committee in a mass meeting. In view of the present situation this is the only course that I can suggest.

I have made an absolutely frank statement of the feelings which led me to resign my office. I hope this plain speaking will hurt nobody as there is no spirit of ill-will or mental reservation behind it.

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XXVIII

STATEMENT

on his rejection of the offer of Presidentship of the "Tehrik-i-Kashmir," issued on the 2nd October, 1933.

I thought it unfair to the All-India Kashmir Committee, of which I am the President, to reply to the letter containing the offer without giving my Committee an opportunity of expressing its opinion on it. I informed Dr. Mirza Yaqub Beg to that effect. It has been wrongly inferred from my letter by certain writers in the Press, who are probably Qadianis, that I have no objection on principle to accepting the office which was offered to me. I therefore hasten to make it clear that I have serious objections on principle not only to accepting the offer but even to entertaining it. My reasons for this attitude are the same as led me to suggest the reconstitution of the All-India Kashmir Committee some time ago.

The offer which has been made to me is obviously a camouflage intended to hoodwink the public into a belief that the old All-India Kashmir Committee still exists as a distinct body from the reconstituted Committee and that the gentlemen who were excluded from the reconstituted Committee are prepared to work under the leadership of the very man who was mainly responsible for the reconstitution.

This device, however, cannot convince me or the

Muslim public that the reasons which led me to the reconstitution of the Kashmir Committee have disappeared. No definite declaration has yet emanated from the Qadiani headquarters that in the event of the Qadianis joining a Muslim political organisation, their allegiance will not be divided. On the other hand events have revealed that what the Qadiani Press describes as "Tehrik-i-Kashmir" and in which, according to the Qadiani newspaper 'Al-Fazl', Muslims were only courteously allowed to participate, has entirely different aims and objects from those of the All-India Kashmir Committee. Certain open letters addressed by the head of the Qadiani community to his "Kashmir brethren"—a phrase which appears to have been used in order to avoid the use of the term Muslim for non-Qadiani Kashmiris—disclosed at least some of the inner motives of this Qadiani "Tehrik-i-Kashmir."

In these circumstances I fail to understand how any Muslim can associate himself with a 'Tehrik' which has revealed itself to be the instrument of a specific propaganda even though it seeks to cover itself with a thin veneer of non-sectarianism.

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XXIX

LETTER TO PANDIT JAWAHAR LAL NEHRU DATED 21st JUNE, 1936

My dear Pandit Jawahar Lal,

Thank you so much for your letter which I received yesterday. At the time I wrote in reply to your articles I believed that you had no idea of the political attitude of the Ahmadis. Indeed the main reason why I wrote a reply was to show, especially to you, how Muslim loyalty had originated and how eventually it had found a revelational basis in Ahmadism. After the publication of my paper I discovered, to my great surprise, that even the educated Muslim had no idea of the historical causes which had shaped the teachings of Ahmadism. Moreover your Muslim advisers in the Punjab and elsewhere felt perturbed over your articles as they thought you were in sympathy with the Ahmadiyya movement. This was mainly due to the fact that the Ahmadis were jubilant over your articles. The Ahmadi Press was mainly responsible for this misunderstanding about you. However I am glad to know that my impression was erroneous. I myself have little interest in theology but had to dabble in it a bit in order to meet the Ahmadis on their own ground. I assure you that my paper was written with the best of intentions for Islam and India. I have no doubt in my mind that the Ahmadis are traitors both to Islam and to India.

I was extremely sorry to miss the opportunity of meeting you in Lahore. I was very ill in those days and could not leave my room. For the last two years I have been living a life practically of retirement on account of continued illness. Do let me know when you come to the Punjab next. Did you receive my letter regarding your proposed union for Civil Liberty? As you do not acknowledge it in your letter I fear it never reached you.

Yours sincerely,
Sd. Mohammad Iqbal.

PART III—SPEECHES IN THE PUNJAB LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

XXX

BUDGET SPEECH

in the Punjab Legislative Council, 1927-28
(5th March, 1927)

Sir, I would pass a few general remarks on the Budget that was presented to the Council on the 28th of February. No one who has read the speech made by the Honourable the Finance Member and the memorandum prepared by the Finance Secretary can remain unimpressed by the remarkable lucidity of these documents. I must say as a layman that I have learned a great deal from them. In fact the Finance Secretary has very candidly suggested the criticism to which the general financial position of the province is open. He has told us that we spent 23 lakhs more than our income last year; and we are going to spend 60 lakhs more than our income this year: that is to say, in two years we shall have spent 83 lakhs more than our income. The question, therefore, arises whether we are justified in spending large sums of money on development. The general financial position, however, in view of the various considerations set forth in the review by the Finance Secretary, is satisfactory; though he has told us that it is not permissible to reduce the taxes in the absence of permanent funds. Now, so far as reduction of taxes is concerned, I will offer a few remarks presently. But in view of the fact that the general financial position of this province is satisfactory some pro-

vision ought to have been made in the Budget at least for rural sanitation as well as for medical relief for women. In fact, medical relief for women is badly needed in this province and no provision seems to have been made for this in the Budget. I would, therefore, draw your attention, Sir, and the attention of the honourable members of the Council to this very important consideration. As to the reduction of taxes, I suppose the Finance Secretary, when he prepared his admirable review of the financial position of the province, was not aware of the remission made by the Government of India. We now know that 86 lakhs have been remitted (Mr. H. D. Craik : May be remitted) of which 60 lakhs are recurring and 26 lakhs non-recurring. If this large amount is remitted, as I hope it will be remitted, my submission is that money should be spent towards the reduction of taxes, that is to say, towards the removal of the anomaly which exists in our system of taxation. The anomaly I mean is this : that we do not apply the principle of progression in the case of land revenue whereas we apply that principle in the case of income-tax.

The reason why this principle is not applied to land revenue is sometimes found in the barbarous theory that all land belongs to the Crown. Neither in ancient India nor even in the days of the Mughals the sovereign ever claimed universal ownership. This is the historical aspect of the matter. The Taxation Enquiry Committee also has accepted this position, though half the members of that Committee were of the opinion that land revenue could not be described

as a tax, the other half being of the opinion that it is in the nature of a tax. But the fact remains that in this country the sovereign never claimed any such rights. We are told that the Mughals claimed such rights; but the people of the Punjab owned and possessed the land of this country long before the race of Babar entered into history—the unmistakable lesson of which is that Crowns come and go; the people alone are immortal.

I submit, therefore, that in this twentieth century such a theory, even if it existed in any country at any time, cannot hold good. In case this money is remitted we should apply it towards the reduction of taxes. We should apply the principle of progression to land revenue. At present all land is subject to land revenue. Whether a man holds two kanals of land, he is liable to pay the land revenue. In the case of income-tax the principle of ability or the principle of progression is applied—that is to say, there is a graduated scale and some people do not pay income-tax at all. My submission, therefore, is that the Council should consider the question of the reduction of taxes in the light of this principle.

XXXI

SPEECH

on the cut motion on Government's demand for grant under 'Education' delivered on the 10th March, 1927.

Sir, the question of education is extremely important and I am glad to see that the honourable members[1] who have preceded me have spoken with great enthusiasm on the subject. They have emphasized the fact that education is a common interest, that it affects all classes of people of this land—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, capitalists and labourers—but they have not looked at the problem from the stand-point of a foreign government. A disinterested foreign government in this country wants to keep the people ignorant. A foreign government is a kind of Roman Catholic Church trying to suppress all the agencies that tend to enlighten the laity. The honourable gentleman[2] who preceded me has conclusively proved from facts and figures given in the 'Report on the Progress of Education in the Punjab for the year 1925-26' that we are wasting tremendous amounts of money on education with no results. Can anybody deny in this House or outside this House that mass education is absolutely essential in the interest of the people? Primary education, secondary education, professional or vocational education are all

1. Pandit Nanak Chand and Chaudhri Afzal Haq.
2. Pandit Nanak Chand.

various aspects of the same problem of mass education. Well, the ancient sages of this country used to say that the world is *maya* or illusion. I do not know whether the world outside this House is *maya* but I am absolutely certain that whatever happens inside this House is nothing but *maya*, though I must say that I am also a part and parcel of this illusion. Let me take the various stages of education, that is to say, primary education, secondary education and higher education. Now, whatever interpretations may be put upon this Report, one fact is perfectly clear from it, and it is this—that the principle of compulsion must be immediately applied. If you turn to page 2 of the Report—I mean the 'Proceedings of the Ministry of Education', you will find the following:

"Thus, as the Director has observed, compulsion should not be regarded as an ideal of distant future, but rather as a present and practical means of ensuring that the sums of money devoted to vernacular education are spent to the most fruitful purpose. It is hoped, therefore, that local authorities and all concerned will take immediate and effective steps toward a more rapid extension of the compulsory principle."

At the same time the education expert, Mr. Mayhew, whom I have the privilege to know personally, has told us that, in so far as the voluntary system is concerned, the present outlook is gloomy. This is an argument in favour of the fact that the principle of compulsion must be applied. We are told that it is applied in the case of 42 municipalities and some 400, perhaps more than 400, rural areas.

What happens there? We do not know anything from this Report. We do not know whether any persons were ever fined for not sending their children to schools. Nor do we know the number of teachers who are teaching in these schools. Unless we are given sufficient information, we cannot say what these rural areas and municipalities are doing? As far as my personal information goes, I can tell the members of this House, that nothing is being done and that there is an absolute waste of money. Only you have opened some schools and ostensibly compulsory, but not at all different to voluntary primary schools. I submit, Sir, that these schools are doing nothing at all, and in fact the way in which they are working does not amount to the adoption of the principle of compulsion. The Report virtually establishes that the principle of compulsion must be adopted. In fact in the amount of money that we are wasting on primary education the Report before us finds an argument in favour of the adoption of this principle. It says that a very large number of boys join the first class but the money spent upon them is wasted as most of them fail to reach the higher classes. If you are spending a very large amount of money on them, then it is your duty to see that they reach the higher classes. Make them reach the higher classes by compulsion. Thereafter my submission is that in so far as primary education is concerned, it is absolutely necessary in the interest of this province to adopt the principle of compulsion at once.

XXXII

SPEECH

on the adjournment motion regarding communal riots delivered on the 18th July, 1927.

Sir, the disease with which we are dealing is a chronic one. There are a good many physicians who have tried to diagnose it. Some have achieved a certain amount of success; others have failed signally in their undertaking. Different physicians have prescribed different remedies for the disease, but in the words of the poet

شد پریشان خواب من از کثرت تعبیر ها

these remedies have failed to achieve the desired end, viz., they have failed to discover a panacea for the evil which has fallen to the lot of this unhappy province.

Some people have ascribed this evil to the struggle for securing more posts under the Government while others have assigned reasons which are diametrically opposed to this contention. From the speech made by Pandit Nanak Chand one gathers the impression that his heart is full of love for humanity; but all this pious talk is nothing more than a cloak for the idea uppermost in the Pandit's mind. We are not prepared to let go what we have already got hold of. Lip service to God with an eye stealing glances at the property of others!

Some of the members are of opinion that the

gutter press of the province is responsible for the existing state of affairs, while others are of opinion that the struggle for votes and posts is responsible for it. There is no dearth of suggestions, but nobody seems willing to act upon them. Just after the occurrence of the Lahore riots a joint committee representing all shades of opinion and thought was constituted at Lahore, and a meeting of the same was held at the house of R. B. Moti Sagar. But I regret very much to say that this meeting was the first and last meeting of this joint committee In this meeting I suggested that in order to eradicate the spirit of mutual hatred it behoved the committee to appoint a number of small sub-committees whose business it should be to go about the different parts of the city and impress upon the people the futility of mutual warfare. But my suggestion met the usual fate of all such proposals. We indulged in much pious talk and everything ended in a fiasco.

In this Council impassioned speeches for intercommunal unity are made. We are asked to constitute joint committees and conciliation boards. But I wish to bring home this lesson to everybody in this Council that procrastination will not mend matters. If you want to do anything, do it without further loss of time. I wonder if the members have realised the fact that we are actually living in a state of civil war. If stringent measures are not taken to put this down, the atmosphere of the whole province will be poisoned.

I support Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan from the bottom of my heart that a round table conference

should be held at the earliest possible moment in which Government should also be asked to participate. This conference should carefully consider the present situation and suggest ways to suppress the existing communal tension. If this communal hatred permeates the rest of the country and the people living in villages also come to loggerheads, God alone knows where eventually it will land us.

XXXIII

SPEECH

on the resolution regarding filling of posts by open competitive examination delivered on the 19th July, 1927.

Sir, after the Honourable the Finance Member's[1] speech, which to my mind constitutes a most crushing reply to the resolution as framed,[2] it is hardly possible for anyone in this House to make a substantial addition to the discussion. However, I cannot but admire the innocent idealism of Sardar Ujjal Singh, which idealism, like all idealisms, sees everything except realities. I can assure my honourable friend that the principle of competition, pure and simple, is absolutely inapplicable in this country, especially in this province. I suppose many honourable members of this House know that such a non-communal institution as the Punjab University has had to adopt the system of fictitious roll numbers in the various University examinations. The examiner, according to this system, does not know as to the caste or creed or colour of the candidate whose paper he is examining or the college from which he comes.

1. Sir Geoffrey deMontmorency, who was later on Governor of the Punjab.

2. The resolution was moved by Sardar Ujjal Singh and read : "This Council recommends to the Government that in future all posts under Government in all departments should be filled by open competition as far as possible; and where this cannot be done and selection has to be made the most highly qualified candidate should be selected without regard to caste, creed or colour."

This system was adopted because it was feared that Hindu examiners might fail Muslim candidates and Muslim examiners might fail Hindu candidates. (Voices: Shame). Yes, it is a shameful thing; but it does exist. With all that both Hindu and Muslim candidates leave certain marks in their examination papers to indicate to the examiner the candidate's caste or creed. Only the other day I was reading the LL.B. examination papers. I found the number "786" which is the numerical value of an Arabic formula and on others I found "Om" marks meant to invoke the blessing of God as well as to reveal to the examiner the community of the candidate. Such is the state of things in a non-communal institution. Take another instance. During the recent riots in Lahore, both Hindu and Muslim citizens went in deputations to the Deputy Commissioner on several occasions—each community complaining of the investigating officers belonging to the opposite community. I happened to be a member of one such deputation. (Voices: Shame). It is not a matter to be ashamed of. We have to see things as they are; and it is a pity that they have come to such a pass. You know, Sir, what the Deputy Commissioner told us. I think he was perfectly right in saying what he did. He said: "Before the Reforms scheme came into operation, there were 120 British officers in the Police department, but that they were only 68 now. We have not got a sufficient number of British officers. Both communities want European officers."

My friend, Pandit Nanak Chand, is unfortunately not here at the present moment. He told us

that Government had removed the colour distinction, so that the posts which formerly went to British gentlemen now go to Hindus and Muslims; but I assure my friend that Government had made a very great mistake and I would welcome if there were more British officers. (Voices: No, no.) I fully realise my responsibility when I say this and I also realise the meaning of this voice of "no, no". I am not enamoured of that false and shallow nationalism which speaks like this. (Dr. Shaikh Muhammad Alam: Everybody is not the same.) Well, it may be so, yet the talk of a united nationalism is futile and will perhaps remain so for a long time to come. The word has existed on the lips of the people of this country for the last fifty years and like a hen it has cackled a great deal without laying a single egg. However, I will tell you that the state of this country is such that it is not possible for us to introduce the principle of competition pure and simple. The best method for the country is the one indicated by Sir Geoffrey deMontmorency in his speech, that is to say, the principle of competition tempered by selection and nomination.

One other thing I should like to point out. I was very glad to hear the honourable member for Simla.[1] I mean his advocacy of the Untouchables in an almost apostolic tone. I welcome it though I do not know what Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya's verdict would be in this matter. (L. Mohan Lal: It is the same as mine.) Only a short time ago he excommunicated one of his nearest relatives because he had given his

1. Lala Mohan Lal, B.A., LL.B.

daughter to a Brahmin of an inferior caste. (L. Mohan Lal: He did not.) It was in the papers and Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya was called upon to publish a reply to open letters which were addressed to him and he published no contradiction. However, I welcome the change, if it is not in theory alone and I hope that through the efforts of my friend, the honourable member for Simla, untouchability will be removed in this province. In Southern India we hear that when a Brahmin is constrained to talk to an Untouchable he must talk to some wall or tree near-by and the Untouchable too has to address, in reply, the same wall or the tree since the Brahmin is too sacred to be addressed by a Sudra. I shall wel-come the day when such bans are entirely removed and the Hindus of this province adopt better prin-ciples of equality.

Sir, I need not say anything more with regard to the principle of competition. My friend[1] has pointed out certain defects in the present system which he has enumerated. He refers to the success of the principle of competition in other countries. I must say that the state of things in this country is totally different to the state of things in other countries. For this reason the principles the application of which is good in other countries would not apply to this country. In this country one community is always aiming at the destruction of the other community. Therefore the power in whose hands lies the destiny of this country must adopt a line of action which is calcu-lated equally to elevate all communities that form the

1. Sardar Ujjal Singh, M.A.

population of this country. It has been argued that the present system tends to retard the progress of what my friend[1] called nationality. Well, I do not know whether it is desirable to become a nation. It is a proposition which can be controverted but assuming that it is so, I would suggest that it is first desirable to develop mutual trust in the communities of this country. The present state of things is such that the communities do not trust each other; they have no faith in each other. When we meet each other we talk of nationalism, we talk of philanthropy and of love of mankind. Only a few days ago a friend of mine told me that he had overheard two Hindu gentlemen talking. One of them asked the other as to what should be our policy now. The other gentleman said: Let nationalism be on your lips, but fix your gaze always on your own community.

1. Sardar Ujjal Singh, M. A.

XXXIV

SPEECH

on the resolution regarding Unani and Ayurvedic[1] *Systems of Medicine delivered on the 22nd February, 1928.*

Sir, the impression is gaining ground amongst the people of this country that the Government has commercial interests in view and is, for this reason, encouraging Western system of medicine on the one side and discouraging indigenous system of medicine on the other. I do not know how far this impression has basis in truth but the fact remains that the *Unani* and *Ayurvedic* systems of medicine do not find favour with the Government.

In my opinion, in spite of all that the supporters of the Western system of medicine say, the latter has yet to learn much from the *Unani* system of medicine. Many of the books written on the *Unani* system and specially those written by Najib-ud-Din Samarqandi, have not been published. There are in the libraries of Europe many works which, if published, are sure to serve as eye-openers to those who boast of superiority of the Western system of medicine. Nor can we lose sight of the fact that ours is a poor country. Its people cannot afford an expensive system of medicine. It is, therefore, essential

1. The two indigenous systems of medicine very popular in the subcontinent. The *Unani* system although originally based on the Greek system was developed considerably by the Arabs and other Muslim people. The Ayurvedic originated in India. Ed.

to introduce and encourage a cheaper system. From this point of view I think our *Unani* and *Vedic* systems very much suit the people. Of course the way in which our medicines are prepared is defective and requires improvement. An institution is needed to teach pharmacy. Our own system of pharmacy, I believe, is more conducive to the health of the people than any other methods. If you excuse me, Sir, a little digression, I may mention that while I was in England an English friend of mine told me that our way of cooking food was unnatural so much so that the original flavour of the food was entirely lost in the act of cooking it. He praised the Western way of cooking food. Thereupon I told him that what we did with our food, the Westerners did with their medicines. Coming back to the point I think that if the Government were to take up the question of improving the indigenous systems of medicines seriously, these systems are sure to prove much more useful to the people of this country. I will, therefore, request the Government to give a little more attention to this matter.

XXXV

SPEECH

on the resolution regarding application of the principles of assessment of income-tax to the assessment of land revenue delivered on the 23rd February, 1928.

Sir, I am glad to see that the Honourable Member for Revenue[1] did not make any attempt to justify the present system of assessment on the basis of State ownership of land. He left it very wisely for the honourable member for Simla.[2] I am afraid this offers a fitting occasion for the application of that humorous Punjabi proverb *chor nalon pand kahli*, that is to say, the property stolen is readier to run away than the thief. (A voice : Who is the thief ?) You may understand it as you like. Since the honourable member for Simla has raised this point, I think it necessary to dispose of it with a few remarks. Let me tell the honourable representative for Simla that the first European author to refute this theory was the Frenchman Perron in the year 1777. Later in 1830 Briggs made a very extensive inquiry as to the law and practice in India and relating to the theory of State ownership of land. He gives in his book an accurate description of the laws of Manu, the Muslim law and the practices prevailing in the various parts of India—Bengal, Malwa, the Punjab, etc., and ar-

1. Sir Fazl-i-Husain. 2. Lala Mohan Lal, B.A., LL.B.

rives at the conclusion that in no period in the history of India the State ever claimed the proprietorship of land. In the time of Lord Curzon, however, this theory was put forward, but the Taxation Committee's report which was published sometime ago has come to a very clear finding that this theory has no basis at all. That is, I believe, the reason why the Honourable Revenue Member has not tried to defend the present system on the ground of that theory. (Revenue Member: Not necessarily.) If you agree, Sir, the Honourable Member may argue on the basis of that theory if he likes. But in his first speech on the subject he did not try to defend the present system of assessment on the basis of that theory. (Revenue Member: I did not want to.)

And we take it that the Government does not rely upon that. However, we have to see, in the first place, how far the present system of assessment is just. Workable it is and sanctioned by a very old tradition; but we have first to see whether it has justice on its side or not. My submission is that it is not at all just. The injustice of it is perfectly clear. If a man happens to be landowner, big or small does not matter, he has to pay land revenue. But if a man earns from sources other than land, less than two thousand rupees a year you don't tax him at all. That is where injustice comes in. Nobody can deny that the system is unjust. It is no argument to say that since there are insuperable difficulties in the way of the removal of this injustice, therefore it must be perpetuated. We must admit that there is injustice and we ought to seek proper remedies in order to

remove the injustice in so far as it is possible. I have no hesitation in admitting that there are serious difficulties in the way of the application of the principle of income-tax to land revenue. As a matter of fact one reason why I withdrew a more or less similar resolution which I sent in last time was this, that I felt that there were serious difficulties and the matter had to be further investigated, although the difficulties that were then in my mind have not at all been referred to by the Honourable Revenue Member, and I need not mention them until I have heard what other members have got to say. (A voice: Is that a secret?) It is an open secret to which the Official Secrets Act does not apply.

The arguments that the learned Member for Revenue put forward are, in the main, two. In the first place, he argues that we are constantly in need of money: the province needs money for its development, and that the Government does not practise alchemy. I think the Government need not practise alchemy so long as they have in their pocket all the tillers of the soil whose hard work turns dust into gold. But this kind of evil practice which brings the required amount of money. But assuming that this argument has force, I submit that the deficiency caused in the land revenue by the adoption of a different system of land revenue may be met in other ways. For instance, we can reduce the expenditure on administration. We can lower the limit of taxable income under the Income-tax Act. We can spend less on the so-called development which is a very dignified expression for something which has not brought us anything

so far. We can further meet it from the remissions made by the Government of India.

Again the Honourable the Revenue Member has tried to meet the argument that the whole burden of land revenue falls on the shoulders of the consumer or by showing that the consumer indirectly shares in that burden. The argument is plausible; but personally I feel very doubtful of its validity. One must not forget the condition of things prevailing in this province. We gave up *batai* long ago. (Revenue Member: Not yet.) Practically, the Land Revenue Bill does not recognise *batai*. (Revenue Member: There is no amended Act yet.) In general practice *batai* is given up. I do not know what would be the attitude of my zamindar friends. On economic grounds, probably the *batai* system, to my mind, is better. However, the prices of the produce of the land are determined by the demand of the consumer and the prices, as the Honourable the Finance Member[1] has pointed out, determine the amount of land revenue. But the moment the land revenue is determined, then it becomes a fixed amount for a number of years. If after the fixing of the amount prices go up, then there is a chance for the seller to profit by the rise of prices; but if the prices fall down, then I am afraid, the consumer has really no share in the burden of land revenue. (Revenue Member: If prices rise?) Well it is a matter of chance. They may rise or they may fall. (Revenue Member: Then the consumer pays.)

I have a serious doubt about this. The whole

1. Sir Geoffrey deMontmorency.

situation depends upon chance. If prices rise, it goes to his profit; if the prices fall down the argument which the Honourable the Revenue Member put forward has no application. The consumer helps in the determination of land revenue, but after the land revenue is fixed, then the whole thing is left to chance. We should not forget that the production is also uncertain especially in areas where the land is *barani*. Again the Honourable the Revenue Member argued that this system should either be continued or be given up at once. There is no third alternative possible. In this connection I beg to say that this is not the spirit of the resolution moved by the honourable member from Rohtak.[1] The spirit of the resolution is that if you recognise that the present system is unjust then do something to make a beginning towards the remedying of that injustice. Definite suggestions were made by the honourable members who preceded me in connection with this matter. I think it is easy to do so without definitely introducing the principle of income-tax in our land revenue system. It can be done by amending section 48 of the Land Revenue Act. I have already submitted an amendment to this effect, though I am afraid the prospect for that amendment is not very bright. I, therefore, suggest that holdings, not exceeding five *bighas* and situated in the non-irrigated areas where the produce is practically fixed, should not be liable to the payment of land revenue. This can be done without deciding the question whether the principle of income-tax should be applied to assessment of

1. Rai Sahib Chaudhri (later Chaudhri Sir) Chhotu Ram.

land or not. If you lay down that a holding not exceeding five *bighas* is revenue-free, I do not think there will be very great deficiency in the land revenue. At any rate, if there is a large deficiency, I think it can probably be met by reducing expenditure in other directions.

Lastly, as regards the argument of the Honourable the Revenue Member, or rather the fear that he expressed that this resolution may mean the death of the baby, the Land Revenue Bill, and the apprehensions that it will amount to infanticide. Well, in these days of birth-control, I think infanticide does not matter especially when we know that the child is going to be a very wicked one. I do not think it is demanding too much if the holdings to the extent of five *bighas* should be declared revenue-free. I hope that Government will give serious consideration to this point. Personally I agree even if you make it less than five bighas. (Revenue Member : Five acres.) An economic holding in this province is about ten or eleven *bighas*. At any rate, five *bighas* is half the economic holding. I do not think that remission of land revenue in the case of persons holding five *bighas* would cause very great deficiency. (Ch. Afzal Haq : Only two crores.) My calculation was that it was much less than two crores. (Revenue Member : Not quite that if you let out only the two acre men.) Two and a half crores. (Revenue Member : *Gunah-i-be lazzat*.)

If you commit this fruitless sin, it would show that there is at least some sense of justice in you. Reference was also made by one of the honourable

members to sending a kind of commission of inquiry to Russia. I am afraid several commissions have already been sent to Russia, though not from this country. My honourable friend is probably not aware of the causes that led to the Russian revolt. It is not necessary to detail those causes ; a good deal of literature has sprung up since the Russian revolt concerning the things that happened and the system that has been adopted there. Books written by such men as Bertrand Russel and others who have devoted their time to economic questions have appeared. But I think my honourable friend Pandit Nanak Chand has already given an effective reply to the proposal made by Ch. Afzal Haq that at the present moment, the Punjab zamindar is not ready to give up the right of private ownership. In this country, there are petty landholders, there are proprietors with two *bighas*, two kanals. They are practically like tenants, yet are not willing to give up the right of private ownership. My submission, therefore, is that Government should give some consideration to the demand embodied in this resolution ; they should give some relief to the small proprietor, the produce of whose land is obviously insufficient to maintain his family.

XXXVI

BUDGET SPEECH

in the Punjab Legislative Council, 1929-30
(4th March, 1929)

Sir, I am afraid the Budget which has been presented to this Council presents a financial position which, in the words of the Honourable the Finance Member even a confirmed optimist cannot regard as entirely satisfactory. And the statement with which this Budget is presented is so concise and so absolutely frank that its very frankness makes extremely difficult for the reader to criticise it. However, there are certain points which must be noticed. One remarkable feature of this Budget is, and this is the first Budget that has this feature, that the contribution to the Government of India finds no place in it. But its most unfortunate feature is that after five years' continuous prosperity we are, for the first time, confronting a deficit Budget. The small increase in Excise and Stamps is no source of satisfaction, because it means an increase in drunkenness and litigation which reflects credit neither on the people nor on the Government. On the expenditure side of the Budget for 1928-29 the only excess is under Irrigation and Jails. The increase under Irrigation is due to floods in August, and the increase under Jails is due to an increase in the number of prisoners and also to higher prices of food. Well, floods are a natural phenomenon and cannot be prevented, but unless we

are complete fatalists, crime is a preventable affair. If appropriate methods to prevent crime are adopted, it can be prevented to a very large extent. The present state of affairs is such that the man who steals cattle worth Rs. 10 is sent to jail for two years, and I think this is very largely responsible for the increase in the number of prisoners in the jails.

In the Budget Estimate of 1929-30 the first thing which I would like to note is Education. Graph No. 4 in the Memorandum tells us that the amount allotted to Education is 1.81. In the statement of the Honourable the Finance Member on page 6 we find it is 1.67. I was not able to understand these figures, because if 12 lakhs on new expenditure are added to 1.67 the sum is 1.79 and not 1.81. (Mr. J.G. Beazley: May I explain, Sir, that that figure includes expenditure on works, repairs and stationery.) Very well, Sir. The state of things so far as Education is concerned is very very disappointing. I was going to say, awful. In 1922-23, 55 new schools in all came up for grants-in-aid, out of which 16 were Islamia schools. The total amount of grants made to schools was Rs. 1,21,906, out of which a sum of Rs. 29,214 went to Muslim schools. In 1926-27, the total amount of grant to high schools was Rs. 1,22,287 and the same amount, namely, Rs. 29,214 went to Muslim schools, i.e., 23 per cent of the total amount. In 1927-28 the total amount of grant was Rs. 10,13,154 and the share of Muslim schools was Rs. 2,04,330, that is to say, the population which is most backward in education and most indebted got only 2 lakhs out of 10. This is a state of affairs which cannot be regarded as

satisfactory. Yet we are told that there are savings in the beneficent departments which Mr. Penny describes as instances of over-budgetting. I am not at all opposed to spending large sums on education nor is it the purpose of this criticism to raise any such opposition: but I should submit that the money spent on education must be spent carefully and must be distributed equally especially in places where people are backward and too poor to pay for education. However, I need not dwell on this point because I believe it will be taken up when the motions for cuts come up before the House.

I would now like to say a few words about capital expenditure. In 1928-29 the budgetted estimate for capital expenditure charged to revenue was 1.81 lakhs. It was later on raised to 1.89 and the revised estimate shows Rs. 2.12 lakhs. For 1929-30, the capital expenditure is expected to be Rs. 1.54 lakhs. Since extraordinary receipts will not amount to much it is proposed to borrow Rs. 1.40 lakhs from the Provincial Loans Fund. This is a very regrettable state of affairs. The province is already in debt. On pages 22-23 of the Budget you will find the exact position of the province. It will be seen that the loans from the public amount to 3 crores while the loans from the Government of India prior to 31st March and the years subsequent thereto amount in the aggregate to about 26 crores. Of course, this sum does not include the loans which have been sanctioned from 1st March, 1929. We are now compelled to borrow another sum of 1.40 lakhs in spite of what the Honourable the Finance Member says at page 4 of

his statement which runs as follows:

> "It has been found impossible to proceed with the full programme of buildings and roads and it is contemplated that 48 lakhs less will be expended under this head in 1929-30 than is shown in the revised estimate for 1928-29. It is also contemplated to reduce transfers to the Revenue Reserve Fund to 5 lakhs only instead of the 15 lakhs budgetted for 1928-29."

I think it was Charles Lamb who said that mankind are really divided into two classes, creditors and debtors. In so far as this province is concerned, if we drop the religious labels,—Hindu and Muslim—and substitute the economic labels, lenders and borrowers, Lamb's remark is perfectly true. But my fear is that this province, as a whole, may now be made a permanent member of debtor class. Thus the present financial position is very disappointing and it is not an easy matter to discover new sources of revenue.

However, I venture to make a suggestion. In the first place, I should like the Government to move the Government of India to provincialise income-tax. That would improve our position to some extent. I may in the next place suggest the imposition of death duties as they have in England. (Revenue Member: Living duties would be more appropriate!) These would be living duties because it is the living who would have to pay them. Some limit such as those inheriting property to the value of Rs. 20,000 or Rs. 30,000 may be fixed. Next we should try reduction of high salaries and purchase of our machinery from the cheapest markets.

XXXVII

BUDGET SPEECH

in the Punjab Legislative Council, 1930-31
7th March, 1930.

Sir, I should like to offer a few general observations on the financial position of the province as revealed in this Budget. In his very clear and lucid Memorandum Mr. Penny has given the present position in a nutshell. On page 13 he says :

> "Even after these special efforts at economy revenue receipts stand at 10.95 lakhs and expenditure at 11.22 lakhs with no provision for a transfer to the Revenue Reserve Fund, and there will thus be a deficit in the year of 27 lakhs. The only consolation is that provision has been made for expenditure of 28 lakhs on special flood repairs, and if this is excluded from consideration as abnormal and non-recurring, the Budget just balances."

Now, I am afraid the consolation given by Mr. Penny does not prove of much consequence in view of what he himself says at page 16 :

> "A glance at the first graph prefixed to this Memorandum will show that the year 1930-31 will be the third in succession to show an excess of expenditure over receipts in the revenue account. It is true that fortune has been singularly unkind in the last two years and the deficits in

both are capable of convincing explanation. But the hard fact remains that if the series since 1921 is taken as a whole, good years and bad years balance, and that the financial system must be adapted to fluctuations which nature herself prescribes. If the decade has been marked by unprecedented floods in the Jumna in 1924 and in the Indus and the Jhelum in 1929, by failure of the *rabi* harvest in 1921, by a strange disaster to the wheat crop in 1929, and by cotton disease in 1926, there have been compensating gains in the reassessments of land revenue that fortunately fell due in the last five years, in the good harvest from 1921 to 1926 and above all in the complete remission of provincial contributions to the Central Government. The continued extension of canal irrigation has made the prosperity of the province and its revenues more and more secure, and added to the resources from which progress in future must be financed. Regarded in the light of the experience of the past nine years the Budget of the year 1930-31 has a special significance."

This is the part of the paragraph to which I will draw your special attention :

"The deficit in the revenue account may be attributed to the completion of flood repairs, but what is of far greater importance is the fact that even if the cost of flood repairs is excluded, the Budget has been balanced only with difficulty and by jettisoning a number of works that had already received the approval of the Legislature and, but

> for unforeseen delays or the need for economy, would already have been under construction."

Mr. Penny then discusses the causes of the present financial position and is driven to what he calls a somewhat melancholy conclusion that the present state of things is not a passing phase but has come to stay. He says:

> "The inevitable but somewhat melancholy conclusion to be drawn from an examination of the Budget for 1930-31 is that it represents not a passing phase which can be attributed to seasonal misfortunes or flood calamities but a state of things that is likely to continue."

Now, Sir, we know that the province is already in debt. The problem of unemployment is becoming more and more acute every day. Trade is at a low ebb. You can easily imagine what the financial future of the province is likely to be. I am inclined to think that the present position is due not so much to stationary revenues as to the present system of administration which necessitates high salaries in the matter of which the people of this province have no say. There are to my mind only three alternatives open to the people of this province—either have the present system with all its ugly daughters, such as deficit Budgets, communal bickerings, starving millions, debt or unemployment or do away with the present system root and branch, or retain the form of the present system and secure the power to pay less for it. There is no other alternative. This system must come to an end if you want to live a comfortable life. We spend more than any other country in the world

on the present system of administration. There is no other country which spends so much on the administration. (Mr. H. Calvert: Question.) The Honourable member may reply when his turn comes. My belief is that we pay much more than our revenues justify. So far as expenditure in regard to which we have some say is concerned, I support the proposition that a retrenchment committee ought to be appointed so that we may be able to see whether any further reductions are possible.

I now proceed to offer a few remarks on Industry and Education. We spend practically nothing on industry. And as I have said before and as many other speakers have pointed out, industrial development alone can save us from the curse of unemployment. There is a good future for weaving industry, and for shoe-making industry in this province and if we encourage these industries, I think we shall be able to save the province from unemployment, provided we protect these industries against Cawnpore and Ahmedabad.

Again we have spent a good deal of money on education and with what results? The report on the progress of education in this province shows that there has been a fall of 27,000 students and about 1,000 schools. The cause of this fall as mentioned in the report is lack of propaganda work on the part of school inspectors. I do not agree that that is the real cause. The real cause of this phenomenon ought to be sought elsewhere. I have a copy before me of the facts and figures relating to the work of the Education Minister during the last three years. Un-

fortunately I cannot go through all these figures within the fixed time-limit ; I would draw your attention only to the special grants to unaided schools during 1928-29. You will see that the total number of schools to which grants have been made is 21. Out of this there are 13 Hindu institutions, 6 Sikh institutions and 2 Muslim institutions. The grant that goes to the Hindu institutions is Rs. 16,973, to Sikh institutions Rs. 9,908 and to Muslim institutions Rs. 2,200. The cause, therefore, of this remarkable phenomenon must be sought in the way in which money on education is spent.

PART IV—STATEMENTS

XXXVIII

STATEMENT

on his Impressions of world Muslim Congress Jerusalem.

I approached some of the holy places common to Islam, Christianity and Judaism with a rather sceptic mind as to the authenticity of the traditions centred round them. But in spite of this feeling I was very much affected by them, particularly by the birth-place of Christ.

I discovered, however, that the altar of the Church at Bethlehem was divided into three parts which were allotted to the Armenian, Greek and Catholic churches, respectively. These sects continuously fight among themselves, sometimes indulging in bloodshed and defiling one another's altars and—contrary to the state of affairs in India—it is two Muslim policemen who have to keep the peace among them.

I was a member of the various sub-committees formed to discuss distinct proposals, but unfortunately was not able to take part in all of them. In one sub-committee I strongly opposed the idea of establishing at Jerusalem a university on the old and antiquated lines of the Jamia Azhar in Cairo and insisted on the proposed university being of a thoroughly modern type.

I do not know how the misunderstanding arose

which caused the rumour that I was opposed to the establishment of any kind of university at Jerusalem. Reuter sent out a wire to that effect. Actually I am a strong advocate of Arabic-speaking countries setting up not one but several universities for the purpose of transferring modern knowledge to Arabic which is the only non-European language that has kept pace with the progress of thought in modern times.

(*Published on 1st January, 1932*)

XXXIX

STATEMENT

on the Communal Award, issued on the 24th August, 1932.

The decision of His Majesty's Government has invoked divergent criticisms characteristic of this land of minorities. This in itself ought to be instructive to those fact-shy politicians who take an easy view of the complexity of the Indian constitutional problem and think that India possesses, or is capable of possessing, on the whole a single national point of view. And all this unhappy fire-work of phrases comes from people who openly confessed their inability to solve their own problems in requesting a third party to give them a decision which, be it remembered, does not close the door for an agreed settlement.

Amidst this welter of indiscriminate criticism, however, a disinterested student of Indian politics will find great relief in reading the views of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru—the astute politician who combines a clear vision of present actualities with a penetrating glance into the future and shows infinite patience in working out the minute details of a complex situation.

I may also recall the amusing observation made in this connection by a gentleman of Bombay who said that the British Government's decision might as

well have been written by myself. I assure him that if I had been called upon to give a decision on the Indian communal problem, I should not have done such glaring injustice to Muslims as the present decision does.

I honestly believe that no community has a more genuine grievance against the decision than Muslims. Indeed I cannot explain to myself how the British conscience has tolerated this injustice.

The outcry that the decision has given a majority representation to Punjab Muslims has absolutely no justification. A Muslim majority, whatever its character, in this province ought not to form a ground of grievance for any community. Besides, in the present case this majority has been made dependent on Muslims winning a number of seats through joint electorates.

The views of the Indian Muslims on the British Government's decision are embodied in the resolution adopted by the Executive Board of the All-India Muslim Conference at Delhi the other day. I need not repeat them. But it appears from a careful study of the decision that it attempts to vindicate two political principles, i.e., no majority should be reduced to a minority and the interests of the minorities should be protected by giving them suitable weightage. In the application of both these principles it is the Muslims who suffer.

The position of Muslims in Bengal proves the violation of the first principle to the detriment of the Muslims and the figures relating to the weightage

given to minorities in various provinces prove that the second principle has been applied more generously to Hindus in the Frontier Province than to Muslims in any other province. In the Punjab the Sikh minority has been given weightage to an extent which reduces the probable Muslim majority to the narrowest possible margin.

The Muslims of Bengal who have been given 48.4 instead of 61 per cent needed only another 2 per cent to ensure an odd majority for them. But His Majesty's Government have thought fit to observe the terms of the Minorities' Pact as far as it related to Europeans and to ignore it as far as it related to Bengal Muslims. Is it because blood is thicker than water or because this injustice to Muslims serves the double object of helping the Europeans and pleasing the Hindus?

The important question for Muslims, however, is what is to be done? I believe that a perfectly constitutional method is open to Muslims to adopt in this connection. Bengal is one of those provinces which have demanded two Houses of Legislature. The constitution of an Upper House for it is yet to be framed and what the relations between the two Houses will be and whether the Government will be responsible to the Lower House only or to both Houses put together, are questions which are yet to be settled. If representation on a population basis is secured for Muslims in the Upper House and if Government is made responsible to both Houses put together, Muslims may still have a majority in that province. In view of the fact that special interests

have received full attention in the Lower House the above method will only do bare justice to Bengal Muslims.

I must add that the mere allotment of seats to various communities is in itself of no great consequence. What is vital is the amount of power which may be transferred to the provinces of India. If real power comes to the provinces there is no doubt that the minorities of India, Muslims and non-Muslims, will have an opportunity of improving their political position in the country and that in working out the coming constitution, Muslims in their majority provinces will, in view of their past history and traditions, prove themselves free from all pettiness of mind and narrowness of outlook. Their one duty, to my mind, is a war against illiteracy and economic slavery.

XL

STATEMENT

on the Conditions Prevailing in Europe issued on the 26th February, 1933.

After visiting different European countries and seeing the general moral chaos of the modern world, I am convinced that the great opportunity for Islam as a faith has come. Millions upon millions of men and women in Europe are anxious to know what Islam and its cultural ideals are. The sooner the younger generation of Muslims realizes this fact the better. European Muslims have already realized it. They are holding a conference in Geneva in August next, the object of the proposed conference being purely social and cultural. I hope the Muslims of Asia and Africa will generously respond to the promoters of the conference.

I visited Cordova, Granada, Seville, Toledo and Madrid and besides seeing the historic mosque at Cordova, and the Alhambra in Granada, I visited the ruins of Madinatuz Zehra, the famous palace built on a mountain by Abdur Rehman I for his wife Zehra, where excavations are still going on. It was there that the first demonstration of a flying machine was given in the twelfth century by a Muslim inventor. I had the privilege of meeting, among others the Education Minister of the Spanish Government, an exceedingly courteous gentleman with a breadth

of vision hardly to be expected in a country like Spain, and Professor Asin, the well-known author of *Divine Comedy and Islam*. Under the directions of the Education Minister the department of Arabic in the University of Granada is being greatly expanded. The head of this department is a disciple of Professor Asin.

The Spaniards living in the south of the country are proud of their Moorish origin and of the great monuments of Islamic culture which are to be found there. A new consciousness is steadily growing in the country and will further expand with the development of education. The movement of reform started by Luther has not yet exhausted itself. It is still working quietly in different European countries and the hold of priesthood, especially in Spain, is gradually loosening.

XLI

STATEMENT

on the Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan, published on the 16th May, 1933.

Turkestan is a vast country divided into three parts, one of which is ruled by Russia, the other by Afghanistan and the third by China. In 1914 there was a great deal of discontent in Chinese Turkestan owing to the appointment of Chinese magistrates in that country and an attempt made by the Chinese Government to impose the Chinese language on the population which is almost wholly Muslim. But matters did not come to a head then. As far as I know the present revolution in that country began in 1930 under the leadership of a 17-year-old Muslim boy named Chong Yng.

Mr. Petro of the Citroen Haardt expedition who met this "infant" Muslim general in Turkestan related his experiences during a lecture to the Central Asian Society in England in 1932. During that year, Ma Chong Yng was besieging the city of Hami and the services of Mr. Petro were availed of for purposes of peace negotiations with the besieged Chinese forces. Mr. Petro who was received by the Chinese general and the Chinese Defence Consul in the city was expecting to be questioned regarding the strength and plans of the army of besiegers. Much to his surprise, however, the first and only question put to

him by the Chinese general was: 'Is it true that Ma Chong Yng is only 20 years old?' On being told that Ma was less than that age the Chinese general turned to the Defence Consul who was in favour of surrendering the city and said, 'I am 81 years old and my hair has been white for a long time. My great-grandson is older than this suckling. How do you think I can surrender this city to an infant?'

The old general acted up to his words and resolutely faced hunger and other privations until he received help from the Chinese Government. During a hard struggle Ma was badly wounded and fled to Kan-Su and hostilities came to an end only to be resumed shortly afterwards. Whether Ma is leading the rebellion at its present stage I cannot say; but his career which, according to Mr. Petro, may well form the subject of a modern *Odyssey* shows that the home of Changez, Taimur and Babar has not ceased to produce military geniuses of the highest order.

I do not think that the cause of this rebellion is religious fanaticism, though in a movement like this all sorts of human sentiments are liable to be exploited by leaders. The causes, I believe, are mainly economic. The world is also thinking to-day in terms of race—an attitude of mind which I consider the greatest blot on modern civilization. I apprehend that the birth of a race-problem in Asia will lead to most disastrous results. The main endeavour of Islam as a religion has been to solve this very problem and if modern Asia wishes to avoid the fate of Europe there is no other remedy but to assimilate the

ideals of Islam and to think not in terms of race but in terms of mankind.

My apprehension that the revolution in Chinese Turkestan may develop into a Pan-Turanian movement is borne out by the trend of thought in Central Asia. Only the other day the well-edited monthly of Afghanistan, *Kabul*, published an article from the pen of Dr. Afshaar, of Iran calling upon Afghanistan, which was described by the writer as forming part of 'the Greater Iran', to join hands with Iran in order to meet the growing menace of Turanism. In any case the revolution, if it succeeds, is bound to produce repercussions in Afghan and Russian Turkestan, particularly in the latter which is already seething with discontent owing to religious persecution and owing to serious food problem created in that country by the Russian Government's policy of turning it into a huge cotton farm. In so far as Afghan Turkestan is concerned, the people of Asia may rely, I hope, on the far-sighted idealism of King Nadir Shah.

The success of the revolution will also mean the birth of a prosperous and strong Muslim State in Chinese Turkestan where Muslims, who are about 99 per cent of the population, will be freed from the age-old Chinese oppression. Chinese Turkestan is an extremely fertile country, but owing to Chinese oppression and misrule only five per cent of its land is at present under cultivation. The establishment of another Muslim State between India and Russia will push the menace of the atheistic materialism of Bolshevism farther away from the borders of our country, even if it does not drive this menace away

from Central Asia as a whole.

The Government of Lord Willingdon, who has the gift of rare political vision, has taken up a wise attitude towards happenings in Chinese Turkestan. This attitude explains and justifies the Government of India's policy regarding the frontiers of Kashmir State.

XLII

STATEMENT

on the Disturbances in Kashmir State, issued on the 7th June, 1933.

The latest *communique* issued by the Kashmir Government states that things are quiet in Srinagar. The information that has reached me from reliable sources is, however, that the situation is not so easy as the official *communique* tries to make out. I fear that in the Kashmir Government itself there are forces which have worked in the direction of defeating Col. Colvin's policy.

A *communique* recently issued by the Kashmir Government informed the world that the leaders of Muslim parties were arrested according to a unanimous decision of the Cabinet. This is another statement which is not borne out by private information which comes from reliable sources. It seems to me that Col. Colvin's judgment of the situation was perfectly correct—a fact which is proved by the results of the so-called unanimous action on the part of the Kashmir Government.

I hold no brief for any of the political parties in Kashmir. But the arrests of the leaders of the two parties and subsequent flogging of people and firing and lathi charges on women and children are likely to plunge Kashmir into the same conditions from which it was rescued by Col. Colvin's policy.

I hope the Kashmir Government will try to discover the psychological background of the present events and adopt an attitude which may bring peace and goodwill.

Recently several Muslims from Jammu and Kashmir have brought to me and other Muslims in Lahore various reports about Kashmir affairs. It was, however, easy to see that their object was to poison the minds of British Indian Muslims against the Muslims in Kashmir. I cannot say why these people have undertaken this curious mission. I, however, consider it my duty to warn, whosoever may be at the back of this move, that members of the Kashmir Committee are not fools and will not fall into the traps which are perhaps being laid for them.

In conclusion, I appeal to Muslims of Kashmir to beware of the forces that are working against them and to unite their ranks. The time for two or three Muslim political parties in Kashmir has not yet come. The supreme need of the moment is a single party representing all Muslims in the State. If perfect unanimity of political opinion is not secured in Kashmir, all efforts of leaders to advance the interests of the people of that State will prove ineffective.

XLIII

STATEMENT

on the Administrative Reforms in Kashmir, issued on the 3rd August, 1933.

The people of India will welcome this *communique*. I hope all the recommendations made by the Glancy Commission will be carried out as soon as possible and that the Kashmir Government will succeed in inspiring complete confidence in the minds of those for whom the reforms are intended. For this purpose an atmosphere of peace and good-will is indispensable between the rulers and the ruled towards whom the Government should behave in such a manner as to make them feel that the Government is not a factor alien to their life and aspirations but an institution of their own through which their legitimate aspirations are to find expression.

I cannot help suggesting to Col. Colvin that in order to win the confidence of the people and restore happy relations between them and the Government he should order the withdrawal of criminal cases pending in Mirpur and Baramula. This will vastly enhance the prestige of the Kashmir administration and the European Prime Minister and take away the sting of propaganda now carried on against him.

XLIV

STATEMENT

on the proposed Afghan University, published on the 19th October, 1933.

An educated Afghanistan will be the best friend of India. The building of a new University at Kabul and the development of the Peshawar Islamia College into another University on the western border of India will very much help in the uplift of the shrewd Afghan tribes who inhabit the country that lies between our frontier and the Afghan frontier.

His Majesty the King of Afghanistan invited us to advise his Education Minister on matters connected with the proposed University at Kabul. We felt it our duty to respond to his call. It appears from the various publications emerging from Kabul that the younger generation of Afghans are thoroughly in earnest about modern knowledge, and its co-ordination with their religion and culture. The Afghans are a fine people and as Indians it is our duty to help them to advance as much as they can. There are very clear indications of the development of new consciousness in that people, and we hope we may be able to advise them on matters of education in the light of our Indian experience. Personally I believe that complete secularisation of education has not produced good results anywhere especially in Muslim lands. Nor is there any absolute system of education.

Each country has its own needs and its educational problems must be discussed and solved in the light of those needs.

XLV

STATEMENT

on the conditions in Afghanistan, issued on the 6th November, 1933.

The first thing which we noticed was that there is complete safety of life and property in the country. This is in itself a remarkable achievement for a Government which overcame a widespread rebellion only four years ago. Another thing which impressed us was the very earnest manner in which all the Ministers are discharging their duties. Even the orthodox party stands solidly behind these workers and consequently there is—as was stated in our presence by a leading Afghan divine—no difference between the *mullas* and the young men in the Afghanistan of to-day.

It is the intention of the Afghan Government to reorganise the entire department of Public Instruction on modern lines and at the same time to improve all roads which connect Afghanistan with neighbouring countries. A beautiful and commodious palace in Kabul has already been reserved for the new University which is gradually developing. Higher education is being imparted in medicine, this being the first faculty to be organised. The next faculty to be organised will be that of civil engineering. As regards the roads, a new one joining Kabul with Peshawar will be completed within the next two years. This

road has been carefully planned. A road leading to Russian frontiers has already been completed and is of obvious importance as it brings Central Asia nearer to Central Europe.

We had the honour of a long interview with His Majesty the King of Afghanistan whose sole desire is to see his country flourishing and living in peace and amity with its neighbours.

Thus Afghanistan represents to-day a united country where in every direction one sees signs of a new awakening and where the authorities are engaged in drawing up programmes of well-planned work. We have come back from that country with a conviction that if those who are in power are given an opportunity of continuing their work for ten years, the future prosperity of Afghanistan will have been assured.

XLVI

STATEMENT

explaining the attitude of Muslim Delegates to the Round Table Conferences, issued on the 6th December, 1933.

I have never had the pleasure of meeting Pandit Jawahar Lal, though I have always admired his sincerity and outspokenness. His latest statement in reply to his Mahasabhite critics has a ring of sincerity which is rare in the pronouncements of present day politicians in India. It seems, however, that he is not in full possession of the facts regarding the behaviour of Muslim delegates to the Round Table Conferences held in London during the past three years.

He has been led to believe that Mr. Gandhi offered personally to accept all of the Muslim demands on condition that Muslims assured him of their full support in the political struggle for freedom and that reactionaryism rather than communalism prevented Muslims from accepting this condition. This is a perfectly wrong statement of what happened in London.

Pandit Jawahar Lal has described His Highness the Agha Khan as the greatest inspirer of 'political reactionaryism' among Muslims. The truth, however, is that it was the Agha Khan himself who assured Mr. Gandhi in the presence of several Indian delegates, including myself, that if the Hindus or the

Congress agreed to Muslim demands, the entire Muslim community would be ready to serve as his (Mr. Gandhi's) camp-followers in the political struggle.

Mr. Gandhi weighed the Agha Khan's words and his offer to accept Muslim demands came later and was hedged round with conditions. The first condition was that Mr. Gandhi would accept the Muslim demands in his personal capacity and would try to secure, but not guarantee, the acceptance of his position by the Congress. I asked him to wire to the Congress Executive and secure its consent to his offer. He said he knew that the Congress would not make him their plenipotentiary on the question.

Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru can easily refer to Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, who sat near me at the time, as to her observations which she shared with me on Mr. Gandhi's attitude. Mr. Gandhi was then asked to secure at least the Hindu and Sikh delegates' consent to his offer. He did make something like an attempt to do so but failed and privately expressed his disappointment with their attitude.

Mr. Gandhi's second and most unrighteous condition was that Muslims should not support the special claims of Untouchables, particularly their claim to special representation. It was pointed out to him that it did not lie in the mouth of Muslims to oppose those very claims on the part of the Untouchables which they were advancing for themselves and that if Mr. Gandhi could arrive at a mutual understanding with the Untouchables the Muslims would certainly not stand in their way. Mr. Gandhi,

however, insisted on this condition. I should like to know how far Pandit Jawahar Lal with his well-known socialist views would sympathise with such an inhuman condition.

This is the inner history of the negotiations between Mr. Gandhi and Muslim delegates. I would leave it to Pandit Jawahar Lal to judge whether the alleged political reactionaryism among Muslim delegates or the narrow political outlook of others was responsible for the result of negotiations.

The offer which His Highness the Agha Khan made to Mr. Gandhi two years ago still holds good. If under Pandit Nehru's leadership the Hindus or the Congress agree to the safeguards which Muslims believe to be necessary for their protection as an all-India minority, the Muslims are still ready to serve, in the Agha Khan's words, as camp-followers of the majority community in the country's political struggle. If, however, he is unable to accept this offer let him at least not accuse Muslims of political reactionaryism but leave those who understand the motive and purposes of Hindu communalism to draw the conclusion that he is in essential agreement with the Mahasabha in the latter's campaign against the Communal Award.

Another accusation which Pandit Jawahar Lal brings against Muslims is that some of them are definitely 'anti-national'. If by 'nationalism' he means a fusion of the communities in a biological sense, I should personally plead guilty to the charge of anti-nationalism. The building up of a nation in this sense is in my opinion neither possible nor perhaps

desirable in the peculiar circumstances of India. In this sense perhaps the greatest antinational leader in India of to-day is Mr. Gandhi who has made it a life-mission to prevent the fusion of Untouchables with other communities and to retain them in the fold of Hinduism without any real fusion even between them and the caste Hindus. As far as I can judge it, his message to the Untouchables amounts to this: 'Do not leave Hinduism. Remain in it without being of it'.

A man who opposes nationalism in the sense of a fusion of the communities is, however, not necessarily anti-national. It is obvious that there are interests common to the various communities of India. In so far as these interests are concerned an understanding among the communities is possible: according to my belief, it is bound to come. The present situation is only a necessary stage in the country's political evolution. A united India will have to be built on the foundation of concrete facts, i.e. the distinct existence of more than one people in the country. The sooner Indian leaders of political thought get rid of the idea of a unitary Indian nation based on something like a biological fusion of the communities, the better for all concerned.

Pandit Jawahar Lal further seems to think that Muslims, while believing in democracy as a religious institution, are afraid of democracy in practice. He overlooks the fact that the communal electorates and other safeguards on which Muslims insist are only intended to prevent 80 million members of a comparatively poor and backward community from being ousted from all real advantages of democracy. The

Muslim wants safeguards not because he is afraid of communal oligarchy in the garb of democracy in India. He wants to ensure the substance of democracy even at the expense of its conventional form.

As for his reference to the speeches made by His Highness the Agha Khan, Dr. Shafaat Ahmed and myself before a gathering of members of the House of Commons, I have only to say that the kind of statements attributed to us were never made. It is unfair to cite the impressions of a Press correspondent instead of an authorised text of our speeches in such an argument. No Indian can believe for a moment that it is impossible to govern India except through a British agency.

In conclusion I must put a straight question to Pandit Jawahar Lal. How is India's problem to be solved if the majority community will neither concede the minimum safeguards necessary for the protection of a minority of 80 million people nor accept the award of a third party; but continue to talk of a kind of nationalism which works out only to its own benefit? This position can admit of only two alternatives. Either the Indian majority community will have to accept for itself the permanent position of an agent of British imperialism in the East or the country will have to be redistributed on a basis of religious, historical and cultural affinities so as to do away with the question of electorates and the communal problem in its present form.

XLVII

STATEMENT

explaining the Congress attitude towards the Communal Award, issued on the 19th June, 1934.

The Congress claims to represent equally all the communities of India and declares that, in view of the sharp difference of opinion in India regarding the Communal Award, it can neither accept nor reject it; yet its comments on the Award amount to a rejection by implication. Consistently with its claim it ought not to have expressed any opinion about the Award. The Congress Working Committee has deliberately chosen to ignore the important fact that the Award, though it has been incorporated in the White Paper, does not stand or fall with it, but stands on an entirely different footing. While the other parts of the White Paper are proposals, the Award represents a decision given by the British Premier at the request of the very men who are now opposing it.

The Congress Working Committee has tried by this resolution to hide its inner communalism, but in the very act of doing so has unveiled its designs to such an extent that no Muslim will fail to see through the game. At this critical juncture I would advise the Muslims of India to stand boldly by the Communal Award even though it does not concede all their demands. This is the only course they can adopt as a practical people.

XLVIII

STATEMENT*

on the Report recommending partition of Palestine.

I assure the people that I feel the injustice done to the Arabs as keenly as anybody else who understands the situation in the Near East. I have no doubt that the British people can still be awakened to the fulfilment of the pledges given to the Arabs in the name of England. The British Parliament, I am glad to say, have in the recent Parliamentary debates left the question of partition open. This decision affords an excellent opportunity to the Muslims of the world emphatically to declare that the problem which the British statesmen are tackling is not one of Palestine only, but seriously affects the entire Muslim world.

The problem, studied in its historical perspective, is purely a Muslim problem. In the light of the history of Israel, Palestine ceased to be a Jewish problem long before the entry of Caliph Umar into Jerusalem more than 1300 years ago. Their dispersion, as Professor Hockings has pointed out, was perfectly voluntary and their scriptures were for the most part written outside Palestine. Nor was it ever a Christian problem. Modern historical research has doubted even the existence of Peter the Hermit.

*This statement was read at a public meeting held under the auspices of the Punjab Muslim League on 27th July, 1937. *Ed.*

Even if we assume that the Crusades were an attempt to make Palestine a Christian problem, this attempt was defeated by the victories of Salah-ud-Din. I, therefore, regard Palestine as a purely Muslim problem.

Never were the motives of British imperialism as regards the Muslim people of the Near East so completely unmasked as in the Report of the Royal Commission. The idea of a national home for the Jews in Palestine was only a device. In fact, British imperialism sought a home for itself in the form of a permanent mandate in the religious home of the Muslims. This is indeed a dangerous experiment, as a member of British Parliament has rightly described it and can never lead to a solution of the British problem in the Mediterranean. Far from being a solution of the British problem in the Mediterranean it is really the beginning of the future difficulties of British imperialism. The sale of the Holy Land, including the Mosque of Umar, inflicted on the Arabs with the threat of martial law and softened by an appeal to their generosity, reveals bankruptcy of statesmanship rather than its achievement. The offer of a piece of rich land to the Jews and the rocky desert plus cash to the Arabs is no political wisdom. It is a low transaction unworthy and damaging to the honour of a great people in whose name definite promises of liberty and confederation were given to the Arabs.

It is impossible for me to discuss the details of the Palestine Report in this short statement. There are, however, in recent history, important lessons

which Muslims of Asia ought to take to heart. Experience has made it abundantly clear that the political integrity of the peoples of the Near East lies in the immediate reunion of the Turks and the Arabs. The policy of isolating the Turks from the rest of the Muslim world is still in action. We hear now and then that the Turks are repudiating Islam. A greater lie was never told. Only those who have no idea of the history of the concepts of Islamic jurisprudence fall an easy prey to this sort of mischievous propaganda.

The Arabs, whose religious consciousness gave birth to Islam (which united the various races of Asia with remarkable success), must never forget the consequences arising out of their deserting the Turks in their hour of trial.

Secondly, the Arab people must further remember that they cannot afford to rely on the advice of those Arab kings who are not in a position to arrive at an independent judgment in the matter of Palestine with an independent conscience. Whatever they decide they should decide on their own initiative after a full understanding of the problem before them.

Thirdly, the present moment is also a moment of trial for the Muslim statesmen of the free non-Arab Muslim countries of Asia. Since the abolition of the Caliphate this is the first serious international problem of both a religious and political nature, which historical forces are compelling them to face. The possibilities of the Palestine problem may eventually compel them seriously to consider their posi-

tion as members of that Anglo-French institution miscalled the League of Nations and to explore practical means for the formation of an Eastern League of Nations.

XLIX

NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE

Broadcast from the Lahore Station of the All-India Radio on the 1st January, 1938.

The modern age prides itself on its progress in knowledge and its matchless scientific developments. No doubt, the pride is justified. Today space and time are being annihilated and man is achieving amazing successes in unveiling the secrets of nature and harnessing its forces to his own service. But in spite of all these developments, the tyranny of imperialism struts abroad, covering its face under the masks of Democracy, Nationalism, Communism, Fascism and heaven knows what else besides. Under these masks, in every corner of the earth, the spirit of freedom and the dignity of man are being trampled underfoot in a way to which not even the darkest period of human history presents a parallel. The so-called statesmen to whom government and leadership of men was entrusted have proved demons of bloodshed, tyranny and oppression. The rulers whose duty it was to protect and cherish those ideals which go to form a higher humanity, to prevent man's oppression of man and to elevate the moral and intellectual level of mankind, have in their hunger for dominion and imperial possessions, shed the blood of millions and reduced millions to servitude simply in order to pander to the greed and avarice of their own particular groups. After subjugating

and establishing their dominion over weaker peoples, they have robbed them of their possessions, of their religions, their morals, of their cultural traditions and their literatures. Then they sowed divisions among them that they should shed one another's blood and go to sleep under the opiate of serfdom, so that the leech of imperialism might go on sucking their blood without interruption.

As I look back on the year that has passed and as I look at the world in the midst of the New Year's rejoicings, it may be Abyssinia or Palestine, Spain or China, the same misery prevails in every corner of man's earthly home, and hundreds of thousands of men are being butchered mercilessly. Engines of destruction created by science are wiping out the great landmarks of man's cultural achievements. The governments which are not themselves engaged in this drama of fire and blood are sucking the blood of the weaker peoples economically. It is as if the day of doom had come upon the earth, in which each looks after the safety of his own skin, and in which no voice of human sympathy or fellowship is audible.

The world's thinkers are stricken dumb. Is this going to be the end of all the progress and evolution of civilization, they ask, that men should destroy one another in mutual hatred and make human habitation impossible on this earth? Remember, man can be maintained on this earth only by honouring mankind, and this world will remain a battle-ground of ferocious beasts of prey unless and until the educational forces of the whole world are directed to incul-

cating in man respect for mankind. Do you not see that the people of Spain, though they have the same common bond of one race, one nationality, one language and one religion, are cutting one another's throats and destroying their culture and civilization by their own hands owing to a difference in their economic creed? This one event shows clearly that national unity too is not a very durable force. Only one unity is dependable, and that unity is the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality, colour or language. So long as this so-called democracy, this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialise.

Let us therefore begin the New Year with the prayer that God Almighty may grant humanity to those who are in places of power and government and teach them to cherish mankind.

APPENDIX I

The Muslim Community.[1]

I wish to consider a few preliminary points, the consideration of which, to my mind, is essential to arriving at any definite conclusion concerning the Muslim Community. These points are:

(1) the general structure of the Muslim community;

(2) the uniformity of the Muslim culture;

(3) the type of character essential to a continuous national life of the Muslim community.

I shall take these points in order.

(I) The essential difference between the Muslim community and other communities of the world consists in our peculiar conception of nationality.

It is not the unity of language or country or the

1. These notes are an extract from a lecture by Iqbal on 'The Muslim Community' as printed in the Report on the Census of India, 1911, Vol. XIV, pp. 162-164. Unfortunately the Report fails to mention where the lecture was delivered. In spite of all efforts it was not possible to procure a complete report of the lecture. Hence the extract is reproduced as given in the Census Report.

The ideas expressed in the lecture are :of great significance and evidently formed the basis of Iqbal's demand, later on, for a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Hence the lecture provides an interesting background to the development of Iqbal's political ideas.

In the Census Report Iqbal's lecture is prefaced by the following remarks:

"The basic principles of Islam are contained in the anhorism (*Kalimah*) *La Ilaha-il-Allah-o-Mohammad-ur-Rasul Allah* (There is none but God and Mohammad is His Prophet). The remarks on this great religion contained in paragraphs 651 and 654 to 686 of the Census of India Report of 1901, leave little to be added, but a few quotations from the writings of a philosophically inclined Indian Mohammadan gentleman will throw some light on the view of Islamic tenets taken by cultured minds of the present day." *Ed.*

identity of economic interest that constitutes the basic principles of one nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the Universe, and participate in the same historical tradition that we are members of the society founded by the Prophet of Islam. Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life principle on the character and genius of a particular people. In its essence, it is non-temporal, non-spatial. In the case of no community the words of Auguste Comte are so completely true as in the case of our own. "Since religion," says he, "embraces all our existence, its history must be an epitome of the whole of our development." It may, however, be asked that if mere belief in certain propositions of a metaphysical import is the only thing, that ultimately determines the structure of the Muslim Community is it not an extremely unsafe basis especially before the advance of modern knowledge, with its habits of Rationalism and Criticism? This is what the French Orientalist Renan thought; he entertained a veiled hope that Islam would one day "lose the high intellectual and moral direction of an important part of the Universe." Nations, the basic principle of whose collective life is territorial, need not be afraid of Rationalism; to us it is a dangerous foe, since it aims at the very principle which gives us a communal life, and alone makes our collective existence intelligible. Rationalism is essentially analysis and consequently threatens to disintegrate the communal syn-

thesis achieved by the force of a religious idea. It is undoubtedly true that we can meet Rationalism on its own ground. But the point which I wish to impress on you is that the dogma i.e., the point of universal agreement on which our communal solidarity depends, has essentially a national rather than intellectual significance for us. To try to cover religion into a system of speculative knowledge, is, in my opinion, absolutely useless, and even absurd, since the object of religion is not thinking about life, its main purpose is to build up a coherent social whole for the gradual elevation of life. Religion is itself a metaphysic, in so far as it calls up into being a new universe with a view to suggest a new type of character tending to universalise itself, in proportion to the force of personality in which it originally embodies itself. The point that I have tried to bring out in the above remarks is that Islam has a far deeper significance for us than merely religion; it has a peculiar national meaning so that our communal life is unthinkable without a firm grasp of the Islamic principle. The idea of Islam is, so to speak, our eternal home or country in which we live, move, and have our being. To us it is above every thing else as England is above all to the Englishman and "Deutschland Uber Alles" to the German.

(II) Coming now to the second point, the uniformity of Muslim culture: the unity of religious belief on which our communal life depends, is supplemented by the uniformity of Muslim culture. Mere belief in the Islamic principle, though exceedingly important, is not sufficient. In order to participate

in the life of communal self, the individual mind must undergo a complete transformation. Just as the Muslim community does not recognise any ethnological differences, and aims at the subsumption of all races under the universal idea of humanity, so our culture is relatively universal, and is not indebted for its life and growth to the genius of one particular people. Our Muslim civilization is a product of cross-fertilization of the Semitic and the Aryan ideas. It inherits the softness and refinement of its Aryan mother and the stirling character of its Semitic father. The conquest of Persia gave to the Musalmans what the conquest of Greece gave to the Romans. But for Persian our culture would have been absolutely one-sided. In order to become a living member of the Muslim community, the individual, besides an unconditional belief in the religious principle, must thoroughly assimilate the culture of Islam. The object of the assimilation is to create a uniform mental outlook, a peculiar way of looking at the world, a certain definite standpoint from where to judge the value of things which sharply defines our community and transforms it into a corporate individual giving it a definite purpose and ideal of its own.

(III) The modern sociology teaches us that the moral experience of nations obeys certain definite law. In primitive society where the struggle of existence is extremely keen and draws more upon man's physical rather than intellectual qualities, it is the valiant man who becomes an object of universal admiration and imitation; when, however, the strug-

gle relaxes and the peril is over, the valorous type is displaced, though not altogether, by what Giddings calls the convivial type, which takes a due share in all the pleasures of life and combines in itself the virtues of liberality, generosity and good fellowship. But these two types of character have a tendency to become reckless, and by way of reaction against them appears the third great type which holds up the ideal of self-control, and is dominated by a more serious view of life. In so far as the evolution of the Muslim Society in India is concerned Timur represented the first type, Babar combined the first and the second, Jehangir embodied preeminently the second; while the third preshadowed in Alamgir, whose life and activity forms, in my opinion, the starting point in the growth of Muslim nationality in India. To me the ideal of character foreshadowed by Alamgir is essentially the Muslim type of character, and it must be the object of all our education to develop that type. If it is our aim to secure a continuous life of the community we must produce a type of character, which at all costs holds fast to its own; and while it readily assimilates all that is good in other types, it carefully excludes from its life all that is hostile to its cherished traditions and institutions. A careful observation of the Muslim community in India reveals the point on which the various lines of the moral experience of the community are now tending to converge.

In the pre-going discussion I have tried to establish these propositions:

(1) That the religious idea constitutes the life

principle of the Muslim community. In order to maintain the health and vigour of such a community the development of all dissenting forces in it must be carefully watched, and a rapid influx of foreign elements must be checked or permitted to enter into the social fibre very slowly, so that it may not bring on a collapse, by making too great a demand on the assimilative power of the social organism.

(2) That the mental outfit of the individual belonging to the Muslim community must be mainly formed out of the material which the intellectual energy of his forefather has produced, so that he may be made to feel the continuity of the present with the past and the future.

(3) That he must possess a particular type of character which I have described as the Muslim type.